

China, 1969–1972

China, 1969

1. Memorandum From Richard L. Sneider of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 25, 1969.

SUBJECT

Republic of China (GRC) Armed Forces Reorganization and Reduction
Recommendation for Clearance of Telegram

Background

For some time, there has been concern that the GRC armed forces are larger than necessary for the defense of Taiwan and are imposing an increasing burden on its economic development given declining U.S. military assistance and the cessation three years ago of grant economic assistance. Additionally, the GRC has been pressing for U.S. provision of sophisticated military equipment, particularly F-4s.² Last August, our message finally got across and the GRC suggested that we begin consultations on force reduction and reorganization plans providing for modernization of key elements of the GRC forces.³ The GRC suggested that we propose a three-year reorganization plan.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 518, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action.

² Since mid-1968, President Chiang, Minister of Defense Chiang Ching-kuo, and other Republic of China officials had urged the United States to provide a squadron of F-4 fighter aircraft to the CAF. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXX, Documents 319, 322, 325, 327, and 329. On December 28, 1968, McConaughy met with President Chiang to discuss military equipment for the ROC. Chiang stated that if the United States could not transfer the planes to the CAF, the U.S. Air Force should station a squadron of its own F-4Cs on the island. (Telegram 13 from Taipei, January 4, 1969; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL CHINAT–US) In telegram 171 from Taipei, January 18, McConaughy reported: “although the President [Chiang] remains most anxious for the transfer of F4C squadron to GRC, I believe he recognizes that this is unlikely in the foreseeable future.” (Ibid.)

³ As reported in telegram 3963 from Taipei, August 2, 1968, *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXX, Document 322, footnote 2.

Proposed Action

Attached for your clearance is the proposed State/Defense response.⁴ It is the result of months of careful study and consideration, including coordination with CINCPAC. It proposes that instead of providing the GRC with a finished plan, a joint U.S.–GRC Consultative Committee be set up to assist the GRC in developing its own plan taking fully into account limitations of projected U.S.–GRC resources. This approach would force the GRC to undertake systematic analysis of resource availability.

Except for a conditional commitment on helicopters (a major item on the GRC acquisition list) the message makes no firm commitment with respect to future U.S. assistance. There is, however, clear implication that grant military assistance on a decreasing scale and some military credit sales would be continued assuming agreement on the force reduction/modernization program. Guidelines are provided for the U.S. representatives on the joint Consultative Committee, calling for

- (1) a break [*brake?*] on rising GRC defense spending;
- (2) a GRC force capable of defending Taiwan and the Penghus taking into account GRC unilateral commitments with respect to the Offshore Islands; and,
- (3) within this framework a reduction and modernization of the GRC forces.

The most sensitive aspect of the proposal is that it defines the role of the GRC forces as defense of Taiwan and the Penghus and by inference unilaterally the Offshore Islands. Without specifically saying so this eliminates offensive capabilities (return to the Mainland) from GRC military planning. The U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan and the Penghus is reiterated so that this is taken into account in the force reorganization discussions. However, Embassy Taipei is specifically instructed not to volunteer any statements on the U.S. response in the event the Offshore Islands are attacked, but if the GRC raises this question, to refer them to the 1955 Joint Congressional Resolution.⁵ This Resolution authorizes the President to employ U.S. forces in the event of an armed attack against the Offshore Islands if he judges that it would be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus.

⁴ Attached but not printed. It was sent as telegram 19013 to Taipei, February 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 6 CHINAT–US) The telegram called for the establishment of a “USG–GRC Joint Consultative Committee” to assist with the force reorganization/reduction plan.

⁵ House Joint Resolution 159 (84th Congress, 1st session) was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 25, 1955, and by the Senate as Senate Joint Resolution 28 on January 28. *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. II, Document 56 contains the full text of the resolution and related background information.

Recommendation

I would recommend approval of the proposed telegram. It represents a very thorough consideration of a most knotty and sensitive issue. It is consistent with our commitments to the GRC and with our efforts to reduce military assistance to it and to persuade the GRC to undertake a more rational consideration of resource allocation between defense spending and economic development. The principal alternatives are (a) to continue in the present mold dealing with haphazard and other ill-considered requests for modern equipment and a continued spiraling up of GRC defense expenditures; or (b) to cut off grant military assistance or threaten to do so with the object of forcing economies on the GRC but with the attendant risk that this could provoke a crisis of confidence regarding all U.S. commitments to the GRC. We could also give the GRC our own reorganization plan but it would be much preferable to guide them to think through their own problems.

RS

2. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, January 26, 1969, 1055Z.

245. Subject: Possible Italian and Canadian Recognition of ChiComs: Conversation with President Chiang. Reference: Taipei 00243.²

1. I saw President Chiang privately for one hour at my request on January 25 to discuss prospective Italian and Canadian recognition of Chinese Communists.³ This meeting followed immediately after

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 16 CHICOM. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Brussels, Hong Kong, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, and USUN.

² Telegram 243 from Taipei, January 24, reported McConaughy's views on the possible ROC reaction to Italian and Canadian moves toward recognition of the PRC. He urged that "renewed efforts be made to determine lengths (if any) to which Italy and Canada prepared to go to resist Chicom pressure to force a complete break with Taipei." (Ibid.)

³ In addition to Italy and Canada, other Western European nations informed the United States of their intentions of holding talks with the PRC with the ultimate goal of establishing diplomatic relations. Analysis of the potential for diplomatic initiatives from Italy, Canada, Belgium, and West Germany are in Intelligence Note 6, January 6, and INR Research Memoranda REU 3.1 through 3.4, January 24-29 (ibid.) and *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. XXX, Document 314.

Congressman Buchanan and I were entertained at tea by the President.⁴ I told him I was in close touch with Foreign Office on all phases of situation but implications of the impending diplomatic moves in Rome and Ottawa were so serious that I felt direct consultation with him was desirable. Generalissimo said matter was a major preoccupation with him and he had planned to ask me to call if I had not taken the initiative.

2. I set forth as persuasively as I could the case for GRC to stand fast in Rome and Ottawa through any period of GOI or GOC exploratory negotiations with Peking. I pointed out seriously prejudicial repercussions which could be anticipated if ChiComs won recognition and diplomatic foothold in these capitals; mentioned the fanatical unwillingness of Peking to even consider establishment of diplomatic relations anywhere if GRC representation remained on scene; pointed out how Peking rigidity on this issue could be exploited by GRC refusing to budge during period of unilateral announcement of recognition or statement of intent to negotiate for establishment of relations. I said GRC could perhaps play a spoiling role in efforts of these two Western nations to establish relations with Chinese Communists, provided GRC was willing to “sweat out” a period of some awkwardness and mild embarrassment, in the interests of any important objective. It was just possible that GRC could at least delay the consummation of any agreement to establish diplomatic relations.⁵ A delaying action could buy time for both our governments to consider the problem more thoroughly and to conduct any conversations with Rome or Ottawa which might be called for. I said we of course appreciated that GRC could not accept unbearable affronts to its national prestige and the self-respect of its representatives, but we felt that such a situation might not develop, at least during the time needed for taking stock. I noted there was a distinction between a mere statement of recognition by one side, and actual bilateral establishment of diplomatic relations and exchange of representatives. I urged him to make the latter step rather than the former the touchstone for his decision on whether to break relations.

⁴ Reference is to Congressman John Hall Buchanan, Jr. (D–Alabama).

⁵ Bundy suggested the same strategy to ROC Ambassador Chow Shu-kai. (Telegram 11528 to Taipei, January 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 16 CHICOM) In telegram 20761 to Taipei, February 8, the Department reported that Chow Shu-kai had met with Rogers on February 7 to urge the United States to prevent the Canadian Government from making any public announcement of talks with the PRC. Otherwise, Chow offered, the ROC “might first lodge protest,” and then take other unspecified actions. Rogers suggested that if the ROC must respond: “it would be best to limit response to expressions of regret, avoiding any threats or setting conditions on future of its relations with Canada.” (Ibid.) No other record of the conversation has been found. Further documentation on Canadian recognition of the PRC is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XLI.

3. Generalissimo said matter had been thoroughly considered in high councils of his government, and all factors carefully weighed. It was considered judgment of entire group that GRC could not afford to undergo the humiliation of staying on after recognition extended to Chinese Communists. He did say that he would not take the initiative to break relations on basis of mere preliminary, unofficial or equivocal statements of intent, but once a formal, unqualified statement of recognition was issued, he was convinced that his government had no choice but to terminate relations and withdraw its representatives immediately.

4. Generalissimo reviewed history of unpleasant event leading up to French recognition of Chinese Communists and severance of relations with GRC in early 1964.⁶ He recalled that GRC had stuck it out in Paris for several painful weeks at behest of USG. During this period GRC representative in Paris had suffered well nigh unendurable slights and insults which were hurtful to national pride and it had all been for nothing since DeGaulle easily put the GRC in a completely impossible situation. He felt that any country which formally and publicly accorded recognition to ChiComs had already crossed the bridge, and nothing that GRC could do at that stage would alter the situation. Host government could always make situation of unwanted Embassy staff completely untenable without directly ordering them to leave. So he could not accept my advice beyond what he had said about holding on until recognition announcement was official and clear.

5. Generalissimo said he had held on so long in French case because France was still a great power, a permanent member of Security Council, a wielder of great influence in many African countries important to GRC and because Gaullist group had long record of close and sometimes beneficial relationships with GRC going back to Chungking days in World War II. Also Generalissimo believed at the time that DeGaulle was still essentially anti-ChiCom. He recalled DeGaulle had written him that his only reason for recognizing ChiComs was to take an action contrary to US policy.

6. Generalissimo said that none of the reasons which had prompted him to stage holding action in Paris applied in the case of Italy. He felt there would be no reason for trying to hold out for a single day after the leftist government now in power in Italy recognized Peking.

7. Generalissimo recognized that Canadian Government did not have any leftist coloration, and he thought Ottawa situation not analogous to that in Rome. He seemed perhaps too relaxed about Canadian situation, apparently assuming that any Canadian move toward Peking would only come by slow stages and that Canadians would

⁶ See *ibid.*, 1964–1968, vol. XXX, Document 11.

show more consideration than Italians for position of GRC. I told him that we feared adverse action might be taken by Canadian Cabinet as early as next week.

8. Generalissimo reiterated that countries seeking to establish relations with ChiComs “would only despise” his government if he sought to continue relations when he knew GRC was not wanted. He said his government and his people could not again stand the sort of insults that had been taken from the French. He expressed the hope that the prompt and decisive action which his government will take by withdrawing at once from any capital which recognizes the Chinese Communists will have a deterrent effect on other governments which might be considering the same action. It would show such governments that they will have to choose between his government and the Chinese Communists, and cannot have it both ways.

9. President Chiang said he felt that current restiveness of various countries as to China policy was related to events in the US. He thought that some countries which were inclined to move toward recognition of ChiComs had decided that current US period of transition and settling in process would be an opportune time for a quick move. We thought these wavering countries were also influenced by their misinterpretation of USG’s own ambassadorial level diplomatic contacts with ChiComs at Warsaw, and by a misreading of context of President Nixon’s praiseworthy references to peace, conciliation and negotiation in his inaugural address.

10. President Chiang said that while his government was doing, and would continue to do, all it could to protect its diplomatic position, he felt that USG held the real key to the problem. He thought that only the US, by making its firm opposition emphatically known, could prevent damaging “snowball effect” after the Italian action.⁷

McConaughy

⁷ In a January 24 meeting with Italian Ambassador Egidio Ortona, Bundy discussed Italy’s possible recognition of the PRC. Bundy informed Ortona that U.S. concerns were threefold: a) the effect on existing Italian relations with the Nationalist Chinese; b) the effect on non-Communist countries of East Asia; and c) the “particular” effect Italian actions would have upon the PRC’s influence on the Paris Peace Talks. Bundy suggested that Italian actions might well encourage hardliners in Peking and their “friends or sympathizers” in Hanoi. He concluded: “While we are not urging that Italians refrain from this action, we hope that they will weigh its implications very seriously and inform us fully as possible concerning their intentions with respect to Taipei, timing, and other aspects of actually carrying it out.” (Telegram 12510 to Rome, January 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 16 CHICOM) According to notes of a January 27 telephone conversation between Bundy and U. Alexis Johnson, Bundy stated: “We would go so far as to express concern to Italians.” Both men “agreed that we should take it easy.” (Ibid., U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Telcons, January–March 1969) General instructions on the U.S. response to diplomatic recognition of the PRC are in telegram 19933, February 7; *ibid.*, Central Files 1967–69, POL 16 CHICOM.

3. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 1, 1969.

I noted in your January 31 report the interesting comments from a Polish source.² I think we should give every encouragement to the attitude that this Administration is “exploring possibilities of rapprochement [*sic*] with the Chinese.” This, of course, should be done privately and should under no circumstances get into the public prints from this direction. However, in contacts with your friends, and particularly in any ways you might have to get to this Polish source, I would continue to plant that idea.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 341, Subject Files, HAK/President Memoranda, 1969–1970. No classification marking. A typed note, attached but not printed, reads: “Copy sent red tag to Dick Sneider on 4 Feb 69 by Col Haig.” The memorandum was not initialed or signed.

² Apparent reference to the President’s January 31 daily briefing memorandum, in which Kissinger informed Nixon of a CIA report on a “Polish source.” This source claimed that his government believed the “Americans ‘know the Chinese are now more anti-Soviet than anti-American’ and are exploring the possibilities of rapprochement with the Chinese.” (Ibid., Box 1, President’s Daily Briefs) The Daily Briefs file contains materials from the Department of State and CIA. These reports were summarized by the NSC staff into a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, which often included the original submissions from CIA or State, along with important telegrams or intelligence reports as attachments. For more information on intelligence and other documents provided to Nixon, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume II. Haig’s review of “Handling Information for President Nixon” is in his January 17 memorandum to Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1319, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 1 of 19)

³ Nixon’s handwritten notes from meetings held January 20–21 covered a wide range of domestic and international issues, including China. He wrote in part: “Chinese Communists: Short range—no change. Long range—we do not want 800,000,000 living in angry isolation. We want contact—will be interested in Warsaw meetings. Republic of China—cooperative member of international community and member of Pacific community.” (Ibid., White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 1, President’s Handwriting File, January 1969) Nixon had hinted of his interest in better relations with the mainland government prior to becoming President. For example, see his 1967 article, “Asia after Vietnam,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 1, October 1967, pp. 111–125, and “Nixon’s View of the World—From Informal Talks,” *U.S. News and World Report*, September 16, 1968, p. 48. In his memoirs, Nixon points to his April 1967 trip to Europe, East Asia, and Southeast Asia as the time when his views on a new policy toward China began to coalesce. See Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, vol. I (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 280–285.

4. National Security Study Memorandum 14¹

Washington, February 5, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director for Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. China Policy

The President has directed that a study be prepared on U.S. Policy Towards China, on U.S. objectives and interests involved and the broad lines of appropriate U.S. policies. The study should incorporate alternative views and interpretations of the issues involved. It should include summary statements of the conceptions and policy lines of the previous administration.

The Study should include the following:

1. The current status of U.S. relations with Communist China and the Republic of China;
2. The nature of the Chinese Communist threat and intentions in Asia;
3. The interaction between U.S. policy and the policies of other major interested countries toward China;
4. Alternative U.S. approaches on China and their costs and risks.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia perform this study.²

The paper should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by March 10.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-134, NSSM Files, NSSM 14. Secret.

² Winthrop G. Brown, Acting Chairman of the East Asia and Pacific Interdepartmental Group, oversaw the completion of this study, the first draft of which was submitted to the NSC Senior Review Group on April 29 and discussed in a May 15 meeting. See Document 13. A summary of the CIA response to NSSM 14 is printed as Document 12.

5. Memorandum From Richard L. Sneider of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 6, 1969.

SUBJECT

Rapprochement with the Chinese

In a memorandum to you, the President suggested that we encourage the attitude that his Administration is "exploring possibilities of a rapprochement with the Chinese," but to do this privately without it getting into print.² I have several suggestions on ways and means and one concern.

My concern is the danger of a leak in this town, even of messages passed through diplomatic channels. I think the message, which is much worthwhile, can be gotten across in other ways:

(1) By failing to calm down the Soviets and other Eastern Europeans when they express concerns about a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement. The Russians have been particularly active in expressing their concerns about what might happen at Warsaw and would probably get the point if we just refused to reassure them.

(2) By passing the message back to the Polish source³ [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

(3) By the posture we take at Warsaw where the Russians and the Poles will fully record our statements.

RS

P.S. Hal Sonnenfeldt and I feel, however, that before we start out on this tactical line, the basic policy implications should be studied. This will be done in the context of the NSSM on East-West relations as well as the subsequent NSSM on China policy.⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 518, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. I. Secret. Kissinger's handwritten comment at the top of this memorandum reads: "Where is memo?"

² Document 3.

³ See footnote 2, Document 3.

⁴ Reference is to National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 10, East-West Relations, January 28, 1969. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 10) NSSM 14, U.S. China Policy, is printed as Document 4.

6. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon**¹

Washington, February 12, 1969.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward Peking and Instructions for the February 20 Warsaw Meeting

The Secretary of State has sent you a recommended position and proposed instructions for the February 20 Warsaw meeting with the Chinese Communists.² I have edited these instructions slightly to remove polemics and in one case to eliminate an implication that we might be prepared to remove our presence from Formosa. The instructions cover a number of continuing problems with Peking, such as the question of Americans held prisoner by the Communists and our desire for an understanding with Peking on assistance and return of astronauts. They also cover a broad range of contingencies that might arise during the Warsaw talks.

The principal issue facing us is the basic posture we should adopt at Warsaw. The attached memorandum (Tab A) discusses the four broad options open to us. As edited, the State Department instructions (Tab B) fall basically within the third option, namely to indicate our willingness to enter into serious negotiations with Peking, make proposals on scientific exchanges, and invite specific proposals from the Chinese.³

Right now, the third option has several advantages: (1) it would cause less concern to the Republic of China, presently very sensitive because Canada and Italy are moving to recognition of Peking; (2) it

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland, Vol. I Warsaw Talks up to 1/31/70. Top Secret; Exdis. This memorandum and the options described in Tab A were taken from a February 11 memorandum from Sneider to Kissinger. (Ibid.) In September and November of 1968, the United States proposed renewing ambassadorial talks between the United States and the PRC that had commenced in Geneva in 1955 and moved to Warsaw in 1957. Talks had been suspended since the 134th meeting on January 8, 1968, and U.S. attempts to restart talks during the spring of 1968 had failed. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXX, Documents 311, 331, and 332.

² Rogers forwarded the draft instructions for the February 20 meeting under cover of an undated memorandum and a cable written by Kreisberg and Platt (EA/ACA) on February 3. The instructions had been cleared by Bundy, Brown, and Barnett (EA). Rogers' covering memorandum and its attachments are also attached but not printed. The Department of State copies of these documents are in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1967–69, POL CHICOM–US.

³ See footnote 2 above.

would reduce the risk that other countries might misinterpret any initiative on our part as marking a fundamental change in China policy in response to, or in connection with, Canadian recognition of Peking; and (3) it avoids prejudging U.S. China policy before the National Security Council undertakes its full dress review in late March.

Recommendation

That you approve the instructions at Tab B.

Approve⁴

Disapprove

Amended

Tab A⁵

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, February 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Warsaw Talks

Background

On November 15, the U.S. proposed deferring the next Warsaw meeting until next February after being unable to obtain any answer from the Chinese Communists on their intentions with respect to the scheduled November 20 meeting. The Chinese responded on November 25, much more promptly than usual, with a letter and subsequent press release proposing the talks for February 20. In contrast to communications over recent years, the Chinese reply was less abusive and revived an old Chinese proposal for a joint declaration of adherence to the Bandung Conference five principles of "peaceful co-existence." This proposal was loosely linked to the usual Chinese Communist demand for U.S. military withdrawal from Taiwan. There have been other

⁴ President Nixon initialed this option. On February 13 Richard Moose sent a memorandum to the Department of State Executive Secretariat detailing several slight changes to the draft cable. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHICOM-US) The instructions were sent on February 15 to Warsaw as telegram 24916. (Ibid.)

⁵ Secret.

indications of a Chinese interest in returning to a “softer foreign policy” emphasizing state relations rather than being revolution-oriented. While there is no evidence Peking is seeking a *détente* with us, it is clear that Peking wishes to resume some form of dialogue with us at Warsaw.

Speculation as to possible Chinese Communist motivations focusses on five possibilities:

(a) Internal difficulties, which continue, may increase the desire for an easing of external relations;

(b) The continuing Paris peace talks coupled with the declining military fortunes of the North Vietnamese;

(c) As a reaction to increased Sino-Soviet tensions;

(d) As an effort to explore the views of the new Administration of President Nixon;

(e) As an effort to probe for softness in U.S. positions, particularly in our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan.

An additional factor to take into account is that there may be divided counsel in Peking on relations with the United States—although there is no evidence of a fundamental shift of attitude towards the U.S. in the Warsaw talks proposals or in subsequent propaganda. At a minimum, we have a retreat from extremist positions taken during the height of the Great Cultural Revolution.

As a first step to test Chinese Communist intentions, we have proposed that the locus of the talks be shifted from a building provided by the Poles to either the U.S. or Chinese Embassy where Soviet/Polish eavesdropping will not be possible. Any serious talks with the Chinese are foreclosed by the present building. The Chinese have rejected this proposal but left the door open for discussion of it at the February 20 Warsaw meeting. In addition, we have been informed that the Chinese Communists will be represented by their Chargé in Poland, in the continued absence of Ambassador Wang. (Almost all Chinese Ambassadors were called back to Peking many months ago for “re-education” during the height of the cultural revolution. They have not been returned.)

U.S. China Policy

In the past, the debate on China policy has focussed on the questions of recognition and UN representation, and U.S. tactics were built around proposals to expand contacts with the mainland. The debate on recognition and UN representation is essentially, in my view, a fruitless exercise given the opposition of both Chinas to any two-China policy—although we will constantly be faced with the problems in preventing an erosion of the Republic of China position. Similarly, efforts to expand contacts with the mainland have brought no response although they have the value of signalling our interest in a broader re-

lationship with Peking. We have one more major play to make in this string—the offer to resume non-strategic trade with the mainland.

The Warsaw talks offer an opportunity to shift the focus of our policy: to seeking a *modus vivendi* with the Communist Chinese which provides greater stability for East Asia, (a) without abandoning our commitment to Taiwan or undermining its position, or (b) damaging the interests of our Asian allies, principally Japan. More specifically, our policy would be directed towards seeking specific, self-enforceable arrangements with Peking which give some substance, and not lip service, to “peaceful co-existence.”

Alternative U.S. Positions at Warsaw

At Warsaw, four broad options are open to us.

Option 1

At the one extreme, we could indicate that we are prepared to negotiate a normalization of relations with Peking based on an agreement for peaceful relations between the U.S. and Communist China and non-interference in the affairs of other countries. The proposal might be sweetened by an offer to resume non-strategic trade. The Chinese Communists would, however, be informed that our proposal is without prejudice to our relations with and commitment to the Republic of China. This approach, explicitly emphasizing normalization, would represent a basic change in U.S. policy—although we have been implicitly moving in this direction.

Advantages

(1) A normalization of relations on this basis, accepted by Peking, would accomplish a shift in relations with the U.S. from an ideological confrontation to state relations and a shift in Peking’s policy away from political warfare directed against other Asian and less developed nations.

(2) The proposal, even if not accepted, would encourage elements within the Peking leadership who may be arguing that the U.S. is not a hostile force and that serious efforts should therefore be made to reach an understanding with it.

Disadvantages

(1) If not preceded by a probing of the mainland position, the Chinese Communists might interpret the proposal as “softness” on our part.

(2) The proposal, even if not accepted, could cause a crisis of confidence in Taiwan and seriously upset the Japanese Government which is trying to hold the line against both conservative and left-wing pressures for a more conciliatory policy towards Peking.

(3) The proposal is likely to lead Japan and other countries to try to get out in front of the U.S., with some countries quickly recognizing Communist China and others moving to change their position on UN representation.

To sum up: Given the low probability of an affirmative Peking response, this alternative involves considerable risks without prospect of immediate gains.

Option 2

The U.S. could indicate that we are prepared to enter into serious discussions or negotiations with respect to our policies with the exception of our commitment to Taiwan. This proposal might be combined with a specific offer or hint of our willingness to review our military presence in the Taiwan area if the Chinese renounce the use of force to settle this dispute.

Advantages

(1) This proposal would represent a move to greater flexibility on our part and a positive invitation to the Chinese Communists. It would also demonstrate that President Nixon's Administration is prepared to take a more conciliatory approach to Peking in response to the shift in Peking's line on the Warsaw talks as set forth in its November 25 note.

(2) It would likewise encourage whatever more conciliatory elements may exist within the Peking leadership.

(3) If this approach were not combined with an offer of strong military presence in Taiwan, it would provide time to consider U.S. China policy within the U.S. Government and to consult with other countries on specific steps to implement it.

Disadvantages

(1) This approach is likely to leave Japan and other interested Asian countries jittery about a possible change in U.S. policy without eliciting an immediate positive response from Peking.

(2) It may not go far enough to force any serious reconsideration of policy in Peking.

(3) The specific offer on Taiwan would bring a quick and negative response from the Republic of China, already agitated by Canadian and Italian initiatives to recognize Peking. In addition it raises the issue of whether we are prepared to withdraw from our bases in Taiwan given the possibility of negotiations with respect to our Okinawan bases.

Option 3

We could pick up the Chinese reference to peaceful coexistence and ask whether they have any specific proposals to make. We would

not, however, take any specific or generalized initiatives beyond indicating our willingness to hear out the Chinese.

Advantages

(1) This approach would emphasize our interest in developing a stable, peaceful environment in East Asia without committing us to any new actions at this time.

(2) It would cause the least concern with our allies of Asia and in fact would probably be welcome.

(3) It would permit a probe of Peking intentions and emphasize that the monkey is on its back for specific initiatives.

Disadvantages

(1) This approach is less likely to elicit a positive response from Peking, either immediately or in the longer term.

(2) It is likely to be construed by Peking and others as a holding action rather than a new initiative on our part.

Option 4

We could take the initiative and clobber the Chinese for past transgressions. This approach would signal a very tough stance and would probably close the door to any meaningful exchanges for some time—assuming that there is any possibility under the present circumstances.⁶

⁶ The PRC cancelled the meeting on February 18, ostensibly due to the defection of Chinese Chargé d'Affaires Liao Ho-shu (Liao Heshu) in the Netherlands on January 24. See "Spokesman of Chinese Foreign Ministry Information Department Issues Statement," *Beijing Review*, February 21, 1969, p. 4. The Department of State documentation on Liao's defection is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 30 CHICOM. Stoessel reported these developments in telegram 427 from Warsaw, February 18. (Ibid.) Stoessel's report was forwarded to Nixon in the President's February 18 daily briefing memorandum. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 2, President's Daily Briefs) INR attributed the cancellation to PRC internal politics rather than the diplomat's defection: "We regard Peking's abrupt decision to postpone the 135th meeting as the latest and most striking evidence of disagreement and indecision at the highest levels of the Chinese leadership." (INR Intelligence Note 102, February 18; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHICOM-US) The CIA had reported that "it is unlikely that there will be any change in Chinese Communist position or softening of attitude toward the United States in the upcoming 20 February Warsaw meeting." (Intelligence Information Cable TDCS-K-314/01387-69, February 10; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 518, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. I) The United States responded to the cancellation on March 12 with a letter to the PRC Embassy in Warsaw, rejecting claims that the United States "engineered" the defection of Liao, and adding that "I am instructed to inform your Government that the United States Government remains ready at an early date to continue the series of Ambassadorial-level meetings between our two governments, either here in Warsaw or elsewhere at a mutually agreeable location." (Telegram 37867 to Warsaw, March 12; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHICOM-US)

7. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–8–69

Washington, February 27, 1969.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAM

The Problem

To assess China's strategic weapons program and to estimate the nature, size, and progress of these programs through the mid-1970's.

Conclusions

A. The development of strategic weapons systems has been given a high priority in China. Despite economic and political crises over the past decade, work has continued and the Chinese already have in place many of the research and development and production facilities necessary to support important ongoing strategic weapons programs.

B. As a result of these efforts, Communist China already has a regional nuclear strike capability in the sense that it could now have a few thermonuclear weapons for delivery by its two operational medium jet bombers. China could also have some fission weapons in stock.

C. This limited capability will undergo modest augmentation in the next few years as the Chinese produce medium jet bombers and move ahead with the development of strategic missiles and compatible thermonuclear warheads. Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) deployment could begin this year or more probably in 1970, reaching a force of some 80–100 launchers in the mid-1970's.

D. As for intercontinental ballistic missiles, if the Chinese achieved the earliest possible initial operational capability (IOC) of late 1972, the number of operational launchers might fall somewhere between 10 and 25 in 1975. In the more likely event that IOC is later, the achievement of a force of this size would slip accordingly.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-037, SRG Meeting, China NPG [Part 1], 5/15/69. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem. Another copy is in Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R1012, NIE and SNIE Files. According to a note on the covering sheet, the CIA and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on February 27 except for the representative from the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. This estimate was included with the materials for the May 15 SRG meeting of the NSC. The updated version of this estimate—NIE 13–8/1–69—is printed as Document 42. For the full text of this NIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, p. 578.

E. But many uncertainties remain which leave in doubt the future pace, size, and scope of the Chinese program. In general, the Chinese are taking more time in the development and production of modern weapons systems than we judged likely several years ago. China lacks the broad base in technical and economic resources essential to rapid progress in the complex field of modern weapons. This situation has been aggravated, and will to some degree be prolonged, by the disorders, confusion, and uncertainties of the domestic political situation.

F. We have no evidence on how Chinese leaders will adjust the competing priorities between advanced weapons production and deployment and the investment requirements for healthy growth in agriculture and the general industrial sectors. At a minimum, however, we believe Chinese planners will come to recognize, if they do not already, that China cannot begin to match the nuclear strike capability of the superpowers. This may lead them to forego large-scale deployments of early missile systems, hoping to gain an important deterrent effect and added political influence from the possession of a relatively few operational missiles and aircraft.

G. So long as the Chinese strategic force remains relatively small and vulnerable, a condition which is likely to persist beyond the period of this estimate, the Chinese will almost certainly recognize that the actual use of their nuclear weapons against neighbors or the superpowers would involve substantial risks of a devastating counterblow to China.

H. We believe that for reasons of national prestige the Chinese will attempt to orbit a satellite as soon as possible. An attempt this year would probably involve the use of a modified MRBM as a launch vehicle.

[Omitted here are paragraphs 1–44, comprising the Discussion portion of the estimate, which include General Considerations and Trends and Prospects (Nuclear Program, Nuclear Materials Production, Delivery Systems, The ICBM Program, and Space Program).]

8. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, March 5, 1969, 1100Z.

643. Subject: GRC Force Reorganization/Reduction/Modernization.
Ref: State 019013.²

1. I made presentation on USG thinking on GRC force reorganization/reduction/modernization to Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo late afternoon March 4. I was accompanied by Admiral Chew, General Ciccolella and DCM Armstrong.³ I had requested the appointment on Feb. 28, and date was set at the end of my conversation March 3 with the Minister regarding his recent trip to Korea (Taipei 0617⁴). I had identified to him the general subject I wished to discuss, without of course going into any of the substance of our views. Although I indicated to Minister at that time that I would be accompanied by others mentioned above, only other Chinese present was Gen Wen, his usual interpreter and note-taker.

2. In presenting our thoughts, I closely followed all of the points in reftel (with the explanation of the US \$5 million FMS credit modified per subsequent telegrams⁵). In leading into the presentation I emphasized the very careful study given to the matter by senior levels in

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF CHINAT. Secret; Exdis.

² See footnote 4, Document 1.

³ Vice Admiral John L. Chew, USN, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command; Major General R.G. Ciccolella, USA, Chief, MAAG; and Oscar Vance Armstrong, Deputy Chief of Mission.

⁴ Telegram 617 from Taipei, March 3, reported on a conversation between McConaughy and Chiang Ching-kuo concerning the latter's visit to the Republic of Korea, February 24–28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 518, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. I)

⁵ In telegram 591 from Taipei, February 28, the Embassy requested clarification of telegram 19013 to Taipei. Specifically the Embassy wanted to know whether the United States would provide data on projected military assistance to the ROC prior to the development of a force reorganization plan, and whether the Departments of State and Defense were seeking a reduction in the "absolute level of military expenditures." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 6 CHINAT) In joint telegram 33064 to Taipei, March 4, the Departments of State and Defense replied that such data should be made available and that "our minimum objective is to persuade GRC to develop force reorganization/reduction plan which, while meeting essential defensive requirements, stabilizes defense expenditures as close to current ratio of GNP as possible. If GRC can develop plan which will meet those requirements at reduced ratio of defense expenditures to GNP, thus freeing resources for more constructive uses, so much the better and we would wish to encourage GRC to make serious effort in that direction." (Ibid., DEF 19 CHINAT)

Washington. Throughout the 25-minute presentation I gave full emphasis to those points which made most evident the tangible benefits which the GRC could anticipate from the procedures we were proposing. I also emphasized our realization that primary responsibility for decision on force reorganization rested with the GRC and that our proposal of course was not intended to encroach in any way on ROC governmental responsibilities. At end of presentation I called on Admiral Chew and General Ciccolella, as we had agreed beforehand, and each of them briefly stated his desire to cooperate fully in the suggested procedures.

3. CCK listened closely to the presentation without comment. At end he said he would like clarification of one point in my remarks: was a decision on the helicopter co-production proposal conditional on the reorganization of the armed forces. (During my presentation, CCK had requested General Wen to interpret into Chinese only that portion of my remarks dealing with the helicopter project and the 5 million FMS credit.) I replied that I was not sure of the meaning of his question. I commented that perhaps he was asking whether a favorable USG decision on the helicopter project was contingent on GRC accepting our proposal for a joint consultative committee. If so, we were not establishing any such condition but we believed that consideration of the project in the joint committee discussions would facilitate a decision.

4. CCK then said that although he had mentioned the matter of force reorganization to General Ciccolella and to me in the past, it was an internal GRC matter.⁶ Because of the friendly relationships that existed, he had solicited MAAG's ideas. He said that establishment of a joint consultative committee would have important adverse "political" implications. It would be a departure from past practice, under which the Ministry had made its views known directly to MAAG and solicited MAAG comments. CCK then said that he does not concur in the proposal to establish a joint consultative committee and hopes that the USG will not pursue the proposal. Instead, planning should proceed in the same manner as in the past. He said that this was not only his own view but he was confident that it was also the view of his government. He said that he also believes that the establishment of such a joint committee would not be to the advantage of the US.

⁶ McConaughy and Chiang Ching-kuo held preliminary discussions on several occasions in early 1969. As reported in telegram 362 from Taipei, February 5, the Defense Minister "told me [McConaughy] GRC intended to both reorganize its armed forces and to reduce their strength." (Ibid., DEF 6 CHINAT)

5. He then turned to the helicopter co-production project.⁷ He said that if his impression of the US position was correct, that is, that in the absence of force reorganization the US would not concur in the project, then this is a “most unfriendly” position. The GRC had made this proposal long ago, and there is no question about the need for it and its importance. He said that he did not see why lengthy discussions were required and he hoped the question of force reorganization and the helicopter proposal could be treated separately.

6. I replied that I thought the Minister had misinterpreted my remarks, as I had not said that a favorable decision on the helicopter proposal was directly tied to force reorganization. I reminded him that he had raised with us the question of force reorganization. I said that the USG was not yet prepared to make a decision on the helicopter project and that we believed that the joint consultative committee would be a good forum in which to examine the matter further. I said that if the joint consultative committee is not established, USG would still give full consideration to the helicopter proposal. However, I thought it unlikely in view of the scope of the questions involved, that the project could be approved this fiscal year. In order not to prejudice the decision, we were suggesting that the GRC use the remaining \$5 million of the \$20 million of FY69 FMS credit for other mutually agreed high priority items and the USG would reserve \$5 million of FY70 FMS credit on the same basis as in FY69. I reiterated that in any event, the USG would continue to give careful consideration to the helicopter project. The military need for helicopters was recognized, and the US Mission here was prepared to assist the GRC in assuring that the full case for the helicopter project was placed before Washington.

7. In view of the strongly negative and obviously deeply felt position CCK had taken on the idea of a joint consultative committee, I decided that further argumentation in that meeting would only exacerbate the problem. As it was obvious that CCK did not desire to elaborate his comments, I moved towards terminating the conversation. I had taken with me an Official Informal-style letter to CCK incorporating almost verbatim the points in para 8 of ref tel. In view of CCK’s allergic reaction I decided not to leave this letter since it might constrain him to make a written negative reply which would serve no useful purpose. Instead, I offered to have sent over to General Wen my talking

⁷ Chiang Ching-kuo attempted to tie United States assistance for helicopter production to force reorganization/reduction, telling McConaughy “that GRC continues to think about possibilities of force reorganization and reduction in context of compensatory modernization of material.” Reported in telegram 529 from Taipei, February 24. (Ibid.) Requests for assistance for the helicopter co-production project often occurred in tandem with requests for F-4 aircraft. See footnote 2, Document 1.

paper. We did so that evening, using the exact text of the letter minus the conventional opening and closing paragraphs.

8. It is regrettable that CCK reacted to our presentation in this manner. Since he reacted so immediately, explicitly, and forcefully, and since he mentioned with assurance "the views of his government", I am inclined to suspect that he must have received some prior intimation of the nature of our proposal. In any event, he made his emphatically negative reaction unmistakably clear and conspicuously avoided giving any impression that he wished to give the matter further consideration or discuss it at a later date.

9. Obviously our proposal for a joint consultative committee touched a very sensitive nerve related to Chinese pride and notions of sovereign prerogatives. CCK may well have felt that we were attempting to obtain a greater influence over GRC planning for its armed forces than we now exert through long established procedures. It is also possible that whatever his own views, he would consider it very difficult for him to justify concurrence with our proposal to the President, armed forces, and key members of the party and the Legislative Yuan.

10. Since above drafted Pol Counselor had luncheon with Gen. Bat Wen, who promptly broached this subject. After Pol Counselor had reiterated our rationale for joint committee proposal, Wen commented on CCK's negative reaction to proposed joint consultative committee. He said Defense Minister was completely opposed to idea. Wen said CCK concerned about motives behind US proposal. He is inclined to believe US more interested in force reduction than modernization or anything else. Gen. Wen recalled long history of US efforts persuade GRC to reduce size of its army. He recalled serious loss of influence and transfer of Chinese like Gen. Tiger Wang of CAF, who on US urging had tried in late 1950s to achieve reduction in GRC armed forces. Gen. Wen said CCK in advocating force reorganization had already taken exposed position and was vulnerable to criticism from the President and opposition from army elements. CCK, however, was trying to counter this opposition by advocating modernization and increased firepower along with force reorganization (reduction). CCK felt that formation of joint committee would make him even more vulnerable. What is more, Gen. Wen said, CCK did not want to have representatives from GRC economic or other ministries involved in or aware of MND plans, including force reduction. CCK felt his courage in advocating force reorganization (including reduction) under present circumstances was not fully appreciated by us. In response to question about CCK's hasty reaction to Ambassador's proposal, Gen. Wen said CCK had foreknowledge of general proposals to be discussed, and had consulted with others (Wen implied President Chiang) prior to meeting. Therefore, CCK's response was not premature answer given

without full consideration US position, but represented considered opinion based partly on factors mentioned above.

11. As to the main question concerning where we go from here on force reorganization and helicopter project, there is precious little if any prospect that CCK will reverse his position. We should consider whether we can by other means achieve some of the objectives we envisioned for the joint committee. Some preliminary thoughts on these questions will be embodied septel.⁸

12. Department requested repeat to Defense, JCS and CINCPAC.

McConaughy

⁸ McConaughy further elucidated his views in telegram 708 from Taipei, March 11. He wrote, "Despite his [Chiang Ching-kuo's] rejection of the joint committee idea, I believe that the decision that MAAG should not formally present a full-fledged reorganization plan to the GRC is a sound one, and General Ciccolella agrees." McConaughy informed the Department of State that he and his staff would attempt to introduce "gradually and informally" the major elements of the reorganization plan through MAAG and Ministry of National Defense channels. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 6 CHINAT)

9. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 13–69

Washington, March 6, 1969.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

COMMUNIST CHINA AND ASIA

The Problem

To survey recent Chinese foreign policy and alternate lines of development in the near term; to define the nature of the Chinese threat in Asia, and to estimate Chinese intentions in the area; and to estimate the longer term outlook for Chinese foreign policy.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–037, SRG Meeting, China NPG [Part 1], 5/15/69. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the covering sheet, the CIA and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on March 6 except for the representatives from the AEC and FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. For the full text of this SNIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, pp. 527–539. This estimate was included with the materials for the

Conclusions

A. The Chinese Communist regime has fallen far short of its aspirations for a position of dominance in East and Southeast Asia and for the leadership of the world revolution. Neither its efforts at conventional diplomacy nor at supporting revolutionary struggles have been pursued consistently or with a regard to objective realities. Mao's ideological pretensions have earned China the enmity of the USSR, and his bizarre domestic programs have cost China greatly in prestige and respect elsewhere in the world. Yet China's location and size, and the traditional apprehensions of its neighbors, ensure for it a major impact upon Asia regardless of the policy it follows.

B. As long as Mao is the dominant figure, major changes in China's international posture do not appear likely. Mao will remain an insurmountable obstacle to any accommodation with the USSR, and there is little alternative to continuing hostility toward the US. A failure by the Vietnamese Communists to achieve their aims might require some shift in tactics, but the Chinese would almost certainly not launch an overt attack, nor would they be likely to open a major new front of conflict.

C. Nevertheless, Chinese aspirations for political dominance in Asia will persist. Almost certainly Mao and his immediate successors will not expect to achieve this by military conquest, although force and violence figure strongly in Mao's doctrines. The Chinese may hope that the possession of a strategic capability will give China greater freedom to support "people's war" or, more remotely, to engage in conventional war in Asia by diminishing the possibility of nuclear attack on China. Whatever Chinese hopes, however, the actual possession of nuclear weapons will not necessarily make China more willing to risk a direct clash with the US; indeed, it is more likely to have a sobering effect.

D. Whatever modifications in Chinese policy flow from its advance into the nuclear age, the principal threat from China will for many years be in the realm of subversion and revolutionary activity—mainly in Southeast Asia. In South Vietnam and Laos, Peking must take account of Hanoi's direct interests. China's policy toward Cambodia will be largely conditioned by Sihanouk's attitude. If he moves

May 15 SRG meeting. According to a March 5 memorandum from Holdridge (then with INR/REA) to George C. Denney, Jr. (INR/OD), this SNIE was discussed by the USIB on February 26 and 28. Holdridge mentioned that the INR/REA staff felt that the original version had "overemphasized the failure of Peking's foreign policy in Asia and overlooked the major role assured for China by her location, population, and traditional fears of her neighbors." He also emphasized that "the Chinese may hope that possession of a strategic [nuclear] capability will limit the possibility of a nuclear attack by the U.S. and the USSR and thus give China a freer hand to support people's war, or more remotely, engage in conventional war in Asia." (Ibid., RG 59, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, SNIE 13-69)

very far toward accommodation with the US, Peking's pressures against him—now minimal—would be increased. The Chinese may see Thailand as a more lucrative target for a Chinese-sponsored "people's war." Peking is already providing some training and support, but even the Chinese must realize that the Thai insurgency faces a long, difficult fight. The Chinese have a more clear-cut choice in Burma, and whether they significantly increase the insurgency or restore more normal diplomatic relations could be an indicator of trends in Peking's foreign policy.

E. The rest of Southeast Asia is less important in Peking's immediate scheme because the Chinese lack direct access and current prospects for insurgency in these areas are minimal. Peking seeks to weaken and embarrass India, but not to confront it directly so long as there is no threat to Tibet.

F. It is in the area of conventional diplomacy, which suffered severely in the Cultural Revolution, that Peking could most easily achieve significant changes. Restoration of normal diplomacy would facilitate a trend toward recognition of Peking, and this would in turn put pressure on other countries, particularly Japan, which does not want to be left behind in opening relations with the mainland. Taipei would undoubtedly suffer diplomatic losses in this process.

G. The departure of Mao could, in time, bring significant change in China's relations with the outside world. There could be contention and struggle for leadership that would freeze major policies during a long interregnum. But on balance, we believe Mao's departure will generate a strong movement toward modifying his doctrines.

H. A less ideological approach would not necessarily make China easier to deal or live with in Asia. Pursuit of its basic nationalist and traditional goals could sustain tensions in the area, and a China that was beginning to realize some of its potential in the economic and advanced weapons fields could become a far more formidable force in Asia than is Maoist China.

[Omitted here are paragraphs 1–43, comprising the Discussion portion of the estimate. These include Introduction, Immediate Prospects, The Chinese Threat in Asia (Military Power, People's War, Politics and Diplomacy, and China's Vital Interests: Korea and Taiwan), and the Post-Mao Perspective.]

10. Memorandum to Members of the 303 Committee¹

Washington, March 14, 1969.

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OVER COMMUNIST CHINA— POLITICAL FACTORS

1. Except for satellites, no overhead reconnaissance has been conducted over mainland China since March 27, 1968. The stand-down was ordered at the instance [*insistence?*] of Secretary Rusk in part because the level of drone reconnaissance over South China in the preceding months, when combined with the frequency of inadvertent overflights of the Chinese border with North Vietnam by US military aircraft conducting bombing raids on North Vietnamese targets, may have given the Chinese reason to believe that the US was being deliberately provocative. The stand-down also anticipated President Johnson's speech of March 31, announcing the partial bombing halt.

2. In the light of the extended stand-down of overflights of China the resumption of such flights now would undoubtedly be looked upon by the Chinese as signalling a shift in US policy. Moreover, the resumption would be taken as an indication of the policy line toward China which will be forthcoming from the new Administration. It can be assumed that Peking interpreted the 1968 stand-down on overflights as an intentional US decision suggesting that US actions against the mainland were not under consideration or at least imminent; the resumption could signify to Peking that the converse may now be the case. This signal would reach Peking at a time when there are signs of serious disagreement in the Chinese leadership over how to deal with the United States and would tend to strengthen the hand of those advocating a hard line towards us.

3. The intensity of Peking's reaction against resumed US overflights would increase considerably if any of the aircraft involved were shot down over mainland China. As has been the case in the past, we

¹ Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 303/40 Committee Files. Top Secret; Idealist; Byeman. Chapin sent the memorandum on March 17 to all agency representatives (Kissinger, U. Alexis Johnson, Packard, Mitchell, and Helms) of the 303 Committee. The Committee met on March 11 to discuss U-2 photographic reconnaissance of Northeast China, SR-71 flights over South China, [*text not declassified*]. The northeast China mission was designed to examine missile construction, while the flights over southern China were to observe fighter aircraft, as well as logistical and support facilities. [*text not declassified*]. While no agreement was reached on these three operations, the Committee reached a consensus that the use of drone reconnaissance over South China was acceptable. (Memorandum for the record, March 13; *ibid.*)

can expect the Chinese to put on display wreckage of downed aircraft as tangible evidence of US provocations and hostility.

4. The net result would likely be to extend the period in which the Chinese stance toward the United States will be essentially one of enmity. A curtailment in US hopes of dealing with the Chinese Communists on anything approaching a reasonable basis would also ensue. While for motives which are not wholly apparent the Chinese acted to postpone the Ambassadorial-level talks scheduled to be held in Warsaw on February 20, they nevertheless hinted that the talks might be resumed when the atmosphere had improved. With renewed overflights, however, an improvement in the atmosphere sufficient to permit a resumption of the talks might be delayed materially. Another possibility is that the Chinese decision on release of the American yachtsmen recently seized near Hong Kong might be affected or resumption of overflights used as a pretext for not releasing them.

5. Finally, the chances are good that the resumption of US overflights of the China mainland would be leaked in the United States, and in any event Chinese Communist publicization of the overflights (e.g., in displaying the downed aircraft) would make their existence known. Those elements in the United States who are seeking to improve Sino-US relations will then almost inevitably blame the Administration rather than the Chinese for lack of progress in the desired direction.²

² Kissinger forwarded a decision memorandum to Nixon on March 22. The President approved the following recommendation: "That you approve resumption of a aerial reconnaissance in South China, but limited at this time to overflights by the 147 H/T drone. All such missions will be subject to approval by the 303 Committee on a monthly basis in accordance with current procedures governing reconnaissance operations." (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, March 22; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, NSC Files, Box CL 301, 303 Committee) According to the memorandum for the record prepared by Chapin, after a "spirited" meeting of the 303 Committee on March 25, it was decided to reconsider the U-2 overflight mission in 3 months [*text not declassified*]. (Memorandum for the Record, March 27; National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 303/40 Committee Files) In late April, through a series of telephone conversations and memoranda, the President and Kissinger made clear that they wanted to resume offshore reconnaissance flights around China. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1319, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 2 of 19)

11. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

Evaluation of Chinese Communist Ninth Party Congress

I attach evaluations of the recently-concluded Ninth Party Congress prepared by CIA and the Department of State (Tabs B and C)² covered by a brief summary analysis prepared by my staff (Tab A.)

The analysis suggests a continuing stalemate, with Mao Tse-tung unable to push through his visionary economic and social programs in the face of opposition within the Party, but with that opposition unable to force its policies upon Mao. The real power of the Army, and particularly of the Army leadership at provincial levels, continues to grow. The attention of the leadership remains focused upon domestic issues and probably upon the contest for power, but because of divided councils there is not even a clear mandate as to the direction of future domestic policies.

Tab A

The Chinese Communist Ninth Party Congress

The Ninth Party Congress closed on April 24, after an unusually long meeting lasting more than three weeks. Documentation as to what happened at the Congress is unusually sparse, consisting only of the speech given by Lin Piao to open the Congress, a brief and unilluminating new Constitution, and the Communiqué issued at the Congress' close. The editorials which normally give an indication of policy decisions in such a Chinese conclave were missing this time, or gave confused signals as to policy direction.

The most dramatic features of the Congress were the evidence of continued policy differences, the failure to resolve the existing power

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 518, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. I. Confidential with Top Secret Attachment. Sent for information. Notations on the memorandum indicate the President saw it, and that it was returned from the President on May 1.

² Tab B is an undated CIA report and Tab C is INR Intelligence Note 316, April 25. Both are attached but not printed.

stalemate between Mao and the leaders who resist his revolutionary programs, the focus upon domestic issues, the failure to resolve those issues in any clear fashion, and the lack of foreign policy initiatives.

1. The continuation of deep *differences* was documented by the following evidence:

—the unusual length of the meeting, and the paucity of press coverage.

—the failure to evolve a coherent program or to endorse Mao's specific programs.

—the pleas for unity in the Communiqué.

—the failure to condemn specific opponents of the cultural revolution (aside from Liu Shao-ch'i), or to call for further specific steps of "purification".

2. The *power stalemate* was evidenced by the lists of Party officials which came out of the meeting. While Mao has succeeded in excluding from power a number of leaders who oppose him, he has not been able to dictate a new leadership to the Party.

—The top leadership of twenty-four remains unchanged from the pre-Congress list. It consists only in part of Mao's close adherents and continues to contain a number of administrators and senior Army officials who probably resist his programs.

—Normally, the Central Committee is listed in order of rank; this time, the new Central Committee is listed in the Chinese equivalent in alphabetical order. It has been expanded, apparently packed with both low-level Maoist representatives and military men.

—The increased power of provincial leaders is demonstrated. Provincial leaders (most of whom are military and most of whom are probably conservative) have consolidated and probably expanded their power. The Army probably remains in effective control of China outside the center.

—However, the standing committee of the new Politburo has been reduced to five persons, and Mao can probably count on a regular majority. This suggests a continuing gap between orders from the center and execution at provincial levels.

3. *The continued absorption with domestic issues* is clear. Doctrinal issues and ritual justification for Mao's class-oriented view of society dominated the documents, and it is safe to assume that competition for positions in the new hierarchy was the key issue at the meeting. Foreign policy was nearly ignored.

4. This is not to say that any consensus emerged as to what domestic policy should be. *The direction of policy was not determined.* The failure either to endorse Mao's program or to set up any workable alternative makes it almost certain that China will flounder for the next year or two without clear policy direction.

—There was no real endorsement of a new "great leap forward", nor was there any specific endorsement of policies, Maoist or otherwise.

—From other reports, we believe that actual current planning recognizes that there will be very limited capital investment, and instead emphasizes development of agricultural production and economic stabilization measures.

—This emphasis conflicts with Mao's wish to move 40 million city dwellers to the countryside, to revamp educational policy and to place it under the control of peasants and workers, and to expand the socialist institutions in the countryside. Newspaper editorials suggest a continuing argument concerning all these policies.³

5. *Foreign policy* will continue to be subject to the general Maoist position, which emphasizes revolutionary struggles and thereby generates suspicion of Communist China in third countries. At the same time there is no indication that the Chinese leaders intend to become less cautious in avoiding foreign commitments.

—Support for class struggles in Southeast Asia, India and Israel was reaffirmed by Lin Piao, but given little emphasis.

—Denigration of the US was pro forma.

—Lin Piao mentioned that the Chinese had refused an urgent Soviet request to discuss the border issue, but he indicated that China was considering whether to engage in border discussions. A momentary damping down of Soviet polemics against China suggests that in early April the Soviets indeed expected there might be some hope for negotiation. The polemics resumed as the Congress closed, suggesting that this hope has evaporated.

—The public statements did not manifest any Chinese concern that war with the US or the USSR is imminent.

—Treatment of Vietnam was perfunctory, and the Chinese have not endorsed the North Korean position during the recent tension.

—The ineffectiveness of the Maoist line in foreign policy is suggested by China's isolation. The Congress had kind words for no governments and for only one Party, the Albanian. A combination of moralistic rigidity towards other Communists, together with a professed desire to see the overthrow of non-Communist neighbors, would appear likely to earn the hostility of both.

³ Nixon's handwritten comment above this paragraph reads: "H.K. note Mao fights the educated establishment!"

12. Summary of the CIA Response to NSSM 14¹

Washington, undated.

SUMMARY PAPER ON NSSM 14: UNITED STATES CHINA POLICY

I. There is no evidence to indicate that the PRC intends to expand its borders or to pursue its objectives by armed conquest, except possibly in the case of Taiwan.

A. The primary objectives of the present regime in Peking include treatment as a major world power and as a primary source of revolutionary leadership; accommodation of its policies by other Asian states; and control of Taiwan.

II. There is little prospect for change in China's attitudes and policies regarding the US while the present leadership obtains, and the US has a limited ability to influence these attitudes and policies.

A. Any US "overtures" to Communist China would be primarily intended to have an impact on China's post-Mao leadership.

B. The immediate post-Mao leadership will share the same nationalism and inexperience in dealing with the West, but the new leadership's ideological fervor may be moderated by domestic political requirements, economic and military development needs, relations with third countries, and somewhat different generational perspectives.

III. Two major alternative strategies to our present policy are available—intensified deterrence and isolation, or reduction of points of conflict and international isolation.

A. Intensified deterrence and isolation is based on the assumption that a post-Mao leadership would be most inclined to moderate² its policies toward the US under the strain of repeated policy failures and growing frustration over China's isolation.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 14. Secret. A May 15 short covering memorandum from [*name not declassified*] Executive Staff, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, indicated that the summary, prepared by CIA, "is being circulated to members of the Review Group at the request of Mr. Morton Halperin." The final version of the response to NSSM 14 is printed as Document 23. The CIA comments were based upon the April 29 draft response to NSSM 14, not printed. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-037, SRG Meeting, China NPG [Part 2], 5/15/69)

² A handwritten correction changed "moderate" to "alter."

1. In the military phase of this strategy the US would expand its military and economic support to Asian countries and increase the forward deployment of strategic and tactical nuclear forces.

2. The political approach would involve vigorous US efforts to support the GRC's international position and to convince Peking that it cannot gain acceptance into the international community on its present terms.

3. The economic phase would call for stronger pressures on our allies to restrict trade with Communist China.

B. The strategy of reducing points of conflict and international isolation would be based on the assumption that a gradual relaxation of external pressures will be most likely to cause a post-Mao leadership to reassess US attitudes and intentions toward China and China's role in international affairs.

1. The military phase would involve a de-emphasis of the military aspect of our policy of containing the PRC while at the same time maintaining an offshore or mid-Pacific deterrence posture toward any overt Chinese attack against US allies in Asia.

2. The political phase could involve public recognition that the PRC exercises authority over the mainland, unilateral reduction or elimination of political measures designed to isolate Peking, and attempts to expand diplomatic contacts.

3. The economic aspect of the strategy would entail a relaxation of trade controls to the COCOM level.

13. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, May 15, 1969, 2:10–3:55 p.m.

SUBJECTS

US China Policy; Nuclear Planning Group Issues

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry Kissinger

State

Donald McHenry

Arthur Hartman

Winthrop Brown (China only)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1969. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Lord forwarded the minutes through Halperin to Kissinger on May 19 under a covering memorandum. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.

Defense
G. Warren Nutter
CIA
R. Jack Smith
JCS
LTG F. T. Unger
OEP
Haakon Lindjord
USIA
Henry Loomis
Treasury
Anthony Jurich (China only)
NSC Staff
Richard Sneider (China only)
Morton Halperin
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Winston Lord

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the NSC schedule.]

China

State will revise the summary paper and perhaps parts of the basic paper along the following lines:²

—A restatement, possibly with alternatives, of our longer term objectives toward China.

—Under the policy option of “Reduction in Tension”, a separation of those issues appropriate for early decision (trade and travel), those dependent on other issues (use of Taiwan as a base), and those of a longer term nature (US policy toward Taiwan, the Offshore Islands, the UN, and perhaps diplomatic relations).

[Omitted here is a brief discussion concerning the Nuclear Planning Group.]

China (2:10 PM–3:30 PM)

Kissinger said that the essential question is whether the NSSM 14 paper adequately presents the problem: is our current policy the best possible mix for both long and short term US interests with regard to

² Reference is to the response to NSSM 14 (Document 4). The April 29 response was forwarded to the NSC on April 30 by Brown who was serving as the “Acting Chairman, East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Group.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1969) The final version of this paper is printed as Document 23.

China? The three principal choices are (a) continue present course, (b) intensify containment, and (c) reduction in tension.³ Are these the principal choices for the NSC, or are they phony? For example, does anybody favor intensifying our pressures on China? The President has made it clear that he does not wish to be presented with artificial options.

Lindjord wondered if intensification of pressures would moderate Chinese behavior.

Unger said that he and his staff believed that we should stay with our present policy. His staff thought that either toughening or easing up our policy could be characterized as phony options because our current policy is working so well. He believed, however, that the NSC should see the options because of the importance of the issues.

Kissinger wondered whether the basic question shouldn't be posed differently: what do we want from China over the longer term and what can we reasonably expect to do to influence that outcome? He believed that a nation of 700 million people, surrounded by weaker states, could be a security threat no matter what type of policy it pursued.⁴ The paper seems to be based on the hypothesis that countries are usually peaceful; if they are aggressive, it is because of their leaders and that you therefore must change the minds of the leadership. Which of our problems with China are caused by its size and situation and which of them are caused by its leadership? Asking such questions might inform us how we can influence the Chinese leadership. Are the paper's three options real ones in dealing with this question. A tougher policy suggests a balance of power approach; we must create a situation so that China has a minimum physical incentive to expand. A softer approach suggests our influencing leaders who are not expansionists.

Brown believed China would expand its influence inevitably in trade and other fields. The issue is how the Chinese go about doing this, in a way that reflects a hostile adversary relationship with us or a more normal competitive relationship between great powers. We should be seeking, to the extent that we can, to move the Chinese away from hostility and the danger of conflict.

In response to Kissinger's question, Brown and Unger confirmed that the East Asian IG agreed on the statement of objectives, and that

³ Reference is to the three major options presented in the April 29 draft response to NSSM 14: A. "Present Policy," B. "Intensified Deterrence and Isolation," or C. "Reduction of Points of Conflict and International Isolation." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1969)

⁴ Kissinger inserted the word "external" immediately before the word "policy" in this sentence (Ibid.)

the issues revolve around the method of pursuing those objectives. Nutter believed Kissinger's formulation in terms of leadership or geopolitical factors was useful. He personally was reasonably impressed with the success of our present policy, believing that we have done the maximum to restrain aggressive intents while leaving ourselves flexibility to adapt to changing conditions. In response to Kissinger's query whether Chinese lack of aggression was due to US policy or internal problems, Nutter said that it was principally the latter, but that an alternative policy would not have helped us any more.

Kissinger wondered whether the tougher policy option should not be dropped since no one seemed to be supporting it. Smith believed that the soft and tough options defined the outer limits of our choices and therefore helped to structure the paper. Sneider mentioned that some people (at least outside the bureaucracy) would support the tougher option. Halperin remarked that some specific steps that people advocate, e.g., use of Taiwan as a base, could have the effects of pursuing a tougher policy. Sonnenfeldt suggested that this option could be relevant if the Chinese change their policy, and therefore should be left in the paper, at least as a contingency. (Although no definitive decision was reached, the consensus appeared to be to leave in all the three policy options.)

Kissinger questioned whether anyone believed that the objectives in relation to China were adequately covered. For example, did the options relate to Objective B of avoiding an alliance between the mainland government and any other major hostile state. Halperin suggested that one argument for the softer option was that it could discourage the Chinese from rebuilding their ties with the Soviets, while the tougher option would be designed to make it appear too dangerous to the Chinese to have an operative alliance with the Soviets.

Loomis had some difficulty focusing the paper. His agency's primary point of view was our China policy's cost and our relations with third countries on other unrelated issues. To many nations we appear mired in the past, supporting Taiwan as the real Chinese Government. We are paying a greater price in other areas than we may recognize, a point that he does not believe the paper really addresses.

Kissinger wondered whether we could frame the China issues as whether our policy should be dominated by security considerations (i.e., a balance of power approach) or by desire for a more conciliatory attitude.

Smith thought that the paper correctly places the problem in a longer term perspective, stating that little could be done in the near future, and considering policies which some day might yield a return when changes in Chinese leadership or circumstances occurred. The essential issue is how to get China to relate to the rest of the world

community. Kissinger noted that this is where foreign policy only starts, and Sneider/Halperin remarked that that is the problem—we are trying to move relations toward a situation of “normal” hostility. Hartman suggested that a more normal relationship would entail greater predictability. Halperin suggested greater communication and Sneider suggested less isolation.⁵

Kissinger asked whether we care if China maintains her policy of isolation so long as this is coupled with a relatively low level of aggression. Loomis suggested that isolation means wrong information and therefore a greater chance for erratic behavior. In response to Kissinger’s remark that few crises have been started by China, Loomis mentioned India and Unger noted Thailand, Burma and aid to North Vietnam and North Korea. Kissinger wondered whether such policies were prompted by lack of understanding or rather by good understanding. Brown and Halperin noted that Chinese policies make us maintain large forces and spend perhaps \$15 billion per year. In response to Kissinger’s query whether the relationship of “normal” hostility would put an end to subversive threats, Halperin said it would not while Brown opined that a softer US approach increases that possibility while a tougher one decreases it.

Halperin noted two aspects of our relations with the Soviet Union which could be useful in a changed relationship with China. Our bilateral relations in certain ways moderate Soviet behavior and provide for communication and understanding that reduce uncertainties. If these are desirable objectives with China, the question is whether you achieve them through a softer or a tougher policy. In response to Kissinger’s question, Halperin thought the basic choice is really between status quo and some easing. Unger pointed out that the paper emphasizes that easing up our policy will bring us little in return in the near future because of the present Chinese leadership.

Kissinger wondered whether we really wanted China to be a world power like the Soviet Union, competing with us, rather than their present role which is limited to aiding certain insurgencies. Smith suggested that bringing China into the world community might make her more manageable and her policies less prone to erratic uncertainty while Sneider emphasized possible long term changes.

⁵ On the day of this meeting, Halperin sent a memorandum to Kissinger with Sneider’s concurrence, stating that “we feel that the ‘Movement towards Reduction of Tension’ option presents the most prudent course toward the PRC. *However*, as it is now presented in the paper, the option mixes short-range and longer-range considerations without adequate differentiation between the two.” (Ibid.)

Kissinger stressed that it is important that the President, in order to make a choice, have a feel for what his decision is likely to accomplish. Brown said that the paper admits that there would not be much short term change, but tries to consider certain elements which might have long run effect, which might improve our relations with other countries, and which might satisfy certain aspects of public opinion.

Kissinger wondered what operating decisions the NSC could make, and Sneider mentioned trade and the Offshore Islands. Sneider said that the paper asks (a) what is our preferred long term strategy, and (b) what if anything can we do in the short term given the inflexibility of the situation. Kissinger formulated the basic problems as being (a) what do we want China to be like, and (b) what US policies help to bring this about.

Nutter mentioned Sino-Soviet difficulties and Kissinger suggested that this was a key issue. What is our view of the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations, how much can we influence them, should we favor one or the other, etc. Brown noted that China thinks that we favor the Soviet Union, while Unger suggested that present policy gives us the flexibility to take advantage of Sino-Soviet developments. Kissinger noted that the Soviets and Chinese each think we are playing with the other.

In response to Kissinger's suggestion that the policy options in the paper might result in an academic decision by the NSC, Brown stated that he thought that selection of the third option (Reduction of Tension) would be a major move. Kissinger agreed that it would be major, but suggested that it is difficult to ask people to make such a decision without giving them a picture of the world that we wish and how we go about getting there.

Sonnenfeldt listed several issues outside of our direct China policy that bear very heavily on our relations with that country, e.g., SALT; security guarantees for India in relation to the NPT; arms policy toward Pakistan; post-Vietnam security guarantees in Asia; and recognition of Mongolia. We can take these questions piecemeal on their merits or we can attempt to weave them into a coherent policy whole. Brown agreed that the very importance of China means that it interrelates with many other issues. How might we make this looming presence less hostile?

Kissinger wondered how we want to go about this. Some Kremlinologists believe that any attempt to better our relations with China will ruin those with the Soviet Union. History suggested to him that it is better to align yourself with the weaker, not the stronger of two antagonistic partners. It is not clear to him that you achieve better relations with the Soviets necessarily because of a hard policy toward China and vice versa. Everyone agrees that we wish to reduce the risk of war

with 700 million people, but the question is whether alignment with the Soviets, more conciliatory posture toward China or some combination would best achieve this end. Smith believed that Soviet concerns about improving relations with China could be somewhat moderated by measures that we could take such as consultation. He would not agree that better Chinese US relations automatically means worse US Soviet relations.

There was further discussion on how to recast the summary, including Kissinger's view that there should be focus on the picture of the Chinese US relations we desire and the policy to achieve these over the middle-longer range. Hartman and Smith pointed out that the paper makes clear that there is little prospect for near term change in our relations with China but the question is what policies might we pursue to put ourselves in a position to influence future Chinese leaders or take advantage of other long term changes.

Nutter suggested that emphasis on balance of power considerations leads to one set of conclusions while emphasis on better relations leads to another set. Sneider said that these need not be inconsistent and he cited our present relations with the Soviets which mix cooperation, competition and attempts to undermine influence.

Kissinger still believed that the paper did not make clear what the desirable role of China in the world should be nor explore fully enough the US-China-Soviet Union triangular relationship, to which Sneider added Japan. Kissinger noted that he had no quarrel with the desirability of reducing tension, but he persisted in wondering whether an isolated China, so long as it caused no major problems, is necessarily against our interests. A China that was heavily engaged throughout the world could be very difficult and a dislocating factor. Why is bringing China into the world community inevitably in our interest?

Smith suggested because we think she will be less dangerous, and Brown stated that we assume that she is going to expand her world role in any event and our objective is to influence the way she acts. Kissinger suggested that while this could be one objective, an alternative formulation could be that it is not in our interest—or at least our task—to bring China in. We need not strive to isolate her, but it may not be worth great investment in US policy to move positively. Fifteen years from now we may look back with nostalgia on the Chinese role today in the world. Brown noted that the paper assumes that China will not remain isolated because of its very size and population and that therefore the question remains how we might be able to bring about better Chinese behavior as they emerge from present isolation.

Halperin suggested that there were four principal criteria for policy, based on the assumption that we cannot have much short

term impact: how does our China policy affect our objectives with non-Communist countries; how does it affect our relations with the Soviets; what impact does it have on a sudden irrational Chinese entrance on the world scene; and how does it affect the eventual emergence on the world scene. Arguments about alternative policies could be structured around these criteria. Loomis suggested adding Communist Asian countries, while Kissinger noted that there was insufficient treatment of the Soviet Union and Japan.

Brown said that State would take another crack at the section on objectives. Nutter noted that it is important to fit China into the great power relationships, including the Soviet Union. There was further discussion of specific elements including the issue of using Taiwan as a base which is keyed to Okinawa decisions. Halperin suggested that the question of Taiwan bases should be considered in the context of overall China policy while Unger pointed out the short term military imperatives in contrast with only long term political changes.

Sneider noted that China policy is difficult because the short term threat is much less than the longer term threat; we have more flexibility in the short term because of the nature of the threat but we have less flexibility because of the Chinese attitudes.

It was agreed that because there is no urgent need for decisions and because of the need to redo parts of the paper, that China would not be on the NSC schedule next week.

Kissinger mentioned that his staff appeared to prefer the option of a gradual movement toward reduction in tension. Brown confirmed that this was State's inclination and noted that Secretary Rogers had already suggested this publicly.⁶

There followed some discussion of which issues, under this option, were appropriate for near term decisions and which could or would have to wait for the longer term. There was consensus at the close with Kissinger's categorization of the three sets of issues under the option of reducing tensions:

⁶ On March 27 Rogers told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, despite the PRC cancellation of the Warsaw meetings and its internal political conflicts, "We nevertheless continue to look forward to a time when we can make progress toward a more useful dialogue to reduce tensions, resolve our differences, and move to a more constructive relationship." (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 14, 1969, p. 312) In his April 21 speech at the Associated Press annual luncheon, Rogers declared that the United States "shall take initiatives to reestablish more normal relations with Communist China and we shall remain responsive to any indications of less hostile attitudes from their side." (Ibid., May 12, 1969, p. 399)

- a. Those that could be taken immediately if it were decided to change our policy—trade and travel.
- b. Those dependent on other decisions—use of Taiwan as a base.
- c. Longer range problems—overall policy toward Taiwan, Off-shore Islands, United Nations and possible diplomatic recognition.

As a result of the Review Group discussion, it was therefore decided that State would revise the summary paper, and perhaps sections of the basic paper in order to recast US objectives and to separate the short run and longer range issues under the policy option of moving toward a reduction in tension.

[Omitted here is discussion concerning the Nuclear Planning Group.]

14. National Security Decision Memorandum 17¹

Washington, June 26, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT

Relaxation of Economic Controls Against China²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-210, NSDM Files, NSDM 17. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Laird, Helms, and Wheeler.

² National Security Study Memorandum 35, "U.S. Trade Policy toward Communist Countries," March 28, called for study of "policy towards COCOM, U.S. differential controls, trade with Eastern Europe, Asian Communist and Cuban trade embargoes, and extraterritorial effects of trade controls." The actual study and discussion that followed focused upon Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, purposely excluding Cuba and Asia. (NSSM 35, March 28; *ibid.*, Box H-142, NSSM Files, NSSM 35) The paper resulting from NSSM 35, as well as supporting materials, are in National Security Council, Secretariat Files, Senior Review Group Meetings, May 7, 1969. NSSM 35 and related papers are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XXXI.

The President has decided, on broad foreign policy grounds, to modify certain of our trade controls against China.³ He has decided, in principle, that we should:

(1) Remove the restraints in the Foreign Assets Control regulations upon foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms on transactions with China that are regarded as non-strategic by COCOM.⁴

(2) Modify the Foreign Assets Control regulations prohibiting purchase of Communist Chinese goods to permit Americans travelling or resident abroad to purchase Chinese goods in limited quantities for non-commercial import into the U.S.

(3) Modify the administration of the Foreign Assets Control regulations and Export Controls to permit general licenses for export of food, agricultural equipment, chemical fertilizer and pharmaceuticals.

(4) Follow these steps, at the earliest appropriate time, by modifying import and export controls in non-strategic goods to permit a gradual development of balanced trade.

The President desires early implementation of these decisions. He has, therefore, directed that the Under Secretaries Committee super-

³ On June 11 Sneider informed Kissinger that in conversations with Green and others, Nixon showed he was “interested” in China policy and “seemed to favor a few short-term steps which would not offer real prospect of reciprocity, such as relaxation of trade and travel controls.” (Memorandum from Sneider to Kissinger, June 11; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 957, Haig Chronological File, HaigChron–June 1969) This effort had many similarities to attempts to modify trade and travel policies during the last months of the Johnson administration. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXX, Documents 302–306, 313, 328, and 336.

⁴ On June 21 Richardson informed Kissinger of four economic restrictions that could be lifted. He also detailed benefits of these changes: 1) “remove the irritant which extraterritorial aspects of our trade controls create in our relations with our allies,” 2) indicate desire for increased contacts with the PRC, 3) simplify administrative procedures and remove an irritant to Americans traveling overseas, and 4) “remove elements of our policy which have little or no effect on China.” (Memorandum from Richardson to Kissinger, June 21; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 957, Haig Chronological File, HaigChron–June 1969) Attached to another copy of the memorandum is a note from Richardson suggesting that a NSDM would be the best way to implement these changes, and that the Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce could develop a plan for media, congressional, and diplomatic handling of this issue. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 17) Kissinger presented these proposals to Nixon on June 23. Nixon wrote “ok” beside each proposal but rejected one of the Richardson/Kissinger recommendations by writing “no” in the margin: “We could remove the restrictions precluding U.S. firms from supplying petroleum to ships owned or chartered by Communist China or any ship destined for China.” This recommendation commented that this “restriction hurts our oil companies through loss of trade far more than it bothers the Chinese.” (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, June 23; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 957, Haig Chronological File, HaigChron–June 1969) It was not included in NSDM 17. Kissinger then divided suggestion 4 of his June 23 memorandum into items (3) and (4) of NSDM 17.

wise the preparation of the following documents, to be submitted to him by July 7, 1969.

- (1) Implementing regulations (to be developed by State, Commerce, and Treasury);
- (2) A press and diplomatic scenario (to be developed by State);
- (3) A scenario for Congressional consultation (to be developed by State and Treasury).⁵

The President has directed that until he decides when and how this decision is to be made public, the SECRET/SENSITIVE classification of this project be strictly observed.

Henry A. Kissinger

⁵ On June 28 Eliot informed the Under Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury that Green would chair the inter-agency group charged with preparing materials for the Under Secretaries Committee meetings dealing with NSDM 17. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 17) Specific procedures for implementing NSDM 17, as well as information on the PRC's reaction, are *ibid.*, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FT 1 CHICOM-US.

15. National Security Study Memorandum 63¹

Washington, July 3, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-155, NSSM Files, NSSM 63. Secret. A copy was sent to Wheeler.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences²

The President has directed a study of the policy choices confronting the United States as a result of the intensifying Sino-Soviet rivalry and the current Soviet efforts to isolate Communist China.

The study should consider the broad implications of the Sino-Soviet rivalry on the U.S., Soviet, Communist Chinese triangle and focus specifically on alternative U.S. policy options in the event of military clashes between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

The study should also examine alternative policy approaches in the event of continued intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict short of a military clash.

The President has directed that the paper be prepared by an ad hoc group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and including representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.³

The study should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by August 15.

Henry A. Kissinger

² In February, a CIA report noted that “the Soviet Union is continuing to strengthen its military forces on the Chinese border.” The report concluded that “the upgrading of forces and command structure east of Lake Baikal appears to go beyond the requirements for border security. It suggests that the Soviets are developing a capability for offensive operations against North China should the need arise.” (“Recent Military Developments Along the Sino-Soviet Border,” Intelligence Memorandum 69–5, February 5; *ibid.*, Box 1, President’s Daily Briefs) Kissinger briefed Nixon on armed conflict along the Sino-Soviet border on March 3. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, March 3; *ibid.*, Box 3, President’s Daily Briefs) Kissinger noted, “This shooting incident was the first of its kind, although there have been previous instances of provocations by the Chinese.” In a later report, Kissinger informed Nixon that “Soviet forces in regions adjacent to the Sino-Soviet border have more than doubled since late 1964 and now total about 285 thousand troops.” (March 29; *ibid.*, Box 4, President’s Daily Briefs) Tension between the PRC and the Soviet Union increased through the spring and summer of 1969, when armed clashes spread to the western border region, the Chinese declared their expectation of war, and the Soviets proposed to form a multinational collective security system that would in effect contain the PRC. On June 24 Haig sent Kissinger a “very significant document” from the CIA, which detailed Soviet concerns over the possibility of improved relations between the United States and PRC. Haig wrote, “The report, together with others we have picked up, simply confirm that a concerted effort on our part to at least threaten efforts at rapprochement with the Chicomos would be of the greatest concern to the Soviets.” (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, June 24; *ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. III)

³ Rogers designated Richardson to serve as chair of the ad hoc group of representatives from State, Defense, NSC, and CIA who were charged with producing this report. Information on this group is *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 63.

16. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, July 4, 1969, 1350Z.

2445. Subject: Meeting with Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo re GRC Raid on Chicom Boats.² Department pass CIA and Defense.

1. I met late this afternoon with Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo at my request to obtain full and authoritative statement of rationale behind GRC raid on ChiCom boats off Fukien coast, and to express concern at possible unfortunate psychological and political effects of the action at this juncture.

2. I referred to undesirability of any hostile action even on very limited scale at this time. I underscored importance of refraining from any move which might heighten tension in Taiwan Straits area or elsewhere in East Asia. I mentioned the negative effect which any such action might have on the negotiation effort in Paris, and efforts generally to improve the prospects for peace in the area. I spoke of the extent that this action might play into the hands of elements in the U.S., the UN and elsewhere that are inclined to be critical toward or unsympathetic with the GRC. I said the Central News Agency news release on the subject had given foreign wire services something of a basis for playing up the incident and portraying it in terms that were probably rather exaggerated. This would give those who are opposed to the GRC another stick with which to belabor it as an instigator of unwarranted and provocative actions tending to increase tensions at a time when it was all-important to relax tensions. I expressed regret that neither [*name not declassified*] nor myself had been informed of the intention to stage the raid and that the first we knew of the incident was when we saw the Central News Agency press release. I then acknowledged with thanks the very comprehensive account of the entire event when Gen

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Received at 1429Z. Kissinger included a summary of this telegram in the President's July 5 daily briefing memorandum. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 9, President's Daily Briefs)

² On the evening of July 2 at least five small boats under the command of the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense (IBMND) attacked several PRC vessels near Tacheng, Fukien Province. A few junks and perhaps one wooden gunboat were sunk. All the attacking boats returned to the offshore island of Matsu (Mazu) without incident. According to information gathered by the U.S. Naval Attaché in Taipei, the operation was "mainly political to test Chicom reaction." (Telegram 2442 from Taipei, July 4; *ibid.*, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. II) Further documentation is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA East Asia Files: FRC 330 83 0123, 1969 Raid on Chicom Boats.

Chou of the NSG had given [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] earlier today [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].³ I told the Vice Premier I had spoken in candor as a friend and (I) was trying to give him a view of the matter which was perhaps different from the angle from which he had seen it. I invited him to comment with the same frankness.

3. Vice Premier responded by thanking me for my frank summary of the incident as it could be viewed from abroad. He said he had been partially but not fully aware of this “other view”. He accepted my summation with good grace. He assured me that the GRC did not want to cause or contribute to instability in the East Asia region. He said this was merely a small-scale probing action and not different in nature or size from various other probes undertaken in previous years, the latest in 1966.⁴ It was carried out not by GRC naval forces but by “sea guerrillas” who are a part of the “Anti-Communist National Salvation outfit”. He said that it was a “very local” encounter well off the mainland coast, some distance northeast of the Min River estuary. He said the probe had no military objective, of course, and the boats lost by the ChiComs were of no military value. He said the object was to test the efficiency of the ChiCom radar detection net against small craft in bad weather, and to ascertain the degree of alertness of the ChiCom personnel. The probe had established the inadequacy of the ChiCom radar against this type of incursion, since the GRC boats were returning to their bases by the time the Chinese Communists reacted. He thought the knowledge gained from the probe would have some utility.

4. The Vice Premier said the probing action was also undertaken to boost the morale of the GRC specialized personnel who took part. They had been under training for two years without having had any mission to carry out until now. It was decided to try them out when the weather conditions were exactly right.

5. In answer to a question from me, the Vice Premier said he did not believe the ChiComs would undertake any major military action by way of reprisal. They might try to attack some of the GRC supply vessels, as had happened before. He said the GRC would be on guard against such attempts. He did not think the ChiCom reaction would

³ Not found.

⁴ For information on the 1966 raid, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXX, Document 193. However, in a July 3, 1969, memorandum to Brown and Green, Shoesmith wrote: “The last such action that we know of was on May 29, 1967, when a GRC commando team reportedly made a landing on the Shantung Peninsula, killed ‘more than ten’ Chinese Communists and damaged one ChiCom patrol boat. Subsequent intelligence reports indicated that the results of this action had been exaggerated to a considerable extent.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 CHICOM)

be either greater or less than on earlier occasions. In answer to a further question he expressed doubt that ChiCom propaganda would attempt to exploit the incident. He thought they would consider it "not to their interest" to do so, since an acknowledgment of the raid by them would amount to a confession of weakness or inadequacy of their security measures. The ChiCom practice did not permit any such admissions.

6. In answer to my observation about the GRC failure to keep in touch with us in advance, the Vice Premier said that he would instruct the new Defense Minister, and through him the Intelligence Bureau, that in future all such projects would be discussed in advance with [name not declassified].

7. Vice Premier expressed earnest hope that this event "would not be overstressed" in the United States. I told him that the conversation had been very helpful and would assist us in placing the matter in the right perspective. I took official note of his assurance that there would be advance discussion of any planned undertaking along this line in future and expressed the hope that the provision for such advance discussion would obviate the sort of difficulty that had cropped up yesterday and today.

8. *Comment:* I believe CCK fully understands our concern over the international repercussions of the raid and the way GRC publicized it without informing us.⁵ His assurance that GRC will in the future

⁵ Referring to the Dulles–Yeh exchange of notes (December 10, 1954; see *Foreign Relations* 1952–1954; vol. XIV, Documents 402 and 403), Shoemith wrote to Green on July 7: "We have sought to restrain limited GRC operations against the mainland not so much by insisting on prior consultations and concurrence as by warning that we would not feel obliged to come to its assistance in the event of retaliation against an 'unauthorized' action, and more recently, by making clear our opposition on policy grounds to 'provocative' acts, without clearly defining the meaning of the term." Shoemith concluded, "on the basis of available evidence, the recent GRC hit-and-run attack on Chinese Communist ships falls within the category of those actions for which, at least since 1960, we have not required the GRC to inform us or to obtain our concurrence in advance." (Memorandum from Shoemith through Brown and Barnett to Green, July 7; National Archives, RG 59, EA/EX Files: Lot 72 D 276, Miscellaneous Top Secret Files)

The Department of State's response to McConaughy stated that "we agree that CCK's assurance that GRC will in future consult [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in advance on 'all such projects' is of considerable importance, and wish to take maximum advantage of that opening to strengthen restraints on GRC actions of a potentially provocative nature." (Telegram 117284 to Taipei, July 16; *ibid.*, Central Files 1967–69, POL CHICOM–CHINAT) McConaughy then reconfirmed this understanding with Chiang Ching-kuo, reporting that "we now have an assurance from CCK which is a milestone in the long and somewhat ambiguous record of our position with the GRC on this subject." (Telegram 2814 from Taipei, July 29; *ibid.*) Officials in Washington announced that they were satisfied: "It seems clear that we now have explicit commitment of CCK that any future action against mainland, regardless of nature or size, will be matter joint US–GRC discussion and agreement." (Telegram 138446 to Taipei, August 16; *ibid.*)

consult in advance is of considerable importance. Having made our point I do not believe it would be useful or necessary to make additional representations about this incident at this time. We recognize Department's problems in coping with press (and perhaps Congressional) queries. However I believe it would now be in our interest to get matter into as low a key as feasible. I assume of course that we will not get into detailed dialogue with press on when GRC must consult under treaty obligations.

McConaughy

17. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Relaxation of Economic Controls Against China

You will remember that you approved three measures liberalizing our trade controls against China.² You also ordered that they be held in abeyance until passage of the Export Control Act, and that the Under Secretaries Committee prepare in the meantime plans for implementing your decision.

Elliot Richardson has now put forward a memorandum, with which I agree, recommending that you not wait until passage of the Act and authorize implementation of the decision before you depart on July 23 (Tab A³). He makes the following three points:

1. The decision would demonstrate the flexibility you now have in administering trade controls and thus would emphasize the lack of need for amending the Act. This would be helpful in obtaining its straight extension.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Printed from an unsigned copy.

² See Document 14.

³ Attached at Tab A but not printed is the July 10 memorandum from Richardson on behalf of the Under Secretaries Committee. The three options below are taken almost verbatim from Richardson's memorandum.

2. A delay, which might be as much as 60–90 days, might lead us into a period where unforeseen circumstances; e.g., worsening of the Sino-Soviet border situation, could preclude the announcement and thus cause us to lose the diplomatic benefits we are seeking. Such a delay would also increase the likelihood of press leaks and attendant difficulties.

3. If you wait to announce this decision until you return from Bucharest,⁴ it probably would be tied in with speculation regarding a putative anti-Soviet purpose in the Bucharest stopover. This would give your decision overly overt anti-Soviet significance.

The Under Secretaries Committee has also prepared implementing instructions,⁵ and has raised the question of how to handle announcement of the decision. I recommend that the decision be leaked in low-key fashion. If a Congressional presentation is desirable, you have two choices.

1. Mention the decision at a meeting of the Joint Leadership at which some other business is being taken up.

2. Have Bryce Harlow mention the decision to a few selected Congressional leaders.

I lean toward the latter.

*Recommendation*⁶

1. That you approve announcing your decision in low-key fashion.

2. If a Congressional presentation is desirable, that it be handled by Bryce Harlow.

⁴ President Nixon visited Romania on August 3, 1969, as part of his around-the-world trip.

⁵ The policy was announced to all diplomatic posts in telegram 120569, July 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, FT 1 CHICOM–US) The regulations were published in the *Federal Register* on July 23, 1969. (34 *Federal Register* 12165)

⁶ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation, but the changes were announced in a “low-key fashion.”

18. National Security Study Memorandum 69¹

Washington, July 14, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Nuclear Policy in Asia

The President has directed the preparation of a study on U.S. nuclear policy in Asia.

The study should examine four broad areas:

1. *U.S. strategic nuclear capability against China.* A range of possible situations in which a U.S. strategic nuclear capability against China would be useful should be examined. The study should consider possible target systems in China and U.S. capability to attack those systems. The implications for U.S. strategic force requirements, for war planning and the required command and control systems and procedures and for the definition of strategic sufficiency should be examined.

2. *U.S. theater nuclear capability in the Pacific.* The study should examine the role of the U.S. theater nuclear capability in the Pacific for both deterrence and defense against possible Chinese attacks and against other forms of aggression against both Allied and non-Allied countries. Under what types of circumstances and how might U.S. theater nuclear forces be employed in improving war outcomes? The study should examine alternative postures and basing arrangements for theater nuclear forces in the light of possible roles for U.S. strategic forces, taking account inter alia of the pending reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

3. *Nuclear assurances.* The study should analyze the current legal and political status of our commitments, both to Allied and non-Allied countries, concerning our actions in the face of nuclear aggression or threats of aggression. This should take into account our obligations under the UN Charter; our various alliances; the Non-Proliferation Treaty (including the Security Council Resolution and Senate testimony), and statements by U.S. officials. In the light of the results obtained under

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 69. Secret. Copies were sent to Wheeler and Smith (ACDA). Little substantive discussion took place on this NSSM until March 1971 (See Document 108).

paragraphs 1 and 2 above, possible modifications to our assurances should be discussed and evaluated.

4. *Nuclear proliferation.* The paper should consider for each option examined the possible effects on proliferation of nuclear weapons and on prospects for wider adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This study should be performed by an Interagency Group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of Defense and including representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. A representative of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should participate in the Nuclear Assurances and Nuclear Proliferation phases of the study. This study should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by 30 September 1969.

Henry A. Kissinger

**19. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State
(Richardson) to the President's Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Changes in Regulations Relating to China

As I told you on the phone,² our people who are most knowledgeable on the subject have considered other actions, including cultural exchanges, we might take relating to China of a more modest

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Richardson forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a July 17 note, in which he urged that the Republic of China be given at least 24 hours notice of the changes, and that Bryce Harlow contact key Congressmen. (Ibid.) A handwritten comment by an unknown hand at the bottom of the note indicates that it was "handled orally." On July 21 David Dean, Political Counselor at the Embassy in Taipei, informed Frederick Chien, Acting Director of North American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the impending changes to FAC and passport regulations. (Telegram 2684 from Taipei, July 21; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FT 1 CHICOM-US) See also footnote 5, Document 17.

² Not found.

nature than what we had previously planned. I am afraid there is not very much other than the following:

(1) *Authorization of Tourist Purchases.* We both agree, and I understand that the President is also amenable, that we still go ahead with the changes embodied in NSDM 17,³ paragraph (2), to permit tourists to purchase Chinese Communist goods in limited quantities for non-commercial import into the United States.

(2) *Authorization to Export Food Grains.* We might modify paragraph (3) of NSDM 17 to provide only for export of food grains rather than food of all types, agricultural equipment, chemical fertilizers and pharmaceuticals. This would be a more modest step, which is not entirely new, since President Kennedy offered in 1961 to consider the export of food grains to China. U.S. reaction was favorable but Peking denounced the move as hypocritical. Decision on food grains now would have the advantages of being a humanitarian gesture and a move welcomed by our grain producers who are excluded by our own regulations from a large potential market. It would merely offer the Chinese access to a commodity already available from other countries. It is unlikely that Peking would respond at this time by shifting purchases to us rather than buying from present trading partners.

(3) *Removal of Travel Restrictions.* We could eliminate our existing restrictions on travel. In addition to China, however, these restrictions also cover North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba. This is a complicating factor, and I would prefer that we consider the whole question of these regulations when they come up for renewal in mid-September.⁴

I have had some second thoughts on the variation of this that we discussed, namely, a blanket authorization for travel to China of Congressmen, students, scholars, and journalists looking toward the possibility of exchanges in these categories. I fear that this proposal, tagged

³ Document 14.

⁴ In March 1969 Richardson had favored immediately lifting the travel restrictions, but was told by Rogers to wait for White House approval. Rogers stated that he intended to revisit the issue in September. (Record of a telephone conversation between Richardson and Rogers, March 12 and March 14; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 104, Under Secretary of State, Telephone Conversations, March 1969) On September 15 the Department of State announced that travel restrictions to China, Cuba, North Korea, and North Vietnam would remain unchanged for the time being but would expire after 6 months. (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 27, 1969, pp. 362–363) On March 16, 1970, the Department of State published the same announcement about travel restrictions but added a short statement: "With respect to mainland China, however, we follow a more liberal policy [than for Cuba, North Korea, or North Vietnam] of passport validation and give validation for any legitimate purpose." (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 13, 1970, pp. 496–497) See also Document 35.

onto the first two, would undermine the effects we seek. As a matter of fact, we have been validating passports for virtually anyone going to China for any purpose other than simple tourism. Congressmen, academicians and journalists (plus Red Cross representatives and medical scientists) are among those who almost always have their passports validated and whose travels are among the 300 we have approved. I fear that the blanket authorization for these categories would be interpreted, particularly by the knowledgeable public, as a gimmick unless we expect the Chinese to respond, which they almost certainly would not do. Moreover, we could again be faced with the question why we are not doing this for the other countries to which travel is now proscribed. This would put too much of a political pall on this measure and on the whole package. I would rather that we deal with this and other aspects of the travel problem also in the context of the termination of the travel restrictions in September.

To sum up, I think we can go ahead immediately with the first and, hopefully, the second proposal. I believe the third would muddy the waters and detract from the other two. In any event, I understand that we would move on the other elements of NSDM 17 at an early appropriate time.

ELR

20. Editorial Note

In 1969 President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger informed many world leaders of their interest in improving ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC). During his first overseas visit in February and March, Nixon told French President Charles de Gaulle that there existed "considerable sentiment" in the Department of State "not only in favor of a Soviet-U.S. détente, but also for a lineup of the Soviets, Europe and the U.S. against the Chinese." Nixon noted that this might be a good short-range policy, but that in the longer term it was in the U.S. interests to recognize China and the Soviet Union as "great powers" and build "parallel relationships with them." He conceded that this was "largely theoretical as it was difficult to have relations with the Chinese." (Memorandum of conversation between President Nixon and General De Gaulle, March 1, 1969; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 447, President's Trip Files, Memcons—Europe) Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XLI.

During his around-the-world trip, July 24–August 3, Nixon discussed China with leaders of Pakistan and Romania. On August 2 Nixon told Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu that the United States opposed the PRC entering the United Nations because of the PRC's attitude toward its neighbors, not "China's internal policy." He added that "our policy is to have good relations with the Soviet Union and eventually, when China changes its approach to other nations, we want to open communications channels with them to establish relations." The President emphasized that the United States did not intend to become involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict and would not "join in a bloc to fence off China." Finally Nixon told Ceausescu that "if it serves your interest and the interest of your government, we would welcome your playing a mediating role between us and China." (Memorandum of conversation between President Nixon and President Ceausescu, August 2; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon President Nixon and President Ceausescu August 2–August 3, 1969) Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXIX.

The most serious discussion occurred in Pakistan. A report on the meeting between Nixon and President Yahya Khan states that the two men discussed Sino-Soviet, Sino-Pakistani, and Sino-American relations. Nixon agreed with Yahya that China should be engaged in the international community but added that the American public was not ready to accept rapprochement. Nixon commented that he could not accept the PRC's admission into the UN "over-night" but promised to work toward that end. (Report attached to memorandum from Harold Saunders to Kissinger, September 2; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I) On August 2 Assistant to the President H.R. Haldeman recorded in his diary that Nixon felt Yahya "made a strong impression as a real leader, very intelligent, and with great insight into Russia-China relations." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House, The Complete Multimedia Edition*, Sony Electronic Publishing, 1994) See Documents 26, 39, 54, and 55 for further information on the eventual Sino-American contact through Pakistan. In 1971 Winston Lord wrote a 7-page memorandum to Kissinger, listing the major contacts between the United States and the PRC through Pakistan, Romania, and other sources. (Memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, April 17, 1971; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1033, Files for the President—China Material, Miscellaneous Memoranda Relating to HAK's Trip to PRC, July 1971)

21. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 6, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS

GRC Ambassador Chow Shu-kai
Dr. Kissinger
John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member

Dr. Kissinger told Ambassador Chow that President Nixon wanted him to pass along assurances to President Chiang that there had been no change in basic US policy toward Communist China. There may have been speculation to the effect that a change had occurred from the news reporting of President Nixon's trip,² but such was not the case. The purpose of President Nixon's trip was to put the US in a position to work with maximum effect in Asia, to gain tactical flexibility with respect to Vietnam and put maximum pressure on Hanoi, and then take care of other problems. The US recognized that the outcome of the Vietnam war would determine the future US role in Asia. If we did badly, this role would diminish; if we did well our position would be enhanced. The President had said on every occasion that we would stand by our commitments.

In response to a question from Ambassador Chow on whether or not a dialogue had occurred in Romania on the subject of opening talks with Communist China, Dr. Kissinger stated that there had been no such dialogue.³ He reiterated that there had been no change in the US position regarding Peking and we were not talking with it anywhere.

Ambassador Chow asked if we had noted any signs of shifts in attitude toward Peking on the part of the Philippines, Thailand and Japan and expressed particular concern about the Philippines. Dr.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III. Secret. Drafted by Holdridge and approved by Kissinger on August 7 with instructions to "hold in W[hite] H[ouse]." (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, August 7; *ibid.*) The meeting was held in Kissinger's office.

² Reference is to Nixon's around-the-world trip, during which he held talks with the leaders of South Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and Romania.

³ See Document 20. Even prior to Nixon's trip, this issue was raised in a July 17 meeting among Chin Hsiao-yi, Personal Secretary to Chiang Kai-shek, other ROC officials, Green, and Froebe: "Mr. Chin took note skeptically of rumors that President Nixon's Romanian trip carried implications for U.S. relations with Communist China—that the U.S. wanted Romania as a go-between in improving contacts with Peking. Mr. Green replied that there was no truth to such speculation." (Memorandum of conversation, July 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/NIXON)

Kissinger said that we were not aware of any shifts, and mentioned that we had received the impression that the Filipinos were very much afraid of the Chinese Communists.

Turning to the Chinese representation issue in the UN, regarding which Ambassador Chow expressed some apprehensions, Dr. Kissinger declared that our position had not changed and that we would continue to support the GRC this year. We had also taken President Chiang's advice on how to handle Outer Mongolia.⁴

Ambassador Chow referred to some of the difficulties which his government anticipated in a number of areas, and how a change in one country's stand on Chinese representation (e.g. by Canada or Italy) might affect others in a sort of domino theory.⁵ Dr. Kissinger reassured him by saying once again that President Nixon had specifically asked that he be called in and told that we had not changed our basic policy. The President also wanted to express his high regard for President Chiang. Ambassador Chow thanked Dr. Kissinger for these words.

Dr. Kissinger then departed for another appointment, and Mr. Holdridge concluded the meeting by reporting to Ambassador Chow what had been said on the Vietnam question during the President's trip: the US and GVN had been extremely forthcoming in demonstrating their sincerity in support of a peaceful settlement in Vietnam and the time had now come for the other side to respond, and that the US would stay in Vietnam until the South Vietnamese people were free to decide their own future without outside interference.

John H. Holdridge

⁴ See Documents 271 and 272.

⁵ See Document 2.

22. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, August 8, 1969, 1021Z.

3031. Subj: Secretary Rogers' August 3 Meeting With President Chiang.

(*Note:* Conversation has been reconstructed in slightly condensed form but very close paraphrase in exact actual sequence in order to convey its full flavor. Language is verbatim only where quotation marks are used. Ambassador McConaughy drafted record, and it was sent telegraphically to Secretary's party for review, since Ambassador Pedersen and Assistant Secretary Green also took extended notes of conversation. Secretary's cabled clearance of August 7 received today.)

1. Summary: During meeting with Secretary Rogers on August 3, President Chiang first asked if Asian visits of President Nixon and Secretary signified a particular US interest in some sort of new collective security arrangement among free Asian countries. Secretary responded that there was no such interest at this time although US was of course very much interested in regional cooperation. President Chiang said US position corresponded closely to that of his government. In response to President Chiang's query, Secretary gave extensive rundown Vietnam situation and US approach to problem. President Chiang generally agreed with this approach but cautioned against any expectation that USSR or ChiComs will help in any way and said that great care should be exercised regarding number and timetable of US troop withdrawal. President then launched into discussion of US policy on China, saying that policy under Secretary Dulles was correct but policy has been not so well defined since then. In particular, he questioned any attempt at "compromise" or "rapprochement" as being foredoomed to failure and as tending to embolden the ChiComs and consolidate their position. He attributed virtually all the woes of the free world in Asia since 1949 to the US permitting takeover of China Mainland by ChiComs. President Chiang asked if President Nixon is disposed to encourage ROC to go back and free the Chinese people, or "freeze" it on Taiwan. The Secretary, after stating we cannot turn clock back to either

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966-1972, Entry 3051B: Lot 70 D 387, Box 74, Secretary's Trip to the Far East, July-August 1969, CF 384. Secret; Priority; Exdis. From July 26 to 28, Rogers accompanied President Nixon on his trip to the Philippines and Indonesia. From July 28 through August 10, Rogers visited Japan, South Korea, the ROC, Hong Kong, Australia, and New Zealand. He was in Taiwan from August 1 to 3. An English-language record of this conversation, provided by the ROC Government to McConaughy, is attached to an August 27 memorandum from Shoemith to Green, and is *ibid.*, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHINAT-US.

Eisenhower–Dulles or Kennedy period, said President Nixon’s position is one of continued support of the Republic of China. US would be happy if ROC could return to the Mainland by peaceful political means, but any sort of military venture would not be realistic to consider. President asked if it is US policy to encourage ROC to “surrender Quemoy and Matsu,” and Secretary said it was not. President then asked if it was US policy that ROC have the capability to defend itself, and Secretary said it was. In response to Secretary’s question, President said GRC is not desirous of attempting invasion of Mainland because it does not have the capability. Secretary noted that there is therefore agreement on question of posture towards the Mainland. Remainder of conversation largely devoted to President’s complaints of inadequacy of US military aid in view of ChiCom threat. He expressed doubt whether GRC in present circumstances could hold out more than 3 days against full ChiCom attack on Taiwan. He voiced specifically desire for more Nike–Hawk missiles and for Phantom F–4 aircraft² and observed that if there is a military crisis in this area and ROC is unable fulfill its defensive role, US inevitably would become deeply involved. End summary.

[Omitted here is a detailed account of the discussion between Rogers and Chiang.]

McConaughy

² See Documents 1 and 8.

23. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 14¹

Washington, August 8, 1969.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

I. PROBLEM

China is not today a major economic power nor, except in certain applications of its land army, is its military power on a par with that

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-023, NSC Meeting (San Clemente), 8/14/69, Briefings: Korea; China. Secret. This is the final version of the response to NSSM 14 (Document 4). The document was largely drafted in EA. Comments on early drafts are in National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 74 D 25, Political Files, NSSM 14. An early draft was discussed in an NSC Senior Review Group meeting on May 15 and returned to

of the US and the USSR. States in Asia, however, feel the weight of China's looming mass, and others believe China has a claim to great power status, including representation in the UN Security Council. Many Americans agree. The US has had a special concern since the 19th Century, complicated by a mystique that has sometimes distorted our sense of what China is and should be; since the Korean War, however, Communist China and the US have been in an adversary relationship. US policies toward China affect to some extent our relations with virtually all third countries. The policies of the US toward most of Asia are closely related to the kind and degree of threats that Peking may present to the US or other countries in the area.

The appropriate US policy towards China depends on answers to the following questions: What are the US interests relating to China? How do the policies of China today affect these interests? How might Chinese policies evolve over the short and long term?² How can the US advantageously influence that evolution? How does present US China policy—and how would alternative policies—affect our interests with regard to third countries, particularly the Communist and non-Communist states of Asia and the Soviet Union? This paper examines these questions in considering the possible range of US objectives and options in our relations with China.

II. PREMISES AND FACTORS³

Premises

Current hostility between the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC) stems from a number of causes including US support for the Republic of China (GRC) and commitment to defend Taiwan, the Korean War, an array of conflicting ideological premises and national objectives, including Peking's endorsement of armed revolutions, and US defense

Brown and the Interdepartmental Group for revisions (see Document 13). Talking points for the President and Kissinger, an outline of NSSM 14 prepared by the NSC staff, and an analysis of U.S. China policy were prepared for an August 14 NSC meeting to be held at San Clemente, California. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-023, NSC Meeting (San Clemente), 8/14/69, Briefings: Korea; China) An August 11 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger stated that the response to NSSM 14 "will be designed primarily as an informal update for members of the Security Council." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 334, Items to Discuss with the President) NSSM 14 was superseded by NSSM 106, China Policy (Document 97) and NSSM 124, Next Steps Toward the People's Republic of China (Document 117).

² "Short-" and "long-term" are not easily defined. They could be interpreted as Mao and post-Mao era, or in some cases, as pre- and post-Viet Nam settlement. [Footnote in the source text.]

³ For a fuller discussion of premises and factors involved in US China policy, see Tab A. [Footnote in the source text. Tab A, attached but not printed, is entitled "Premises and Factors."]

commitments in Asia. Although China faces serious problems in national economic development, it will continue to be ruled by a Communist government and will gradually become stronger militarily, possibly acquiring a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles within the next fifteen years. Peking's policies toward the United States may moderate somewhat under a post-Mao leadership, but Chinese efforts to assert their influence in Asia will result in rivalry with the US regardless of the nature of the Peking regime. Whatever the PRC's actual intentions and capabilities, most other Asians are uneasy about mainland China's long-range objectives in the area, and this concern is reinforced by China's encouragement of revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. As China's power grows, there will be an increasing tendency on the part of other states to recognize the PRC as representing "China", even at the expense of the GRC.

Chinese Objectives and Capabilities

The *present* Peking regime wants other Asian states to accommodate their policies to those of the PRC and eventually model their societies and governments on that of Communist China. Peking wants to be treated as a major world power and as the primary source of revolutionary ideological leadership, and to gain control of Taiwan. China has provided a limited input of funds and training for insurgencies around its border and given selective economic assistance to governments whose attitudes it seeks to influence. It has also engaged in similar activity in other LDC's, especially in Africa. Thus far these efforts have met with little success.

Peking has the ability to launch a major armed attack against any of its immediate neighbors, but we have no evidence of PRC intent to expand its borders or pursue its objectives by armed conquest, except possibly for Taiwan. Peking thus far has not used its limited nuclear weapons capability directly to threaten other Asian states.

The PRC's ability to attain its objectives is limited by 1) severe economic problems, particularly in agriculture; 2) political confusion internally and ineptness externally imposed by Maoist ideology; and 3) a military capability geared largely to defensive operations by its huge land army and constrained by increasing domestic responsibility for the armed forces.

There is substantial agreement that those aspects of Chinese policy that adversely affect US interests are unlikely to change over the short run and that, in the long run, no matter how Chinese policy may evolve, US and Chinese interests will remain in conflict in substantial respects. However, over the next five to ten years, depending in part on when Mao dies, certain changes are possible. These are presented below in the form of two contrasting alternatives. It is recognized that neither alternative is likely to emerge in toto, as described. What is

more likely is an evolution lying between the two extremes, probably incorporating elements of each scenario.

1. In one possible evolution, the Chinese could move towards a policy of more aggressive action. This could involve:

- a. increasing their support for insurgency movements in Asia and elsewhere;
- b. employing direct nuclear threats;
- c. employing the threat of conventional military action, particularly against Asian neighbors;
- d. launching military operations against the Offshore Islands and/or Taiwan, or against the Soviet Union.

2. We believe, however, that it is more likely that China's policy ultimately will moderate, given an international climate conducive to moderation. Domestic economic pressures and the emergence of a more pragmatic leadership in Peking to cope with these pressures would contribute to such an evolution. This could involve:

- a. seeking improved relations with the US and/or Japan, in part as a counter-balance to Soviet pressures;
- b. reducing their concrete support for revolutionary movements;
- c. seeking increased contact with the nations of Asia and membership in international organizations;
- d. developing an interest in measures to control the nuclear arms race.

A question can legitimately be posed as to whether or not it is in US interests for Peking to become more engaged in the international scene. If Peking should choose to pursue a more pragmatic and moderate foreign policy, pressures by the nations of Asia for accommodating Peking and for accepting the PRC into international organizations would build rapidly. Peking's emergence from its self-imposed isolation would thus pose new challenges for US policy in Asia and would probably result in certain short-term losses to ourselves and our allies. Over the long term, however, evolution of Peking's policies toward moderation would offer the prospect of increased stability in East Asia. Since it does not lie within the United States' power to prevent Peking from breaking out of its isolation, the issue posed for the US is whether this evolution will take place in spite of US resistance or whether the US will be seen as willing to accept and live with Peking's entry into the international community and do what it can to take advantage of the change. US failure to adjust its policies to accord with the changed environment would strengthen the impression of US inflexibility and lend credit to Peking's rationale for continued hostility towards the US.

The GRC and Taiwan

The Taiwan issue, including US support for the GRC, is a primary obstacle to an improvement in US/PRC relations. Peking seeks not only

the removal of the US military presence from the Strait area and Taiwan, but also US acceptance of its claim that Taiwan is an internal matter. Taiwan has occupied an important position in US strategic planning. We are committed by treaty, however, only to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores. While US policies over the years have created certain constraints on our actions, the US has made no commitments to the GRC that would require its consent to a change in our relations with the PRC. The GRC's insistence that it is the legal government of all of China of which it claims Taiwan is a part lies at the heart of the mainlander-dominated political structure on Taiwan. The Taiwanese population of the island is resentful of mainlander domination but undoubtedly prefers the GRC to the PRC. They probably hope that Taiwan will remain separate from the mainland and looking primarily to the US to maintain this separation. While Chiang Kai-shek is in control, the GRC will adhere firmly to its claim to be the only rightful government of China. It may, however, tacitly accommodate to US policies and actions which take into account the fact of Peking's control over the mainland, and to a limited extent has already done so.

Relationship of North Viet-Nam and North Korea to Chinese Interests

Although North Viet-Nam and North Korea pursue largely independent policies, sometimes in conflict with those of the PRC, Peking has a major national security interest in their continued existence and would almost certainly intervene militarily if the Communist regime of either country were seriously threatened.

Japan and the Soviet Union

The bi-polar situation that characterized Asia in the past is shifting toward a four-sided relationship among the US, the Soviet Union, Japan and Communist China. The Soviet Union has become with the US one of Peking's two principal antagonists, and Japan's economic strength and growing sense of nationalism will likely lead it toward an increasingly significant political role in Asia. Although under present circumstances there is little likelihood that Peking will alter its rigid and defiant stance vis-à-vis the US, the USSR, and Japan, a future Chinese leadership may seek, through the manipulation of its relations with these three states, to achieve limited rapprochement with one or more of them.

The possible impact of current Sino-Soviet tensions on US policy toward the Soviet Union and China will be discussed in detail in NSSM 63.

US Policy as a Factor Influencing PRC and Third Country Attitudes

The United States ability to influence the attitude and policies of present Chinese leaders is probably very limited, aside from the re-

straining influence of US military power. Future Chinese leaders' perspectives may be altered, however, by considerations of domestic political control, by the need for economic development and by China's relations with third countries. US actions to alter what Peking perceives as the US "threat" could contribute to this. The impact which US actions toward Peking have on third countries depends upon the geographic proximity of each state to China. Any improvement in Sino-US relations will eventually produce pressures in most countries on China's periphery for greater accommodation with Peking. This need not be hostile to US interests in the long-run if it allows for continuing US political and economic relations with these countries even though at a reduced level of intimacy than previously.

UN Considerations

The question of China's representation in the United Nations is inseparable from the claims of both the PRC and the GRC to be the government of all of China and derives its importance largely as a reflection of support for those claims. Although a substantial number of UN members feel that it is a serious defect in the UN system for nearly one quarter of the world's population not to have a direct spokesman in the UN, there is also widespread unwillingness to deny membership to the GRC. Both the PRC and the GRC, however, strongly oppose any two-Chinas arrangements; and under present circumstances support in the General Assembly is inadequate for adoption of two-Chinas proposals because of opposition by member states concerned with their bilateral relations with Peking or Taipei.

The margin of support for our present position in the General Assembly and Security Council is narrow and could be jeopardized by developments outside the UN, such as increased diplomatic recognition of the PRC.

III. US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES RELATING TO CHINA

If there were no conceivable prospect for a change in the attitudes of the leaders of the PRC and the policies they are currently following except in the direction of greater militancy, the choice of options for US policy would be meager and bleak. The key considerations might be when, not whether, a major Sino-US conflict might take place, how the US should best prepare to meet such a challenge, and whether or not consideration should be given to preempting a Chinese attack. Our objectives under such circumstances would focus either on strengthening our own military posture and that of our allies, and on isolating the PRC to the extent possible, or on deciding in advance to reduce or abrogate US commitments and involvement in all areas in which a direct Sino-US conflict might occur.

There is little reason to believe, however, that this present level of conflict and antagonism will endure indefinitely. US long-range objectives and interests can, therefore, plausibly be set in more flexible terms and in the direction of the achievement of an improved and more relaxed relationship with the PRC. These can be summarized as:

a. To deter aggression in East Asia *and* avoid a direct US–PRC armed confrontation or conflict, including the outbreak of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait area, while pursuing the objectives below.

b. To prevent alliance between a mainland government and any other major state directed against the US or other friendly state.

c. To maintain a balance of influence in East Asia which preserves the independence of the states of the area and enables them to maintain friendly political and economic relations with other countries, including the US.

d. To obtain Chinese acceptance of such a system of independent states and Peking's cooperation with other Asian countries in areas of common economic and social activity and interest.

e. To achieve a relaxation of tensions between the US and the PRC, including participation of the PRC in discussions on measures for arms control and disarmament, and the normalization of US political and economic relations with the PRC.⁴

f. To achieve a resolution of the future status of Taiwan without the use of force and, if possible, consistent with the desires of the people on Taiwan.⁵

g. To maintain access to Taiwan to the extent necessary for our strategy in meeting our defense commitment to the GRC and, as needed, our strategic requirements elsewhere, *or alternatively*, to maintain access to Taiwan to the extent necessary for our strategy in meeting our defense commitment to the GRC.⁶

h. So long as Taiwan remains separate from the mainland, to encourage continued growth of its economy and an increasing contribution to regional economic development.

⁴ For a discussion of major alternative policies and problems for the US in improving relations with Peking, see Tab F, *Diplomatic Contacts and Relations with the PRC*. [Footnote in the source text. None of the tabs is printed.]

⁵ The relationship between mainlanders and Taiwanese on Taiwan and the complex problem that this presents in relation to other US objectives makes it desirable at the present time to avoid choosing definitively how best to achieve this objective; by the ultimate political unification of Taiwan and the mainland; the establishment in some way of an independent Taiwan state; or the indefinite continuation of the present situation. For a discussion of major alternative policies and problems in this regard, see Tab C, *The GRC and Taiwan*. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ For a discussion of major alternative policies and problems for the US in resolving the Taiwan question, see Tab D, *Taiwan as a US Military Base*. [Footnote in the source text.]

IV. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

A. Present Strategy

Present strategy has assumed that there is at present only a very limited military threat from China. It also has assumed that, in the short run, US efforts to reduce Chinese hostility toward the US or toward those of its neighbors that are closely aligned with the US will achieve extremely limited results.

In the longer run, it hypothesizes a China that could be militarily more dangerous to the US but with new leaders who could shift the emphasis of Chinese policy in a number of different ways, including to diminished hostility toward the US, and that the US posture may over time be a factor in influencing such change.

The strategy has therefore included two elements: deterrence of any possible direct Chinese threat across its borders or to the US, and limited efforts to suggest to the Chinese the desirability of changing their policies in the direction of a more tolerant view of other states and of the present world political system. Partly because of other policy considerations, the first element has been given somewhat greater stress than the second.

Under our present strategy the US has continued to recognize the Government of the Republic of China as the legal government of China and to support it in the international community. However, in bilateral relations, the US has dealt with the PRC as the government controlling the mainland and with the GRC only concerning the territory over which it has actual control.

We have a commitment to the GRC to assist in the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, but we have indicated to both the GRC and the PRC that we oppose the use of force in the Taiwan Strait area by either side. We have sought to maintain access to military bases in Taiwan both for use in meeting US commitments elsewhere in Asia and for general war contingencies.

We have maintained a virtually total embargo on all trade and other financial transactions with Peking and resisted efforts by other countries to liberalize strategic controls.

We have tried to avoid a direct US-PRC military confrontation or conflict while supporting defensive military and counterinsurgency efforts of independent nations on China's periphery.

We have sought to reduce tension, promote reconciliation with the PRC, and encourage greater Chinese contact with the outside world and with the US, through (i) public statements, (ii) relaxation of controls on travel and cultural exchanges, and specific offers for greater US-PRC contact, (iii) our ambassadorial conversations in Warsaw, and (iv) avoidance of provocative military actions. We have not extended this policy to embrace UN membership.

The questions now posed are these: Is such a policy adequate to deal with the long-term problem of Communist China? If not, what are the alternatives?

There are two major variants to our present strategy by which US objectives might be pursued under present circumstances. Both assume that current Chinese policies can be changed but take different approaches toward how US policy can contribute to an acceleration of the change. Neither alternative completely excludes aspects of the other but each is set forth in a sharply differentiated form in order to clarify the differences. It is assumed that a third alternative, total US withdrawal from involvement in the Asian area where US and Chinese interests impinge on one another, would not further the US objectives described in Section IV [III] above.

B. Intensified Deterrence and Isolation

This strategy would be based on calculations that (1) the strain of repeated policy failures and of growing frustration over China's isolation would cause a post-Mao leadership to reassess China's role in international affairs and alter its policies in a manner that would reduce the conflict between the US and Chinese objectives, and that (2) US efforts to improve relations with Peking have not succeeded in leading China to perceive a need to moderate her policies. To limit Peking's success in pursuit of present policies and strengthen the credibility of the US commitment to its Asian allies, the US could increase its military and economic support of Asian countries to demonstrate that insurgencies supported and encouraged by Peking will fail; strengthen US offensive and defensive capability to demonstrate to Peking that its development of advanced weapons will not affect US deterrent capability, and strive to convince Peking that it cannot gain acceptance into the international community on its present terms.

Opponents of this approach argue that present deterrent capability against China is sufficient and that further attempts to isolate Peking may well increase the present dangers which Peking poses. According to this view, there is no prospect that China's present form of government will be changed by force, and it is impossible effectively to isolate a nation as large as China.

C. Reduction of PRC's Isolation and Points of US-PRC Conflict

This strategy would be based on a calculation that (1) a relaxation of external pressures will be most likely to cause a post-Mao leadership to reassess US attitudes and intentions toward China and China's role in international affairs and that (2) present US policy has given too much weight to deterrence and not enough to steps designed to open up for Peking the possibility of and benefits from greater cooperative involvement in the world. To encourage this reassessment, the US,

while maintaining its defense commitments and continuing to deter any possible overt Chinese attack against US allies in Asia, could gradually de-emphasize the military aspect of our containment of the PRC, unilaterally reduce or eliminate economic and political measures designed to isolate Peking, and acquiesce in the PRC's fuller participation in the international community.

Opponents of this approach argue that unilateral US gestures without demanding corresponding conciliatory steps by Peking will be taken as an indication that the PRC's present militant approach has been successful and would add to existing frictions with our Asian allies. It is further argued that, since there is small likelihood of an early change in Peking's attitudes, China's greater involvement in the world community would simply disrupt present efforts toward international cooperation and complicate US relations with third countries.

[Omitted here is an 11-page discussion of Policy Approaches in Pursuit of the Alternative Strategies. The report also includes eight annexes: Premises and Factors, Modes of Military Deterrence, the GRC and Taiwan, Taiwan as a U.S. Military Base, Offshore Islands, Diplomatic Contact and Relations with the PRC, China and the UN, and Trade.]

24. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11/13-69

Washington, August 12, 1969.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

THE USSR AND CHINA

The Problem

To estimate the general course of Sino-Soviet relations over the next three years.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, SRG Meeting, Sino-Soviet Differences, 11/20/69. Secret; Controlled Dissem. This NIE supersedes NIE 11-12-66; see *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, vol. XXX, Document 223. According to a note on the covering sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate except for the representatives from the FBI and the AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdictions. For the full text of this NIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, pp. 543-559. This estimate was included with the materials for the November 20 Senior Review Group meeting of the NSC. See Document 47.

Conclusions

A. Sino-Soviet relations, which have been tense and hostile for many years, have deteriorated even further since the armed clashes on the Ussuri River last March. There is little or no prospect for improvement in the relationship, and partly for this reason, no likelihood that the fragments of the world Communist movement will be pieced together.

B. For the first time, it is reasonable to ask whether a major Sino-Soviet war could break out in the near future. The potential for such a war clearly exists. Moreover, the Soviets have reasons, chiefly the emerging Chinese nuclear threat to the USSR, to argue that the most propitious time for an attack is soon, rather than several years hence. At the same time, the attendant military and political uncertainties must also weigh heavily upon the collective leadership in Moscow.

C. We do not look for a deliberate Chinese attack on the USSR. Nor do we believe the Soviets would wish to become involved in a prolonged, large-scale conflict. While we cannot say it is likely, we see some chance that Moscow might think it could launch a strike against China's nuclear and missile facilities without getting involved in such a conflict. In any case, a climate of high tension, marked by periodic clashes along the border, is likely to obtain. The scale of fighting may occasionally be greater than heretofore, and might even involve punitive cross-border raids by the Soviets. Under such circumstances, escalation is an ever present possibility.

D. In the light of the dispute, each side appears to be reassessing its foreign policy. The Soviets seem intent on attracting new allies, or at least benevolent neutrals, in order to "contain" the Chinese. To that end Moscow has signified some desire to improve the atmosphere of its relations with the West. The Chinese, who now appear to regard the USSR as their most immediate enemy, will face stiff competition from the Soviets in attempting to expand their influence in Asia.

[Omitted here is the 11-page Discussion section in four parts—Political Background, The Military Dimension, Prospects, and Impact of the Dispute Elsewhere in the World. Also omitted are a 3-page annex entitled Territorial Claims and a map of the eastern and western border between the Soviet Union and the PRC.]

25. President Nixon's Notes on a National Security Council Meeting¹

San Clemente, California, undated.

Helms San Clemente—N.S.C.

China

Cultural Revolution

1. Mao believed enthusiasm for revolution was ebbing

- a. Technicians in ascendancy
- b. Too much like U.S.S.R.—“Fat, non revolutionary”

2. 1965—purged elite

Red Guard from youth mobilized

1. Some of top leaders were skeptical.
2. Army called in in February of 67—and at later times—to bring calm.

—1. Military carried out orders with gusto.

—2. Some of students sent to countryside and state farms.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Personal Files, Box 51, Speech File, NSC Meeting, September 1969. No classification marking. The meeting was held on August 14. Nixon's handwritten notes were transcribed by the editor for this volume. An August 9 memorandum from Kissinger to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, George A. Lincoln, indicated that Helms would give a 25-minute “assessment of present Chinese Communist situation, including development of their nuclear capability and political trends.” (Ibid., NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-023, NSC Meeting (San Clemente), 8/14/69, Briefings: Korea; China) The President's notes suggest that he was listening to Helms' briefing. Although typed minutes from the portion of the meeting devoted to South Korea are in the National Security Council files, no record of discussion of NSSM 14 or China policy was found. (Ibid.) Nor have the materials used in the Helms briefing been located in the CIA files. The President's Daily Diary indicates that the President, Kissinger, Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Mitchell, Lincoln, Wheeler, Richardson, Helms, Halperin, Haig, Lynn, Holdridge, and Green attended the meeting, which lasted from 9:39 a.m. to 12:25 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) Kissinger's personal account of this meeting states that “the President startled his Cabinet colleagues by his revolutionary thesis (which I strongly shared) that the Soviet Union was the more aggressive party and that it was against our interests to let China be ‘smashed’ in a Sino-Soviet war. It was a major event in American foreign policy when a President declared that we had a strategic interest in the survival of a major Communist country, long an enemy, and with which we had no contact.” (Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1979), p. 182). Laird's files contain talking points on Sino-American relations that concluded: “It is assumed that United States policy toward Communist China remains unchanged, with the exceptions of the decisions concerning mainland travel of US citizens and limited purchases of goods of mainland Chinese origins.” (Talking Paper for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NSC Meeting of 14 August 1969; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 75 0103, 335 NSC)

3. Revolution showed army loyal—but unable to cope with civilian tasks.

1. Public discipline deteriorated
 - a. Once proud of it.
2. Enemy got a set back.

Party Congress = to rebuild unity.

1. But much factionalism in all institutions
2. But Peking calls shots
 - a. No war lordism.

Radical Social program. Education and health have been put on back burner

Theme of preparing for war—played heavily.

1. But to unify country.
2. Not to wage war.

Sino–Soviet:

1. U.S.S.R. =# [one] enemy (over U.S.)
2. China sent delegation to Moscow for trade talks.
 - a. Doesn't want a Soviet confrontation.
3. Last event below previous levels, but both sides play them up.
4. China does not expect Soviet attack, but are nervous now—try to settle.
5. Condemn Brezhnev's Asian collective security pact vigorously.

Decline in productivity and trade until 1968.

1. Grain supply is reasonably good.

Nuclear weapons tests proceed.

1. Chinese have done better job than French have.
2. Could have 1972 initial capability of I.C.B.M. but 1975 more likely, when they could have 25.

Aircraft production.

1. Kept at modest levels.
2. A few SAMs (from Soviets).

Largest land army in world.

1. 162 divisions.
2. Below U.S.

30 Russian—full strength.

26. Memorandum From Lindsey Grant and Hal Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 21, 1969.

SUBJECT

Pakistan: Mediation in Sino/US Relations²

Two communications from Jim Spain in Rawalpindi may be worthy of your review:³

Tab A: The Pakistanis are working in the belief that President Nixon told President Yahya that the US wished to seek an accommodation with Communist China and would appreciate the Pakistani's passing this word to Chou En-lai and using their influence to promote this. Yahya is apparently debating whether to call in the Chicom Ambassador to convey the message or whether to wait until he sees Chou En-lai, probably some months hence.

Tab B: Spain believes that in retrospect, reports of Nur Khan's views of Communist China—including Nur's midnight talk with you in Lahore—seem to indicate that the Pakistanis were delivering a message which the Chinese wanted us to hear to the effect that they regard the threat to them from the USSR as more imminent than from us and that they would react sharply.

Spain may be over-reading the Chinese intention to communicate specifically with us via Nur Khan. They have been expressing their concern at Soviet behavior widely enough; Nur Khan just happened to be in China when the Chinese leaders, legitimately, are absorbed with the Soviet problem. He himself made clear to you that he did not bear a message from the Chinese, and the only indication that the Paks themselves may think that the Chinese were talking for our benefit is a

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. Grant signed for himself and Saunders. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum: "This is to be strictly WH matter. I want *no* discussion outside our bldg. Has Hal talked to Hilaly[?]"

² See Document 20.

³ Tab A is an August 16 letter from James W. Spain, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Pakistan. Tab B is an August 7 letter from Spain; an August 1 memorandum of conversation of a meeting held in Lahore among Kissinger, Spain, Saunders, and Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator Air Marshal Nur Khan; and [*text not declassified*]. All attached but not printed.

remark by the Pak Ambassador in Peking. (This all of course leaves the Prague story still tantalizingly in the air.)⁴

Whether or not President Nixon actually intended to encourage President Yahya to an effort at mediation (and only he of course can answer that), we are inclined to believe that Yahya's efforts will do us no harm and may actually do some good. They will underline the sincerity of US interest in improved relations, even if (as is most likely) the Chinese do not respond in any way.

There are several practical dangers in letting the word get around that we have asked others such as the Paks to pursue a *détente* between US and Communist China. All of them are manageable.

a. We may generate excessive expectations as to what is negotiable, with consequent fears in Southeast Asia, and with pressures from some quarters of US opinion to go further to show good faith to the Chinese. At this point in history, the Chinese do not seem to harbor any illusions that they could use us effectively against the Soviet threat by seeking a rapprochement, and most other Chinese objectives must be won *against* us rather than *with* us, so we have little reason to expect that present US bids will pay off in the near future.

b. We will make the Soviets nervous.

c. In the UN context, any reports of a US willingness to improve relations with Communist China always generate rumors that we are slackening our support for the Republic of China, with a danger of erosion of the vote on the Chinese representation issue.

The first of these problems fades quickly with time, and can be met by reiterating our assessment that the Chinese are unlikely to seek better relations in the short term.

The effect of Soviet nervousness is moot. We have already decided to show them that we are capable of dealing with China, anyway.

The third problem is particularly topical, with the UNGA coming up shortly. It can probably be best met by making explicit what has been implicit for eight years: that our objection is to any effort to seat the Chinese Communists *at the expense of* the GRC. This line is itself justified by

—the long-term need to place ourselves in a position from which we can move to accept Chinese Communist membership.

—the need to show consistency with our position that we do not seek to isolate China.

⁴ Apparent reference to a series of stories that surfaced in Prague in mid-July that connected Romanian-American talks to Sino-American rapprochement. (Telegram 1812 from Prague, July 10, and telegram 1863 from Prague, July 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US/NIXON)

—the fact that this line is much more acceptable to most other countries than is a continued opposition to Chinese Communist entry.

Pressures for Chinese Communist entry into the UN will mount if China continues to move toward a more subtle and less doctrinaire foreign policy. Even from our own standpoint, Chinese Communist entry would have its advantages as well as its disadvantages. Moreover, we would be in a stronger tactical position fighting for the GRC's right to stay than in trying to resist Chinese Communist participation. It is also quite possible that we would eventually lose, in any case, or that the GRC would refuse to remain in a UNGA which invited the Chinese Communists in. In either case, the diplomatic defeat for the US would seem much smaller if we had been seen not as opposing Chinese Communist entry but as trying to save a place for the GRC.

27. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 28, 1969.

SUBJECT

Sino-Soviet Contingencies

The two options being examined for the contingency of major Sino-Soviet hostilities should be subjected to much more rigorous examination and debate. As things now stand, the first approach—strict impartiality—seems likely to break down completely in the execution, and the second—shading toward China—could have major consequences in our relations with the USSR.

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for information. A covering note reads: "The attached memo (Tab A) represents a highly personal and apparently minority view of our choices in the event of major hostilities between Russia and China. Still, you might find it worth reading before the interagency paper is submitted next week." Kissinger's handwritten comment reads: "Note to Hyland: 1st class paper. Thanks. HK." Regarding the interagency paper, see Document 29.

Impartiality

This exists only in theory. In practice, the US will have to make choices which will have the net effect of a distinct sympathy for one or the other side.

Consider the following problems:

—do we continue bilateral and four-power Middle East talks with the USSR? If strict impartiality means business as usual, we should continue them; but this will be subject to the interpretation that we are condoning Soviet “aggression;”

—would we start or continue SALT? If we did the Soviets and most of informed opinion in the world (and in China) would see it as favorable to the USSR; if we refused to talk this would be a clear retaliation, not impartiality;

—would we continue negotiations on a seabeds disarmament treaty?

—consider a UN resolution condemning the USSR (introduced by Albania); could we abstain? Moscow would be overjoyed; could we vote against the USSR and be impartial, etc.?

The point is, that in an effort to be truly impartial, we would probably wind up clearly supporting the USSR, unless we were prepared to take specific actions to indicate our disapproval, which would then amount to support to China. Indeed, trying to be even-handed and impartial or neutral once China has been attacked by major force, is clearly tantamount to supporting the USSR.

Even if all of the specific problems could be miraculously sorted out, the world at large and domestic opinion is going to scrutinize our position and conclude that we favor one side.

One way out of this dilemma could be not to adopt an avowed policy of impartiality but one of enlightened self-interest, regulating our reactions, statements, and actions to the actual situation. As many have pointed out a Sino-Soviet war, for a limited period and if limited in scope, is by no means a disaster for the US. It might just be the way to an early Vietnam settlement. It might also be a “solution” to the China nuclear problem.

In any case, it is worth considering the option of being mildly pro-Soviet, trying at the same time to be mildly pro-Chinese, depending on the scope and duration of hostilities.

In other words, instead of measuring our various actions against the criteria of impartiality or neutrality, to measure each against the national objectives of the United States, which are in the process of being defined in the NSSM-63 study.²

² Documents 15 and 40.

Partiality Toward China

This variant does not seem to be very well thought through. Two reasons have been advanced:

- we will incline toward China to extract some Soviet concessions;
- we will incline toward China to prevent a shift in the Asian “balance” (the argument apparently being that a major defeat of China would result in Soviet predominance).

The notion of extracting Soviet concessions, once major hostilities have begun, is extremely naive.³ The Soviets are not going to attack China in some quixotic mood. If they take this drastic step, they will be fully and totally committed to pursue it to the end. They are already working up deep racial and political emotions in Russia. The Soviet leaders believe we should share their concern about China, and expect, at the least, sympathy and understanding for whatever actions they might take. They will almost certainly regard American gestures to China as sheer hypocrisy.

If this argument is even close to the mark, then the Soviet reaction to our slight partiality toward China is likely to be massively hostile. They might not be able or want to do anything about it at the time, but it will poison Soviet-American relations for a very long time.

The notion of supporting China to some small degree because of the effect on the Asian balance is rather fatuous. Only a slight knowledge of history suggests that foreign conquest of China is not very likely (the Soviets are not so inexperienced as to believe they can conquer China). A quick “victory” simply is not in the cards. The alternative of a long, inconclusive struggle is another problem, but it need not be decided in any contingency plan at this moment.

If the Soviet blow brings down the present regime, this would not be a great disaster. A replacement would have to be anti-Soviet to come to power. The alternative of a pro-Soviet faction surfacing in Peking after an attack is too remote to be discussed; even if the Soviets could find such Chinese leaders, their tenure in China would be brief, and their authority would not extend beyond a few provinces.

The idea that we can build up political credit with the Chinese leaders by displaying our sympathies is not very convincing. If we were serious in this regard we should take actions to forestall a Soviet strike, which the Chinese could claim we have full knowledge of (cf. press reports of such a strike in all US papers on August 28).⁴

³ This is not to say that the Soviets would not pay some price in advance to prevent a more accommodating US policy toward China. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ Chalmers M. Roberts, “U.S. Fears Chance of Sino-Soviet War is Rising: Russia Reported Eyeing Strikes at China A-Sites,” *Washington Post*, August 28, 1969, p. A-1.

If the strike does occur, the only way to gain a real credit in Peking would be a straightforward anti-Soviet campaign. Anything short of this will probably be regarded by the Chinese as a charade. Indeed, the Chinese could already conclude that we know of Soviet intentions and are colluding with them. If and when it becomes public knowledge that the Soviets did in fact mention to us a strike against Chinese nuclear facilities, the Chinese will simply write us off as Moscow's tacit ally.

In sum, there is a considerable danger that by trying to be slightly sympathetic towards Peking we will court a massive overreaction from the USSR and still accomplish very little in the eyes of this or any other Chinese leadership.

28. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 28, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Agha Hilaly
Harold H. Saunders

On Dr. Kissinger's instructions relayed via Colonel Haig, I made an appointment with Ambassador Hilaly immediately after he returned to Washington from the West Coast and made the following points:

1. Dr. Kissinger asked me to call.
2. I understand that when Presidents Nixon and Yahya met, President Nixon said that the U.S. would welcome accommodation with Communist China and would appreciate it if President Yahya would let Chou En-lai know this.²
3. We thought perhaps there might be some uncertainty about what we had in mind and wanted to clarify our point along these lines:
 - a. The President did not have in mind that passing this word was urgent or that it required any immediate or dramatic Pakistani effort. He regards this as important but not as something that needs to be done immediately.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Cookies II, Chronology of Exchange with the PRC, February 1969–April 1971. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders on August 29. The meeting was held in the Pakistani Embassy.

² See Documents 20 and 26.

b. What President Nixon had in mind was that President Yahya might at some natural and appropriate time convey this statement of the U.S. position in a low-key factual way.

4. We would like to establish a single channel for any further discussion of this subject should President Yahya have any questions about what President Nixon intended or any impressions of Chinese views which he might wish to relay to President Nixon. We would like to see Ambassador Hilaly and Dr. Kissinger as the two points of contact.

The Ambassador said he felt there was no misunderstanding on this subject. To confirm, he walked to his desk and picked up what looked like 10 legal-sized pages which apparently constituted his record of the debriefing President Yahya had given him on the talk with President Nixon.

Reading from various parts of this record, he reconstructed the conversation between the two Presidents along the following lines:

1. President Nixon said that he thoroughly understands Pakistan's points of view toward China.

2. President Yahya, discussing China's view of the world, said that China feels surrounded by hostile forces—India, Soviet Union and the United States in Southeast Asia. China seeks no territory or war but will fight with no holds barred if war is thrust upon it. President Yahya stated his view that there is a need for a dialogue with China to bring China into the community of nations.

3. President Nixon stated it as his personal view—not completely shared by the rest of his government or by many Americans—that Asia can not move forward if a nation as large as China remains isolated. He further said that the US should not be party to any arrangements designed to isolate China. He asked President Yahya to convey his feeling to the Chinese at the highest level. When President Yahya said it might take a little time to pass this message, President Nixon replied that President Yahya should take his own time and decide for himself the manner in which he would communicate with the Chinese.

In concluding the conversation, Ambassador Hilaly said that Chou En-lai had been invited to Pakistan and had accepted but it was not clear when he would come. He said President Yahya might, in a conversation with the Chinese Ambassador, simply say that the US had no hostile intent toward Communist China but he would wait until he sees Chou En-lai to convey President Nixon's specific views.

Harold H. Saunders³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

29. Memorandum for the Record of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

San Clemente, California, September 4, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kissinger
The Attorney General
Admiral Nels Johnson
Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson
Assistant Secretary G. Warren Nutter
Thomas Karamessines
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
John H. Holdridge

1. The group agreed that while the draft was a good first cut, some adjustments would have to be made to make the paper more specific and more useful.² It was agreed that the section on Vietnam should be strengthened and that the implications of a Soviet blockade of the China mainland would need to be examined from the legal standpoint in detail. An international study of neutrality was required. In addition, further study on the question of the US relationship with the Soviets was required. For example, in the event of a Soviet attack, would we drop discussions with the USSR on SALT, the Middle East and Berlin.

2. It was also generally agreed that the position of impartiality would have the practical consequences of helping the Soviets. Dr. Kissinger proposed, and the rest agreed, that in such circumstances we might try to get something from the Soviets. There were possibly opportunities which might exist for us in other areas such as Korea and Vietnam.

3. On the question of the public position to be taken by the US in the UN or elsewhere, there was concurrence on the point that we could not condone a nuclear exchange, and that if we wanted to quiet things down we must say so. On asking for a ceasefire, it was accepted that for the US to ask for one without at the same time condemning the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-071, WSAG Meeting, 9/4/69, Sino-Soviet. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Holdridge prepared talking points for Kissinger. (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, September 3; *ibid.*)

² Reference is to a paper entitled "Immediate U.S. Policy Problems in Events of Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities." The draft version is *ibid.*, Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970.

Soviets would appear to the Chinese as “collusion.” With such a condemnation, however, it was acceptable to ask for a ceasefire.

4. Dr. Kissinger remarked that 2 factors are involved: the actual situation, and what the Chinese perceived. He felt strongly that the definition of impartiality would be to establish a position which in the next decade would focus Chinese resentment entirely on the Soviets, and not on the US.

5. Another point raised by Dr. Kissinger was the undesirability of creating a situation in which a country would establish a principle of resorting to nuclear weapons to settle a dispute. If such a principle were established, the consequences for the US would be incalculable. It was not enough for us to deplore the effects of nuclear weapons on health and safety factors and we must make this very plain to the Soviets despite the US nuclear policy in Europe.

6. With respect to the paper itself, it was agreed that it should be refined into two alternatives: a situation in which major hostilities were in progress, and a situation in which the Soviets launched a surgical strike against Chinese nuclear centers. There was general agreement that a surgical strike would probably lead to greater hostilities, but for the purpose of the paper this distinction should be made.

7. The group also agreed that section four—what to do to deter—was most pertinent and urgent. The Soviets, in fact, might be getting the idea that we are encouraging them and our record should be clear.

8. Dr. Kissinger observed that as in the Korea papers it would be helpful to know something about what DEFCON should be entered into. He added that it would be insane for Eastern European countries to attempt to approach the US if the Soviets were to knock out the Chinese nuclear capacity.

9. A problem was noted in where to contact the Chinese—Warsaw would probably be out. What we said to the Chinese, though, would not need to accord with what we said publicly.

10. Additional problems were noted concerning US reconnaissance. We faced something of a dilemma in that the time we wanted the most information there might be a cutback in the ways to get it. It was accepted that we would continue as fully as we could with reconnaissance flights, perhaps standing farther off the coast.

11. There was some questioning of the inclusion of a civil defense posture.³

³ A “Summary of Conclusions” listed decisions taken by the WSAG as outlined in this memorandum for the record. (Ibid., Box H-071, WSAG Meeting, 9/4/69, Sino-Soviet)

30. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee¹

Washington, September 8, 1969.

SUBJECT

CIA Covert Action Program Against Communist China

1. Summary

This memorandum describes the covert action program of CIA which is directed against Communist China. CIA seeks approval to continue this program. Communist China, because of current ferment, appears especially vulnerable to the program's extensive, varied, but carefully targeted efforts: clandestine radio operations to Communist China [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]; political action groups, with related newspaper, journal and magazine publications [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]; use of world-wide covert press placements; balloon-delivered leaflets [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]; black operations originating from Headquarters and field stations; assistance to the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) overt radio broadcasts to the mainland; and the establishment of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] political action agents [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

The program fund levels for these activities are: [*dollar amount not declassified*] in Fiscal Year 1969, of which over half is for the purchase and installation of new radio transmitting equipment, and [*dollar amount not declassified*] in Fiscal Year 1970.

In the field these activities are coordinated with the U.S. chief of mission, as appropriate. At Headquarters they are coordinated with the Department of State at the Assistant Secretary level.

2. Background

Communist China, weakened by the Cultural Revolution, is re-defining its internal and external policies and there are indications it may re-emerge into the world society. The recent Ninth Party Congress

¹ Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 303/40 Committee Files, China. Secret; Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. A handwritten notation on the first page indicates the 303 Committee approved the memorandum at the October 16 meeting. According to the minutes of that meeting, attended by Kissinger, Mitchell, Packard, U. Alexis Johnson, and Helms: "The consensus was that this is a worthwhile program and its continuation was approved." (Memorandum for the record by Frank Chapin; *ibid.*, 303 Committee, 1969 Minutes) The 303 Committee became the 40 Committee after President Nixon signed NSDM 40 on February 17, 1970, thus updating NSC 5412/2.

set a wobbly course for China's recovery from internal chaos. Preliminary indications are that ideology will be again stressed with emphasis on constant revolution for China and, where possible, for the rest of the world. The Chinese people appear weary of internal conflict and the lack of individual material progress. These weaknesses in the Chinese Communist system are vulnerabilities which the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] covert action program is designed to exploit.

The program aims to further U.S. policy objectives by supplementing such U.S. overt efforts as Voice of America with covert activities which, if attributed to the U.S., would embarrass the U.S. Government, compromise our foreign assets, or reduce the credibility and impact of the operation.

The program conceives that continued lack of success at home and abroad will lead the Chinese Communist regime to adopt more sensible practices and policies. We do not seek to overthrow the Mao regime, but rather we work to induce moderation and greater internal orientation. In addition, we attempt to widen the Sino-Soviet split and to exacerbate relations between Communist China and North Vietnam and North Korea.

This program was approved by the 303 Committee on 28 April 1967.² The Committee commended a progress report on the success of the black radios on 16 August 1968. A proposal to provide additional transmission facilities to both overt and covert radio operations [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] was approved by the 303 Committee on 22 April 1969.³

[Omitted here is a 9-page discussion of activities concerning China.]

² See *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. XXX, Document 254.

³ As outlined in a memorandum prepared for the 303 Committee, April 10 (Subject: Improvements in Radio Propaganda Broadcasts to China), and approved according to a memorandum for the record by Frank Chapin, April 24. (*Ibid.*, Subject Files, China and *ibid.*, 303 Committee, 1969 Minutes)

31. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 9, 1969, 3:15–4:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

Conversation with the President Concerning China and U.S.-Chinese Contacts

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Henry Kissinger
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

At the President's request, I described to him the procedures we followed in Warsaw for communicating with the Chinese Embassy. The President asked if I could pass a message to the Chinese privately, and I assured him that I could do so by addressing a letter to the Chinese Chargé which would be delivered by an Embassy officer.

The President wondered what would happen if I attempted to talk directly with the Chinese Chargé at a diplomatic reception at one of the neutral embassies in Warsaw. I said I did not know but that I could certainly attempt to make such a contact. The President requested me to do so on an appropriate occasion following my return to Warsaw. If I was able to engage the Chinese Chargé in conversation I could say that I had seen the President in Washington and that he was seriously interested in concrete discussions with China. Any reactions from the Chargé to such an approach obviously would be of the greatest interest.

If the press noted my conversation with the Chargé and inquired about it, the President said I should be noncommittal in my comments, although I might say that the U.S. is interested in good relations with all countries. The President also remarked that, if I did see the Chinese Chargé at a reception, it might also be well for me to seek out the Soviet representative subsequently to keep things in balance.

The President commented that, in general, any person in a responsible position in the U.S. Government must realize that we should

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL CHICOM–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting was held in the White House. Although Stoessel's memorandum notes that the meeting began at 3 p.m., the President's Daily Diary indicates that the President, Kissinger, and Stoessel met from 3:15 to 4:05 p.m. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) According to another copy of the memorandum, Stoessel forwarded it through the Executive Secretariat to Kissinger on September 20. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III)

seek on a long-range basis to better relations with Communist China. We cannot leave that tremendous country and people isolated.

The President spoke of the reactions he had received on his Far Eastern trip to Brezhnev's interest in a collective security pact in Asia. Of course, the Philippines and Thailand were opposed; Pakistan was also against such a pact, since they are playing up to the Chinese. The interesting thing for the President was that India and Indonesia were also opposed.

The President thought that countries in the Far East feared the possibility of a Soviet-U.S. cabal against the Chinese. A Soviet-U.S. "deal" would be bad enough in itself, but the Far Eastern countries see that it could also strengthen the Soviets to the extent that they might be able to take over China in the sense of controlling its policies and actions. If this happened, a Soviet-Chinese bloc would be created which would be dangerous to world peace and specifically to the neighbors of China.

The President noted that we had made a small gesture toward the Chinese lately and it was interesting that the Chinese had not rejected this out of hand. We could go further and put the Chinese on the same basis as the Soviet Union concerning trade. This was something which should be considered.

The President said that, of course, there are issues such as U.N. membership for Communist China which are of concern, but these are short-run political problems which will be resolved eventually. In our own interests we must be prepared to deal with China on trade matters and other things which are of concrete importance.²

² Based on instructions that he received in this meeting, Stoessel struggled to make contact with the Chinese in October and November, but there were few occasions attended by both U.S. and PRC diplomats. Stoessel's letters to various Department of State officials concerning his contacts with PRC officials are *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Walter J. Stoessel Files, China Talks (Warsaw). A meeting was finally arranged in early December (see footnote 2, Document 53).

32. Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 17, 1969, 4:45–6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Status Review of WSAG Papers

PARTICIPATION

Henry A. Kissinger—Chairman

State

U. Alexis Johnson

William Cargo

Defense

G. Warren Nutter

CIA

Thomas H. Karamessines

JCS

Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson

NSC Staff

Col. Alexander M. Haig

Harold H. Saunders

John H. Holdridge

William G. Hyland

Col. Robert M. Behr

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

1. Sino-Soviet Paper²—agreed actions:
 - a. Re-do section on reconnaissance capability.
 - b. Strengthen section on Soviet blockade of China with special emphasis on U.S. military responses should the Soviets deny access to Hong Kong or interfere with U.S. shipping on the high seas.
 - c. Take another look at the operational consequences of “partiality” or “impartiality,” especially in the light of U.S. actions that can be taken in NVN.
 - d. Delete section on civil defense.

[Omitted here is a short section on decisions related to Korea.]

The meeting began at 4:45 P.M. with Secretary Johnson in the chair in the absence of Kissinger who was detained in the President’s office.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Colonel Robert M. Behr who forwarded the minutes through Haig to Kissinger on September 22. (Ibid.)

² Reference is to a paper entitled “Immediate U.S. Policy Problems in Event of Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities.” An early draft of the paper prepared for this meeting is *ibid.* The final version is Document 43.

The acting chairman suggested that the agenda be limited to a wrap-up of the Korean papers and a discussion of the Sino-Soviet paper. The Middle East papers are not yet, he stated, in a form to be addressed by the principals. He called upon Cargo to set the stage for discussion of the Sino-Soviet paper.

Cargo reported that the paper generally reflects the guidance which emanated from the WSAG meeting on September 4, 1969 (held at San Clemente). Alternative situations—a Soviet “surgical” strike and a condition of widespread, major hostilities—have been built in. The intelligence and reconnaissance sections have been expanded. An annex treating the legal aspects of a Soviet blockade has been added. A new Section IV has been written dealing with U.S. advantages in negotiating with the Soviet Union if a policy of strict impartiality is followed. He remarked that further work is needed in the discussion of U.S. responses to Soviet denial of access to the Port of Hong Kong or interference with U.S. shipping on the high seas. The revisions to the paper, he said, have been accomplished with no substantial interagency differences.

Secretary Johnson raised a point of form—an ambiguous use of asterisks in Section III. This will be corrected. He then questioned whether the discussion of overhead reconnaissance capabilities reflected an accurate statement of U.S. capabilities. In short, can the program provide a “tactical” intelligence gathering capability?

Karamessines gave an excellent run-down of the U.S. program and its schedule of events. He described the gaps in coverage (in time as well as geographical area) were an effort to be made to “telescope” the schedule to achieve a given observation requirement. The only prudent assumption one can make is that photographic coverage of a specified geographic area (at a given time) will not be possible in the near future. In a protracted conflict situation, however, a useful observation pattern could be established.

Secretary Johnson inquired how long it takes to prepare for satellite development once a mission order is received. Karamessines said that a vehicle could be launched in fifteen days, with a five day “hold on the pad” period. After that time the equipment would have to be re-cycled.

Secretary Johnson asked if one could follow land order of battle. Karamessines replied affirmatively, saying that movement of major troop elements is relatively easy to detect with overhead photography. Admiral Johnson added that photo coverage is complemented by COMINT, which also gives good data on air movement.

Secretary Johnson asked Karamessines to re-draft the paragraph on reconnaissance. An accurate description of U.S. capability is needed. Karamessines agreed to do so, noting that the wording would be such as to avoid classification problems. Admiral Johnson offered the assistance of DIA specialists. The offer was accepted.

The group then turned to a discussion of a Soviet blockade of the China coast. Secretary Johnson asked for recommendations on how to improve the paper. Cargo said the Soviets could attempt either a blockade of the Chinese coastline or a measure similar to the U.S. quarantine imposed during the Cuba crisis. In either event, the consensus of his working group was that the appropriate U.S. response would be to accept as lawful the Soviet attempt to interdict commerce to the Chinese mainland and seek through diplomatic means to protect the right of U.S. ships to navigate freely, without interference, to neutral ports in the area, but accepting no measures of Soviet verification and control. The real problem, he noted, would arise if the Soviets get hard-nosed and deny access to Hong Kong and interfere with shipping on the high seas. Secretary Johnson observed that not only American nationals in Hong Kong but the whole colony would be held hostage should access be denied. The colony could probably not survive longer than three weeks if food were not introduced either by running the blockade or through Red China. While there would be room for much tactical maneuvering the situation would nevertheless be difficult. Most difficult would be a determination of an appropriate military response. This part of the paper, he said, needs more work. In developing the draft State and Defense should not be bound by the composition of the present working group, but should bring in additional individuals from the departments who can contribute imaginatively. Karamessines said the group should not lose sight of the overall situation—that of major Sino-Soviet hostilities. He wondered if the Soviets might not be somewhat flexible. Admiral Johnson said that whether they were or weren't flexible would not, operationally, mean as much as the opportunity for the U.S. to provide relief by the use of naval escort vessels. The China coast is long and a total blockade inordinately difficult. The Soviets could, however, mine the approaches to Hong Kong harbor, but they probably couldn't impose an air blockade.

Nutter remarked that the Soviet option to blockade China calls for consideration of a parallel situation in Vietnam. Could we expect, if we respected the Soviet blockade, that they would honor a blockade of Vietnam? Secretary Johnson thought the idea had merit and asked Cargo to work it into the paper.

Admiral Johnson wondered whether, in the context of Sino-Soviet hostilities, the U.S. should consider applying greater pressure on North Vietnam. Nutter thought it possible, remarking that over time—two months or so—the internal situation in China would probably deteriorate making that nation less willing to support North Vietnam. Secretary Johnson asked whether such considerations didn't go beyond the scope of the paper, perhaps being more germane to the NSSM 63 study. After considerable discussion of the pros and cons, the group agreed to introduce two additional ideas into the section on Vietnam. We could consider heavy military pressure, including landing of forces

north of the DMZ, or we could offer an attractive (but undefined) “carrot” in an effort to lessen Hanoi’s intransigence. Admiral Johnson cautioned that budget cuts now being worked out will inevitably impair the U.S. ability to conduct amphibious operations in North Vietnam. Hyland thought the idea of a landing contradicted the paper’s general theme of impartiality in that the net effect of such an operation would be detrimental to Chinese interests. All agreed that Vietnam is *our* problem and in trying to solve it, U.S. interests come first.

(Kissinger joined the group at 5:41 P.M. Secretary Johnson briefed him on what had happened in his absence.)

Kissinger reflected on the idea of a blockade of Haiphong in the context of how much sooner, in the event of such an action, the North Vietnamese could be driven to a breaking point.

After considerable speculation about what could be done in North Vietnam (considering additionally the effects on both China and the USSR), Kissinger asked Cargo to lay out the strategic choices with respect to North Vietnam in the event of Sino-Soviet hostilities. (Were such hostilities to occur, the President would immediately ask what to do about Vietnam.) Additionally, he asked Karamessines to prepare for the group an estimate of the current supply situation in North Vietnam, including stockpile quantities and location.

Kissinger inquired how civil defense considerations got into the paper. Since no one had a good answer, it was agreed the section could be deleted.

[Omitted here is a short discussion on Korea.]

No definite date was set for the next WSAG meeting other than that one would be required before Secretary Johnson returns from vacation on October 6, 1969.³

The meeting adjourned at 6:30 P.M.

³ Although the Sino-Soviet conflict was also on the agenda for the September 29 WSAG meeting, it was only briefly discussed. The meeting minutes noted that “Kissinger was called out of the meeting but paused long enough to respond to a question from Cargo pertaining to the Sino-Soviet study and its relationship to the NSSM 63 report. Cargo said that the two efforts were distinctly different, especially in their time frames. He questioned the real utility of developing a detailed analysis, in the NSSM 63 report, of the contingency involving an escalating crisis or rapid deterioration of the overall Sino-Soviet situation. Kissinger deferred to Cargo’s judgment on how the problem should be approached but requested that neither paper neglect to examine the relationship between courses of action and their probable outcome.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970)

33. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹**

Washington, September 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

Kosygin's Mission to Peking

Very little is known of the origins or purposes of Kosygin's visit to Peking. Judging from the characterization of the talks by both sides—"frank" (Chinese) and "useful" (Soviets)—there was no significant movement toward an accommodation.

The fact that the talks were held against a background of sharply-rising border tensions does suggest, however, that each side had an interest in attempting to check what seemed to be a gathering momentum toward large and more serious clashes.

The initiative apparently came from the Soviets perhaps using the Romanians or North Vietnamese as intermediaries. The Soviets may have seen an advantage in appearing to take the lead in trying to reach an understanding, whether the Chinese agreed to the meeting or not. Should hostilities ensue, the Soviets would thus be in a position to present themselves as the aggrieved party. At the same time, the actual Soviet motive may have been to put on the record for Chinese benefit their refusal to tolerate a protracted border conflict. This is the line they took in recent letters to other Communist parties. It may not necessarily reflect a Soviet decision to escalate, but rather an effort to pressure and deter the Chinese.

The Chinese motive is a question, since so far they have been quite consistent in rejecting third party intervention or direct Soviet appeals. The Chinese willingness to receive Kosygin could reflect the more flexible Chinese diplomacy which seems to have been developing in recent months. However, the Chinese would not wish to appear to be resistant to Kosygin's visit, especially since third parties in the Communist world were apparently involved, and would want to appear at least as "reasonable" as the Soviets. In their public treatment they took pains to minimize its significance by stating that Kosygin was merely "on his way home" and that Chou En-lai met him at Peking airport.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. V. Secret. According to a handwritten notation, the memorandum was returned from the President on October 6. Sonnenfeldt forwarded an attached report to Kissinger on September 12. Kissinger then requested that a memorandum be prepared for Nixon. Attached but not printed is a 3-page "CIA Analysis of the Kosygin-Chou Meeting" that served as the basis for this memorandum.

US Interests

Until we learn more of the content of the Peking discussion, it is uncertain how our own interests might be affected;

—there is nothing thus far, however, that suggests a new Sino-Soviet diplomatic offensive on Vietnam;

—there is nothing to suggest a narrowing of Sino-Soviet differences on fundamental problems;

—it is at least possible, that the failure of a personal encounter may actually worsen relations;

—sudden moves of this sort do point, however, to the caution which the US should exercise in basing its own actions solely on expected developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute; much of this relationship is still shrouded from us.

34. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China and Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command¹

Washington, September 23, 1969, 2117Z.

161648. Joint State/Defense Message. CINCPAC pass to POLAD. Subject: Modification of Taiwan Strait Patrol.² Refs: A. Deptel 111806,³ B. Deptel 120842.⁴

1. We regrettably have found it necessary to modify Taiwan Strait patrol. In future patrol will be manned on intermittent basis as Commander Seventh Fleet can make forces available for this purpose.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 6–2 US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Froebe (EA/ROC); cleared by Sloss (J/PM), Captain Hayward (Office of the Under Secretary of the Navy), Rear Admiral Behrens (CNO, Ops–61), Colonel Mayland (Joint Staff, J–5), Colonel Karrick (ISA/PP), Rear Admiral Shepard (ISA/EAPR), Dr. Doolin (DASD/EAPR), Green, U. Alexis Johnson, and Kissinger; and approved by Shoesmith (EA/ROC). Repeated to CNO, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CHMAAG Taipei.

² In notes made during a September 11 telephone conversation between Johnson and Nutter concerning the Strait patrol, Nutter “said that there are various [budget] cuts which have political implications and that they have got to talk to individual countries in advance.” (Ibid., U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Telcons, September–October 1969) A September 15 memorandum from Laird to Nixon stated: “Following my directive to the Services to reduce Fiscal Year 1970 expenditures, the Navy proposed, and I have approved, a number of force reductions that will affect our world-wide naval posture.” He added that the Commander of the Seventh Fleet would make forces available on an intermittent basis in the Strait. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Top Secret Files: FRC 330 72 A 6308, China, Rep. of, 1969, 000.1) In a September 18 memorandum to Haig, NSC staff member Howe wrote that Holdridge had drafted a memorandum recommending approval of the telegram to Taipei. Howe opposed the change in the patrol’s deployment, writing that “its withdrawal will have important political significance. The cable does not satisfactorily cover the implications of this decision on our relations with Peking and naively assumes, in my view, that Chiang Kai-shek will accept such a reduction with little reaction.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III) Kissinger’s memoirs briefly mention the patrol, indicating that Kissinger and Richardson “worked out” this new policy in late September or early October. (*White House Years*, p. 186)

³ In telegram 111806 to Taipei, CINCPAC, and CINCPAC POLAD, July 7, the Department requested information concerning the ROC’s request to purchase nine U.S. warships that had been placed on the stricken list, including four destroyers, four radar picket escort ships, and one diesel submarine. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–8 US–CHINAT) The United States rejected the submarine request but agreed to sell the warships if the ROC decommissioned some of its old vessels. Armstrong suggested that the warship sale and the patrol be treated as separate issues. He wrote that “to suggest that the sale of warships in some way substitutes for present Taiwan Strait patrol could even tend to accentuate GRC concern that ‘modification’ of Taiwan Strait patrol is in fact indicative of US intentions to disengage from US 7th Fleet responsibilities related to our commitment.” He also pointed out that combining the patrol modifications, the refusal to sell submarines, and U.S. requests for ROC ship deactivations in order to purchase newer vessels “would not be a particularly attractive package to the GRC.” (Telegram 4063 from Taipei, October 14; *ibid.*) On October 16 the Departments of State and Defense sent a joint telegram to Taipei accepting this proposal.

(FYI: We cannot now be more precise as to frequency, and wish to avoid being drawn into speculation on this point. End FYI) Decision necessitated as part of over 100 ship reduction in world-wide US naval deployment, made pursuant to recent \$3.0 billion reduction in defense expenditures. Bulk of this reduction will fall primarily on CONUS-based naval forces. Outside of CONUS, majority of destroyer-type reductions will affect our commitment to NATO, while in Pacific area there will be some diminution in naval forces assigned to Southeast Asia along with modification of Taiwan Strait patrol.

2. We believe, however, that following offsetting factors should allay GRC concern for its security interests as a result of this change:

A) Modification carries no implication whatever of any change in US defense commitment or in ability of Seventh Fleet to perform mission contemplated for it under Mutual Defense Treaty.

B) Elements of Seventh Fleet will continue to call at Taiwan ports as in past, and thus will continue visibility of Seventh Fleet in Taiwan Strait.

C) We will in near future make forthcoming response to GRC request for surface ships (Refs A and B) as commented on by all addressees. FYI: Submarines will not be approved. End FYI. Real offset in above reductions is that they are largely responsible for availability of surface vessels now under consideration.

In presenting this decision to GRC, you also should try to keep modification of patrol in perspective for GRC by emphasizing that patrol has been only one aspect of presence of Seventh Fleet in Strait, that other aspects such as R&R visits and periodic calls by Commander Seventh Fleet will continue, and that whatever additional units of Seventh Fleet are necessary to fulfill our commitments under Mutual Defense Treaty are available for immediate deployment to Taiwan Strait area. FYI: This perspective of special importance in view of possibility that President Chiang may choose to interpret modification of Taiwan Strait patrol as contravening Secretary Rogers' statement to him during August visit (when Chiang asked whether US would make "fresh demands for (GRC) to abandon Quemoy and Matsu so that US Seventh Fleet could be withdrawn from Taiwan Strait," and Secretary responded that President Nixon did not "have any intention to move Seventh Fleet"). End FYI.

(Telegram 175922 to Taipei, October 16; *ibid.*) After notes were exchanged in Taipei on November 28 and December 8, the United States sold three destroyers to the ROC. See Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1970, p. 20. Armstrong handled these matters while McConaughy was away from post from late August through early December 1969.

⁴ In telegram 120842 to Taipei, July 22, the Department requested that the Country Team evaluate an ROC request made on July 8 for the loan of four submarines. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-CHINAT)

3. In giving comprehensive consideration to this decision, we recognize that it may reinforce type of concern recently expressed by GRC that major change in US China policy may be impending. It will be evident from foregoing that no change in our basic relationship with GRC is involved.

4. We request, therefore, that Chargé, accompanied by COMUSTDC, seek early appointment with Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo to inform GRC of decision. We suggest that detailed presentation, drawing on paras 1 and 2 above, be made by COMUSTDC in order to emphasize primarily military nature of decision. COMUSTDC should also ask Vice Premier's agreement that TDC brief MND on military aspects of decision.

5. Public announcement of that portion of force reduction involving Taiwan Strait patrol will be made at yet undecided date, and will avoid any direct reference to modification of patrol. Please inform Department as soon as notification given GRC inasmuch as public announcement must await this notification.⁵

Richardson

⁵ On November 1 a joint message from the Departments of State and Defense requested that Embassy officials in Taipei notify the ROC Government of U.S. intentions. (Telegram 185493 to Taipei; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III)

35. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 25, 1969.

SUBJECT

Renewal of US Passport Restrictions

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 337, Subject Files, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May 1969–December 1969. Confidential. Sent for information.

Secretary Rogers has set forth his reasons for continuing the present restrictions making US passports invalid for travel to Cuba, mainland China, North Korea and North Vietnam (Tab A).²

Secretary Rogers notes that the restrictions are ineffective because court decisions have eliminated any sanctions. He has decided to extend the rules for another six months because their elimination at this time could be misconstrued in view of the General Assembly meeting and of measures we may be taking on Vietnam. Removing the remaining restrictions at this time would also have undermined the effect of the limited easing of restrictions undertaken last July with respect to Communist China.

Secretary Rogers believes that "we should look toward the elimination of these restrictions at the earliest possible time." The question is one of timing, and he promises to recommend their removal when he thinks the moment is appropriate.

I agree with Secretary Rogers' decision to make this extension, and with his desire to eliminate the restrictions as soon as we appropriately can.³

² Attached at Tab A but not printed is a September 15 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon. Kissinger restates the contents of the Rogers memorandum. A record of a September 13 telephone conversation indicates that Richardson drafted the memorandum to the President for Rogers' signature. Richardson also noted that Barbara Watson, Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, forwarded a memorandum to Rogers calling for the immediate lifting of travel restrictions. Rogers and Richardson decided to delay any change for the time being. (Record of a telephone conversation between Richardson and Rogers, September 13; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Under Secretary of State, Telephone Conversations, September 1969)

³ Nixon drew a line bracketing the final paragraph and wrote below it: "I agree. Soon—but *not now* but *never* to Cuba until I *decide* it."

36. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 25, 1969, 2:25–3:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

Sino-Soviet Differences (NSSM 63)

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Richard F. Pedersen (came late)

William I. Cargo

Donald McHenry

Defense

G. Warren Nutter

CIA

R. Jack Smith

JCS

LTG F. T. Unger

OEP

Haakon Lindjord

USIA

Frank Shakespeare

NSC Staff

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

John Holdridge

William Hyland

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

The Ad Hoc Committee paper² is to be revised to spell out the consequences of policy choices in three situations:

- a. Continued Sino-Soviet tension but no hostilities;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. NSC staff member Jeanne Davis forwarded the minutes to Kissinger on October 7, under a covering memorandum in which she noted that Sonnenfeldt had reviewed and approved them. A notation on the covering memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.

² Reference is to the draft response to NSSM 63 prepared by the Interdepartmental Ad Hoc Group on September 3. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 63) The October 17 version is printed as Document 40. In an undated memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt and Holdridge criticized the draft response to NSSM 63: “it is inadequate in that it gives almost no proposals or options for US actions to implement the broad strategy it recommends.” They added, “The one area where the NSSM did break new ground—the contingency of Sino-Soviet hostilities—is largely overtaken by the separate contingency paper.” Both added that the leader of the ad hoc group that produced the paper, Elliot Richardson, “was highly favorable to taking some initiative

- b. Active U.S. effort to deter hostilities;
- c. Hostilities
 - 1. one-shot strike, or
 - 2. protracted conflict

The revised paper will be considered again at a Review Group meeting and then by the NSC.

Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting saying that this was a difficult paper to write on a conjectural issue of which we do not know the dimensions. There were, in fact, two papers: a basic paper and a summary. There was, however, no inevitable relationship between the two, since parts of the basic paper were not covered in the summary. He suggested, and it was agreed, that this meeting would deal with the summary paper plus certain points of the basic paper not covered in the summary.

He noted the summary's assumption that the President has already spoken in favor of Strategy D ("to assert an interest in improving relations with both contestants").³ He acknowledged this was true, but noted that usually the President's position was more complicated than what he said. He (Mr. Kissinger) did not wish to be in a position of announcing to the Review Group what the President's policy is, then structuring the meeting accordingly. The President is open to other suggestions if the judgment of this group indicates that another course would be more desirable. The President's position was contained in a public statement that we want to be friends with both sides. Mr. Kissinger interpreted that to mean that in a non-hostilities situation we would be more inclined to lean toward China while publicly pronouncing that we favor neither. He thought the President's view was not so firm that it could not be changed by reasoned

with the USSR to lay out our position." (Undated memorandum from Sonnenfeldt and Holdridge to Kissinger; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, Review Group Meeting—Sino-Soviet Differences 11/20/69) A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. A short summary of this meeting, prepared by R.J. Smith, CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, is in Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01086A, Executive Registry, Richard Helms Files, Box 7, Folder 224. The Department of State version, prepared by Cargo, is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 63.

³ The September 3 draft stated that "In theory, four broad strategies are open to the United States in the face of this classical falling-out between two states, both of which are also in opposition to U.S. interests. A. To support the Chinese position by collaborating with Peking in its efforts to avoid politico-economic isolation. B. To collaborate with the USSR in isolating China. C. To adopt a 'hands-off' attitude, refusing to have anything to do with either contestant that might be interpreted by the other as tilting the balance. D. To assert an interest in improving relations with both contestants, gaining leverage where we can from the dispute in pursuit of our own interests."

argument, and reiterated that there were no restrictions on this group's discussions.

He thought the situations could be stated more explicitly than in the paper, possibly as: (1) continued tension but not hostilities; (2) a U.S. policy to deter hostilities; (3) U.S. policy during hostilities. He could see the argument of leaning toward China on the grounds that in a non-war situation it was more logical to support the weaker against the stronger. During hostilities, neutrality would have the objective consequence of helping the USSR, and assistance to China would probably not make any difference to the outcome. Therefore, since policy in a pre-hostilities stage would not be applicable to a hostilities situation, it would be worth examining policy in both situations.

Mr. Cargo agreed, saying the deterrent policy was presumably a part of the contingency study underway in the WSAG.⁴ He thought the first and third situations (no hostilities and hostilities) were addressed in the paper before the meeting. He noted that Section V examines the implications area by area in both situations.

Mr. Shakespeare asked why there was not more emphasis on and more analysis of the role of Japan and U.S. relations with Japan. He pointed out that Japan now had the third largest GNP and it was predicted that by 1972 its GNP would exceed Germany and France combined. Herman Kahn predicted that by 2000 Japan could tie the U.S. It was the third major industrial power with an excellent physical location and an intense marketing strategy in Asia whose national interest led them to China. He thought that in accordance with the President's policy of regionalization the U.S. should pay more attention to Japan in its relation with China. If our policies could be coordinated, the industrial potential could be much greater.

Mr. Kissinger replied that the China paper looks at the relationship to Japan. He noted that one problem with the Sino-Soviet paper is that there are three studies now going on as pieces of the puzzle.⁵

Mr. Cargo agreed that Joe Neubert and Dick Davies (drafters of the paper) had a terrible time confining the study to the limits set down—they found it hard not to relate the study to the global problem. He knew they had considered Japan and other countries in connection with the paper.

Mr. Shakespeare agreed with the difficulty, but reiterated that Japan would be an enormous potential factor in 10 years.

⁴ Minutes of the WSAG meetings are printed as Documents 29 and 32.

⁵ Apparent reference to the response to NSSM 63, the WSAG Sino-Soviet Contingency paper, and NIE 11/13–69 concerning the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the Defense Department supplement should be considered a dissent.⁶

Mr. Nutter replied that this was a difficult study to confine and still do what it is supposed to do. It started with the China study, which considered some of the longer-range aspects of the problem but did not address the problem of triangular relations. The more immediate triangular concerns were addressed in the contingency study. However, a number of important questions were falling between stools and the longer-range aspects were not being as fully considered as possible, which was one of the reasons for the Defense supplement. The differences between the USSR and China were both political and military. If the Soviets take military action, they would also look to a resolution of the political problems. The question was how to deal with the alternative internal political situations that might develop in China. We would face different problems depending on the political outcome. He saw similar implications in Section V of the paper—consideration of Soviet influence and our reaction in other areas of the world in the case of change with or without hostilities. Defense would like to see more emphasis on an analysis of what opportunities would be presented to us for furthering our national interests in different aspects of the triangular situation. The purpose of the supplement was to indicate that there should be more consideration of the implications of political developments.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt returned to Mr. Shakespeare's point on Japan, saying that if we examine the implications of leaning toward China we must also examine the U.S. attitude toward the economic policies of Japan and other countries. One of the best vehicles for "leaning toward China" would be to be more permissive and tolerant toward third countries dealing with China, and Japan would be an important country in this regard.

Mr. Smith commented that item 6 in the Key Judgments section of the Summary was less than evenhanded in describing the pros and cons—e.g., it omitted the "pro" that in the event of hostilities the present Chinese nuclear capability would be destroyed.

⁶ The Department of Defense submitted a short, undated "supplementary paper" and a summary of the supplementary paper for NSSM 63. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, Review Group Meeting—NSSM-63, Sino Soviet Differences, 9/25/69) The summary emphasized that "The DOD paper contends that the NSSM-63 Summary Statement (Tab A) and the Ad Hoc Group Report (Tab B) give inadequate consideration to two possible outcomes of major Sino-Soviet hostilities, viz the creation of Soviet-sponsored regimes in China and the downfall of the Mao-Lin government." The paper also posited that a Soviet "politico-military effort" might lead to the emergence of a non-Communist regime and complained that the NSSM-63 study did not give adequate consideration to this possibility. This paper is discussed further in Document 41.

Mr. Shakespeare commented that the paper makes the assumption that a Sino-Soviet conflict is to be avoided at all costs and questioned whether this is correct.

Mr. Smith commented that there was little we can do to deter such a conflict.

Mr. Shakespeare noted that we were talking about high-level statements, to which Mr. Kissinger replied that we would make such statements even if we were egging them on.

Mr. Smith said it was not certain that hostilities would create havoc, to which Mr. Nutter commented that it would depend on the real outcome.

General Unger explained that the supplement was designed to explore all the options. He thought the summary paper leads up to the possibility of hostilities and then drops it as undesirable. There could, in fact, be all sorts of outcomes. In line with Strategy D we should be aware of the possibility of the emergence of a non-Communist regime in China. The possible outcome could be in the U.S. interest.

Mr. Lindjord remarked that much of the paper is a contingency plan and asked if we wanted to introduce such a political question.

Mr. Kissinger commented that our stance depends on our idea of a desirable outcome; for example, if we lean toward China in a pre-hostilities period it would be on the assumption that China will be a functioning unit. If China breaks up, we are in a different universe and would no longer have the option of supporting China. We should get some assessment of the trends in a pre-hostilities phase but it would be more important in the event of hostilities. We should consider two possibilities: (1) a military situation where the Soviets have taken out China's nuclear capability and nothing else, and (2) a situation in which the Soviets have moved massively into a protracted ground war. In the first situation, we could make the best of a demonstration of impotence and in the second, we could enjoy the vicarious pleasures of someone else's Vietnam. It was not in our interest for the USSR and China to become a monolithic bloc. If China breaks up, it would not be so much of a problem. He asked if we should postulate a few assumptions.

Mr. Cargo said that perhaps the papers we have don't embrace the whole picture. The contingency plan covers approximately 60 days, while this paper considers the possibility of war further down the pike. Neither paper talks about major hostilities and the possible outcome, but the Defense Department supplement does. He noted that hostilities would provide an opportunity for the Soviets to establish a regime in China more favorable to their interests.

Mr. Nutter agreed that they might.

Mr. Cargo concluded that we need to project further down the road and to consider possible outcomes.

General Unger cited some discussion of this aspect on page 23 of the basic paper.

Mr. Kissinger said it would be helpful to bring the paper to a point where one gives the President some idea of what Strategy D means in practice—what operational policy goes with what types of decisions.

Mr. Holdridge noted that there was a strong Chinese nationalism to be contended with which was a common force in any scenario. The Soviets would have to be physically present in force to make the Chinese regime fly apart.

Mr. Nutter commented that they might be pulled apart.

Mr. Holdridge said the main force in China is to rectify the results of the various periods of imperialism and thought China would tend to hold together.

Mr. Nutter said he would not rule this out in a probabilistic sense, but noted that there were divisive elements in China.

Mr. Smith agreed with Mr. Holdridge. He thought the Defense supplement was speculative in terms of the present paper, but that it had a place if the scope of the present paper should be enlarged.

Mr. Kissinger said he could make no judgment on what will happen in China, but he thought we should make a judgment on the effect of a single Soviet strike on China vs. a massive ground war and that it would be worthwhile to look at the position the U.S. should take. He questioned whether it was worthwhile taking the time of senior people to consider possible political outcomes in China.

Mr. Cargo agreed, saying he thought the Defense Department supplement overstates the case. He asked if we think Soviet political action could produce a change in the Chinese regime.

Mr. Nutter asked what would happen on the death of Mao.

Mr. Smith replied we would probably have collective leadership. He said the Defense supplement ignores the fact of Chinese nationalism and the pervasive anti-Soviet and anti-foreign feeling. He could not see any group of Chinese who would be willing to identify with Soviet interests.

Mr. Nutter remarked that we can't make national policy on such definite statements.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there were no possibility of indigenous change in China.

Mr. Smith thought this would require a major Soviet military effort—that it couldn't happen without it.

Mr. Nutter thought this was a matter of various experts rendering judgments.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there were no possibility of a Chinese leadership that placed greater emphasis on the unity of communism worldwide and would make adjustments.

Mr. Smith thought not immediately following a war—maybe later.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt drew a distinction between a pre-war and a wartime situation. He thought there were elements that could be attracted to a pro-Soviet position in a non-war situation. In a wartime situation, he thought the Soviets could capture enough territory to set up a puppet regime but it would require great effort to maintain it.

Mr. Nutter noted that the population of Sinkiang is primarily non-Chinese, to which Mr. Sonnenfeldt added that they were not pro-Soviet, however.

Mr. Kissinger thought Sinkiang and Tibet were different—they could split off without affecting the Chinese power position. He drew a distinction between them and Chinese core territory.

Mr. Smith agreed that under conditions of great stress, fragmentation would be a serious possibility.

Mr. Nutter remarked that South China had also been shaken.

Mr. Holdridge acknowledged differences between Cantonese speakers and others, but noted that a unifying education policy had existed since 1919 which taught that they were Chinese first and Cantonese second.

Mr. Kissinger thought we might add some consideration of the contingencies beyond the 30-day period to the present 30-day contingency paper—possibly expand it to a consideration of U.S. policy in a period of tension. We should also consider U.S. options in a war situation. Even with the President's statement of Strategy D, should we give him an opportunity in this paper to refine his thinking by putting the key choices before him again. He thought the statement concerning leaning toward one side or the other was too simple; e.g. we could lean toward China but not at the price of getting concessions from the USSR. We need some operational definition of what is implied by the various options.

Mr. Cargo cited the top paragraph on page 2 of the Summary, saying one could spell out the kinds of things that could be done.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that many things were mentioned in germinal form, citing the helpful statements on pages 19–20 of the Basic Paper, but asked so what?

Mr. Shakespeare asked if hostilities would not result in an interdiction in land or sea routes to Vietnam, or, at least, a change in world attention to Vietnam. He thought the USSR would probably pull back from the Middle East and that there would be increasing ferment in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Kissinger commented that this was not the judgment of the paper.

Mr. Nutter noted, with regard to Eastern Europe, that the paper says we can't exploit the situation because it would lead to armed occupation. He asked whether this would necessarily be disadvantageous to the U.S. In the Middle East, we might break away from discussions with the USSR and begin to deal directly with the Arab countries. With regard to Cuba, the paper suggests there is nothing we can do. He questioned whether the paper ruled out possible moves in these areas because we think Soviet action would be to our disfavor.

Mr. Kissinger said that, to the extent our policy in the Middle East is influenced by a fear of becoming embroiled with the USSR, we would have to consider Soviet reluctance to become involved with us in the Middle East and with China in the Far East. This would depend on the different possible war outcomes. If the Soviets were involved in a protracted war in the Far East, they would be reluctant to get into another war. *But*, if they could make a clean nuclear strike, it would enhance their fearsomeness and the temptation to intervene in the Middle East would be greater.

Mr. Shakespeare replied that, even so, the Soviets would have earned the implacable hostility of China. And they might be in difficulty in Eastern Europe. Would the U.S. be worse off?

Mr. Kissinger asked what the effect would be if the USSR knocked off the Chinese nuclear capability, even on top of the Czech invasion. What could China do in 10 or 15 years?

Mr. Shakespeare asked if we gained or lost from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia?

Mr. Kissinger replied we lost.

Mr. Pedersen commented that we did not want a worldwide deterioration of the situation.

Mr. Kissinger thought the "implacable hostility" of China wouldn't hurt the Soviets for 10 years. He cited the Chinese attack on India in 1962 which resulted in India's loss of confidence in China. He thought hostilities might lead to an interesting situation in the Middle East. But, on the other hand, it might make the Soviets think they should clean up the situation in the West before they have to face the East again.

Mr. Shakespeare thought that we should consider whether the possibility of a protracted conflict between the USSR and China could have decided benefits.

Mr. Cargo thought we could analyze the possible types of conflicts which would be advantageous, although we would not have that kind of choice. He thought we must say 'no' to a Soviet-Chinese conflict. He

thought the nuclear problems—the question of fallout alone—would require this position.

General Unger noted the third-country problem, and Mr. Cargo commented that we would be letting the genie out of the bottle.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt commented that arguing the methodology of advantage or disadvantage isn't going to get far. We should isolate the consequences and what problems each would pose. In the Middle East, what would Israel calculate the Soviet reaction to be if they should march. What would be the effect on the India-Pakistan situation?

Mr. Shakespeare agreed. While the paper assumes that hostilities should be avoided at all costs, he thought there was another side.

Mr. Kissinger asked whether, even if we assume our interest is in avoiding conflict, should we not consider it. He thought it would be very useful to expand the contingency paper to 45 days plus. We could handle the Vietnam issue as a part of the contingency paper in view of its sensitivity.

Mr. Cargo agreed.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt noted with regard to SALT that the paper says the Soviets might be more reluctant to go into SALT in the event of major hostilities. He thought this would be true in the event of protracted war, but, on the other hand, the Soviets might want to use SALT as a safety valve and to manipulate the Chinese into a bad position.

Mr. Pedersen noted that the interesting thing in Gromyko's speech to the General Assembly was his statement that any radical disarmament must include all five powers. This was different from what he had said last year.⁷

Mr. Kissinger thought this was suspicious unless the Soviets were getting ready to disarm China.

Mr. Kissinger recommended that, in order to make the NSC discussion useful, we lay out the consequences of various choices in various situations. He thought we might get useful directives as a result.

Mr. Kissinger noted there were overlapping (or possibly conflicting) interests between us and the Soviets which might lend themselves to negotiations in the case of a period of tension or of hostilities.

⁷ In his speech at the September 19 plenary meeting of the 24th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Gromyko introduced a plan for "the strengthening of international security," which was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly. (United Nations, General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, *Official Records*, 1756th Plenary Meeting, September 19, 1969, pp. 7–14; *ibid.*, *Annexes*, Agenda Item 103, Document A/7654 and A/7903, pp. 1–6) International reaction to the Soviet proposal was lukewarm. (Richard Halloran, "Nations Show Little Interest in Pact on A-Arms," *The New York Times*, September 20, 1969, p. 10)

Except for Taiwan, we might have few similar situations with China. Which would be easier?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt noted the disagreement over whether “overlapping” means “converging” or “conflicting,” citing the experience in drafting the BNSP.

Mr. Kissinger thought we should explore what is really hidden by “overlapping,” get it explicitly analyzed and resolved.

Mr. Cargo thought we might highlight the principal choices and their operational consequences and attempt to project them further ahead.

Mr. Kissinger said we should separate hostilities from a period of tension and we should sub-divide the types of hostilities—a one-shot strike vs. protracted conflict. He thought we should bring the matter to the NSC as soon as possible.

Mr. Cargo noted that the “lean toward” option would be taken care of in such an approach.

Mr. Kissinger thought we would probably come out with a recommendation to keep open our options toward China in order to and to the extent that we could get concessions from the USSR. We should pose the question in terms of the three new basic options he had mentioned at the beginning of the meeting. He asked if we could get a revision of the paper in a week or two.

Mr. Cargo replied we could.

Mr. Kissinger said he foresaw a quick Review Group meeting on the revised paper, then to the NSC.

37. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

The US Role in Soviet Maneuvering Against China

In the last two months, the increase in Sino-Soviet tensions has led the Soviets to sound out numerous American contacts on their

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 337, Subject Files, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May 1969–December 1969. Secret. Sent for action.

attitude toward a possible Soviet air strike against China's nuclear/missile facilities or toward other Soviet military actions.² These probes have varied in character from point-blank questioning of our reaction to provocative musings by Soviets over what they might be forced to do against the Chinese, including the use of nuclear weapons. Some of these contacts have featured adamant denials that the Soviets were planning any military moves—thereby keeping the entire issue alive. (Secretary Rogers' Memorandum on this subject is at Tab A.)³

Our contingency planning for major Sino-Soviet hostilities is well along, and NSC consideration of a basic policy paper on the Sino-Soviet dispute is scheduled for October 8.⁴

Meanwhile, I am concerned about our response to these probes. The Soviets may be quite uncertain over their China policy, and our reactions

² The Department of State and the White House received hints from a Soviet official of possible joint action against the PRC as early as March 1969, when two Soviet journalists told U.S. Embassy officials in Moscow that "the situation might reach a point where a U.S.-Soviet 'understanding' on China would become necessary." (Telegram 1169 from Moscow, March 20, attached to the President's March 25 daily briefing memorandum; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 4, President's Daily Briefs) Also during March 1969, Kissinger's daily briefing memoranda to President Nixon contained cables and reports concerning Soviet sensitivity to improving ties between the United States and the PRC. For example, speeches by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) and former John F. Kennedy aide Theodore Sorensen, suggesting the need for better relations with the PRC, provoked immediate Soviet reactions. Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Emory C. Swank, reported from Moscow: "During the past week I have been impressed by suspicion with which some ordinarily sophisticated Soviets have reacted to statements on China recently made by Kennedy and Sorensen." (Telegram 1325 from Moscow, March 29, attached to the President's Daily Brief for March 31; *ibid.*)

³ In the attached September 10 memorandum to the President, Rogers cited a conversation on August 18 between the Soviet Embassy's Second Secretary Boris N. Davydov and William L. Stearman, Special Assistant for North Vietnam, INR/REA. Rogers observed: "Davydov's conversation was unusual for the length of the argument that he presented for such a Soviet course of action [an attack on Chinese nuclear facilities]. None of the other occasional references to the idea in talks with the Soviets which have come to our attention have spelled out such a justification." Rogers concluded, "the Department's analysts judge that the chances of this particular course of action are still substantially less than fifty-fifty and that Sino-Soviet conflict, if it does occur, might more likely result from escalation of border clashes. That assessment seems reasonable to me." Robert Baraz (INR/RSE) drafted the memorandum for the President on August 29, and Green sent it to Rogers at the Secretary's request on August 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12 CHICOM) Kissinger wrote his comments on an earlier version of his September 29 memorandum to the President that Sonnenfeldt and Holdridge had drafted: "I disagree with State analysis. Soviets would not ask such questions lightly—though this does not mean that they intend to attack. Redo cover memo for President giving a little more flavor of communist probes. Remember he *never* reads back up material. But I want us to work with them and give specific guidance. Best would be to send directive to State about [unintelligible] of instructions we received." (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt and Holdridge to Kissinger, September 12; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. V)

⁴ See Documents 40 and 43.

could figure in their calculations. Second, the Soviets may be using us to generate an impression in China and the world that we are being consulted in secret and would look with equanimity on their military actions.

A related issue is the shifting Soviet attitude on Chinese representation in the UN. We have had two indications that the Soviets, in an effort to keep the Chinese Communists out of the UN through indirection, are dangling the prospect before us of cooperation on the representation issue. Gromyko, in his UN speech, of course failed to mention Peking's admission for the first time.⁵

I believe we should make clear that we are not playing along with these tactics, in pursuance of your policy of avoiding the appearance of siding with the Soviets.

The principal gain in making our position clear would be in our stance with respect to China. The benefits would be long rather than short-term, but they may be none the less real. Behavior of Chinese Communist diplomats in recent months strongly suggests the existence of a body of opinion, presently submerged by Mao's doctrinal views, which might wish to put US/Chinese relations on a more rational and less ideological basis than has been true for the past two decades.

Recommendation

That you authorize me to ask the Department of State to prepare instructions to the field setting forth guidance to be used with the USSR and others, deploring reports of a Soviet plan to make a preemptive military strike against Communist China.⁶

⁵ Kissinger first reported these "two indications" to the President. According to a second-hand account of a conversation with a Soviet diplomat in Canada, the diplomat accepted that the PRC should "eventually" join the UN and hold a seat on the Security Council, but that the ROC should remain in the General Assembly. (Telegram 1615 from Taipei, May 14; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 6, President's Daily Briefs) The other indication came from a meeting between U.S. Ambassador to the UN Charles Yost and a Soviet diplomat. The Soviet remarked that he hoped the United States would not change its policy toward Chinese representation in the UN. (Telegram 1292 from USUN, May 1; *ibid.*) Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's September 19 speech to the United Nations mentioned almost every Socialist country except the PRC and every issue except UN membership for the PRC. (United Nations, General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, *Official Records*, 1756th Plenary Meeting, September 19, 1969, pp. 7-14)

⁶ The President initialed his approval and added a handwritten comment: "Base it on 'reports which have come here—etc.'" Apparently this was not the first time the issue had arisen. The President responded to such a report on Soviet concerns that the United States might exploit Sino-Soviet tensions in the President's September 17 daily briefing memorandum, writing: "K—we must be getting through. We must not be too obvious about it." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 10, President's Daily Briefs) Attached to another copy of Kissinger's September 29 memorandum is an unsigned and undated memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers, laying out the President's request as described in this paragraph. (*Ibid.*, Country Files, USSR, Box 710, Vol. V)

38. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 8, 1969.

SUBJECT

Time for US Initiative Toward Peking?

An accumulation of indicators, especially the latest Chinese statement on the border negotiations with Moscow, suggests that the present may be an opportune moment for a move toward Peking. The Chinese statement contains an extremely interesting formulation worth quoting in full:

"The Chinese government has never covered up the fact that there exist irreconcilable differences of principle between China and the Soviet Union and that the struggle of principle between them will continue for a long period of time. But this should not prevent China and the Soviet Union from maintaining normal state relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence."²

Obviously this thesis of normal relations could apply to the US as well as to the USSR. Indeed, it is reminiscent of the Chinese statement last November agreeing to resume the Warsaw talks.³ In this respect it could be a signal of some importance.

It comes against a background of other indications that the so-called "pragmatists" in Peking seem to have increasingly reasserted their influence over the conduct of Chinese diplomacy. If this is so, then some probing by the United States would seem justified.

Moreover, the apprehensive tone of the statement on the border dispute, plus other signs that the Chinese have been impressed by the Soviet threats of recent weeks, suggest that concern over the Soviet problem may make them more receptive to US overtures than at any time in the past several years.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 518, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Hyland. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it on October 10.

² The Five Principles were "mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence." (*Beijing Review*, October 16, 1970, p. 13) These ideas were first articulated by Foreign Minister Chou En-lai at the 1955 Bandung Conference.

³ See Document 6.

Finally, there is some concrete evidence worth considering. The Norwegian Ambassador has reported on the rather even-handed Chinese discussion of relations with the US which he had with a Chinese foreign ministry official recently.⁴ And the new French Ambassador in talking with Chou En-lai gained the impression that Chou was generally more dispassionate in discussing the US.⁵ For example, he did not reject the idea of resuming talks, but commented that the "situation was complicated", apparently referring to the situation in Peking. On the Sino-Soviet border he charged that our attitude was "ambiguous," but went on to say that America thought nothing good would come from war between China and the USSR.

All of the above seems to suggest an exploratory American overture. Such an overture could be designed to accomplish two purposes:

1. To establish our interest in resuming a dialogue, in Warsaw or elsewhere.
2. to lay out for the Chinese our position on Asian policy as expressed by the President during his trip, with special emphasis on Vietnam.

There are several points which could be made to the Chinese:

- we could officially call their attention to the changes in our import control and passport regulations;⁶
- we could call to their attention the reduction or removal of the destroyer patrol in the Taiwan Straits;⁷
- we could call to their attention the statement by Elliot Richardson on the Sino-Soviet problem, and expand somewhat on the theme of our position of non-collaboration with the Soviets;⁸

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 123.

⁵ Telegram 14940 from Paris, September 30, reported on meetings between French Ambassador to the PRC Etienne Manac'h and Chou En-lai that took place on September 25. French Ambassador Charles Ernest Lucet met with Irwin to give further details on the talks, which were reported in telegram 169976 to Paris, October 7. (Both telegrams are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, China, Vol. III)

⁶ See Documents 14 and 35.

⁷ See Document 34.

⁸ In a September 5 speech before the American Political Science Association (APSA) in New York, Richardson remarked: "In the case of Communist China, long run improvement in our relations is in our own national interest. We do not seek to exploit for our own advantage the hostility between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic. Ideological differences between the two Communist giants are not our affair. We could not fail to be deeply concerned, however, with an escalation of this quarrel into a massive breach of international peace and security." He also emphasized that the United States would seek agreements with the Soviets and attempt "to bring Communist China out of its angry, alienated shell." The full text is in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 22, 1969, pp. 257-260.

—we could note the formulation quoted above, on “normal relations” despite differences of principle, and inquire whether this could apply in our relationship;

—finally we could expand on the strategic implications for Peking of the President’s Vietnam policy:⁹

a. we are not threatening China; indeed we are trying to end the war and are withdrawing troops from both Vietnam and Thailand;

b. we have not sought to take advantage of Chinese problems on the Soviet border;

c. that peace in Southeast Asia would open up new possibilities in our relations with Peking, along the lines of the President’s backgrounder in Guam, etc.¹⁰

We should not expect much of a response on the official level but the situation inside China has probably evolved to the extent that the message will be read and understood. It might lead to nothing at first. But it is the one avenue of diplomacy connected to Vietnam which has been blocked. It is certainly worth probing to see if that avenue is now opening up.

*Recommendation*¹¹

That you discuss this with Richardson at your next meeting and suggest State work up a proposal for your early consideration.

Approve

Disapprove

See Me

⁹ The President read his September 24 daily briefing memorandum, which contained a report on Lodge’s conversation with Frenchman Jean Sainteny, who had recently returned from Hanoi. Sainteny believed that the PRC was key to the Vietnam conflict, because it was using its economic aid to pressure Hanoi to continue fighting. Nixon added a handwritten note: “K—important? Peking may still be holding the Soviet’s feet to the fire.” (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, September 24; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 11, President’s Daily Briefs)

¹⁰ Reference is to the President’s July 25 remarks at Guam, during which he outlined what came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 544–556. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. I, Document 29.

¹¹ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendations, but Kissinger did meet with Richardson on October 11 to discuss easing passport restrictions to China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. In briefing Kissinger for that discussion, Haig also noted, “The President has authorized you to ask State to prepare instructions to the field setting forth guidance for deploring reports on a Soviet plan to make a preemptive military strike against Communist China.” (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, October 11; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Subject Files, Box 337, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May 1969–December 1969)

39. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 16, 1969.

SUBJECT

President Yahya and Communist China

I was visited at the end of the week by Ambassador Hilaly and by Sher Ali Khan, President Yahya's Minister of Information and National Affairs who was here at the head of Pakistan's UN delegation. Although Sher Ali may not quite be Yahya's number two as he claims, he is apparently close.

Sher Ali came to report follow-up on your suggestion that President Yahya tell Chou En-lai that the US would welcome accommodation with Communist China.²

Sher Ali reported that Pakistan's delegate to the Peking 20th Anniversary celebrations had been instructed to let the Chinese know that Yahya was prepared to discuss the subject of American intentions in Asia when Chou En-lai visits Pakistan, presumably early next year. Now Sher Ali felt that it would help President Yahya to have something specific to say to the Chinese, perhaps on US intentions on Vietnam. They could make a general pitch for the improvement of relations but that would be unlikely to provoke a specific response. President Yahya hoped that we might give him something to say.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. According to a handwritten and stamped notation, the memorandum was returned from the President on October 28.

² See Documents 20 and 26. The Pakistanis apparently were encouraged by the Department of State. Holdridge reported to Kissinger on September 16 that "The President's interest in using the Pakistanis as a line of communication to the Chinese Communists has become known to a number of people in State. The attached Secret/Limdis cable reports a conversation in which Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly described [to Sisco] the President's approach to President Yahya and reiterated Pakistan's willingness to communicate with Peking." Sisco raised the issue of Sino-American relations by suggesting that Pakistan could "find ways of persuading Chinese that U.S. wants to get along peacefully with them." Holdridge continued, "I assume that Hilaly took Assistant Secretary Sisco's remark as the approach for which he had been waiting." (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, September 16; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I) Telegram 154461 to Islamabad reporting the September 10 conversation between Sisco and Hilaly was attached. The full memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHICOM-USSR

I told him that I would have to consult with you so that we could pass on a more precise formulation than I was prepared to do at that moment. I did tell him however that, if President Yahya were communicating with the Communist Chinese Ambassador, he might say confidentially that the United States is removing two of its destroyers from the Formosa Straits.³ I told him that he should not allow any misunderstanding of this move—it did not affect our basic position on Taiwan but it was an effort to remove an irritant. I told Sher Ali that we would be in touch with Ambassador Hilaly when we had something more precise to say.⁴

³ See Document 34.

⁴ President Nixon wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “K—also open trade possibilities.”

40. Draft Response to National Security Study Memorandum 63¹

Washington, October 17, 1969.

[Omitted here is a Table of Contents.]

NSSM-63

U.S. POLICY ON CURRENT SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES

Summary

This paper considers the policy options posed for the United States by the Sino-Soviet dispute on the assumption that the dispute continues to be fought out in terms of an essentially political rivalry on the present pattern; analyzes the nature of the interrelationships between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, and examines in general terms the problems and opportunities for the United States which would result from major hostilities between the Soviet Union and China. (The immediate short-range options in the event of Sino-Soviet war are the subject of a separate contingency study.)²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, Review Group Meeting, Sino Soviet Differences, 11/20/69. Secret. For drafting information, see footnote 3, Document 15.

² See Document 43.

Options

Three broad strategies are considered.

Option A would have the effect of supporting Communist China, the weaker of the two contestants, and would probably take the form of making various unreciprocated gestures towards China, such as endorsing Peking's border claims, while, at the same time, displaying reluctance to engage in negotiations with the USSR, e.g., on SALT. Pursuit of this strategy might result in some long-term improvement in the U.S.-Chinese relationship and it might also help prolong the Sino-Soviet dispute, but the Soviet reaction would be strong and adverse. The Soviets would probably pursue an intensified policy of attempting to detach Western Europe from the U.S., win over Asian countries, particularly Japan, strengthen their hold over Eastern Europe, and step up their own military program.

Option B would have the effect of supporting the Soviet Union, the stronger contestant, and would take the form of maintaining our present posture towards China without change, while we adopted a generally softer line towards the USSR. It could result in a more accommodating Soviet attitude on some of the major issues between us and in the general Soviet posture, but it might have the effect of making the USSR more difficult to deal with and more ready to take preemptive action against the Chinese. It would damage the chances of an improvement in our relations with China.

Option C would be one of overt neutrality and could be applied in one of two ways.

Option C. 1. would involve our taking no action which might be construed as favoring one contestant or the other. Accordingly, we should make no effort to develop our relations with Communist China and, at the same time, avoid trying to arrive at understandings with the USSR. Such a policy would reduce to a minimum the dangers of U.S. involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute, but would hamper pursuit of our own interests, vis-à-vis both China and the USSR.

Option C. 2. would involve maintenance of a policy of neutrality, while we pursued our own long-term interests towards both China and the USSR, without undue regard to the interpretation either side might put on our actions. In implementing this policy, we should attempt to develop our relations with China, while continuing our basic support of the GRC on Taiwan, and simultaneously seek to negotiate with the USSR on the important issues between us. This option would have the advantage of leaving us free to try to work out a satisfactory relationship with each of the contestants, but it would be difficult to pursue, since it calls for constant awareness of how each of them reacted to it.

The Interrelation: The Soviet Union, China, and the U.S.

The Soviets almost certainly see their relationship with China as the most compelling problem in foreign affairs now confronting them. Short of a conceivable Soviet decision to strike militarily against China, it can be anticipated that Moscow will persist in efforts to strengthen its military position along the border with China, to develop improved relations with both Communist and non-Communist countries on the Chinese periphery, to shore up its overall security position (particularly in Eastern Europe), to diminish Chinese influence in other Communist countries, to protect its political gains in the Middle East, and to establish a generally less hostile relationship with the West.

The character of Soviet policy could change if Moscow comes to believe that the Chinese are on the way to breaking out of their largely self-inflicted isolation, and most especially if this seemed to be happening in a way that foreshadowed a real and far-reaching Chinese rapprochement with the U.S. In this event, the Soviets might well see a need to strengthen further their general military position; they might feel greater compulsion to strike militarily at China; and they might adopt a more hostile attitude toward the U.S. Alternatively, the Soviets might decide that a serious effort to improve relations with the U.S., even at the expense of concessions on specific issues, was more likely to serve their interests.

It seems probable that the Chinese, for their part, also now regard the USSR as their most immediate and threatening adversary. They seem determined to give no ground in the quarrel, in spite of their obvious military weakness vis-à-vis the USSR. Since many of the handicaps which encumber Chinese foreign policy are of their own making, the way to greater international maneuverability is open to them—if they choose to use it. It is possible, therefore, that Peking might at some point come to see that it would be better served in the struggle with the Soviets by a more flexible posture. This could, even in the near term, lead the Chinese to seek improved relations with third countries and a somewhat less hostile relationship with the U.S. Peking recognizes its own military weakness in facing the Soviet Union and it is most unlikely that the Chinese will launch a military attack against the USSR. Nevertheless, the Chinese can be expected to react violently against any Soviet attack on Chinese territory.

The triangular relationship between the U.S., the USSR, and China is, of course, an unequal one: U.S. and Soviet interests intersect in many parts of the world, whereas our problems with China lie mainly in Asia. For the foreseeable future, the views of Peking and Moscow as to how the world should be organized are likely to remain incompatible with ours. Thus, until a fundamental and far-reaching change takes place in China or in the USSR, the resolution of critical differences we have with either is unlikely. Nevertheless, there is today some convergence of

interest between us and the USSR in the various parts of the world where our interests interact, arising mainly from our mutual desire to avoid a nuclear war. There is less convergence between U.S. and Chinese interests. Broadly, however, each of the three powers wants to avoid collusion between the other two or any dramatic expansion of the power of either adversary at the expense of that of the other.

Growing dissidence between the USSR and China has limited both countries in the pursuit of policies basically antagonistic to U.S. interests; this is the most important benefit which assumes to the U.S. from Sino-Soviet rivalry. Beyond this, the dispute has, in a positive sense, heightened Soviet interest in developing a less abrasive relationship with the U.S. and it may at some point lead China in the same direction.

Problems and Opportunities for the U.S. Assuming Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities

A change in the degree of tension between the Soviets and Chinese is a more likely prospect than a change in kind. The latter is, however, now well within the realm of the possible. There are two ways in which major hostilities might develop:

- (1) through inadvertent escalation, and
- (2) by deliberate resort to military force on a large scale.

Given the calculus of military power only the USSR would be likely to see advantage in the second course.

The impact of major Sino-Soviet hostilities on U.S. interests could vary significantly depending upon the nature and duration of the hostilities, the general posture of the U.S. toward the two sides, and the outcome of the war. The course and outcome of such hostilities are highly unpredictable.

Major Sino-Soviet hostilities which did not directly involve third countries (other than Mongolia) and were fought only with conventional weapons would not necessarily be disadvantageous to us. During such a war, the U.S. could expect (1) a drastic reduction in the capability of the USSR and China to pursue policies inimical to U.S. interests elsewhere, (2) a drastic reduction in assistance to Hanoi thereby eventually enhancing the prospect for political settlement in Viet-Nam, and (3) improved relations with third countries anxious to strengthen their own security in an uncertain situation. However, if third countries in Asia or in Europe were to be drawn in on one side or the other, if wars of opportunity should break out as a result (e.g., between North and South Korea), or if nuclear weapons were used in the conflict, serious dangers and problems for the U.S. would arise.

The general posture of the U.S. toward the Soviet Union and China at the time major hostilities broke out between them—and during the conflict—could affect U.S. ability to maximize advantages and

minimize risks. If we clearly supported one side in the conflict, we would be unable to gain advantages in relations with the other and we would have difficulties with third countries not adopting the same partisan attitude. A U.S. posture of neutrality in the dispute would provide maximum flexibility in dealings with third countries and might encourage both Moscow and Peking to make concessions to ensure that the U.S. not become involved in their quarrel, since both would fear U.S. support of the other.

The outcome of a Sino-Soviet war could have important policy implications for the U.S. If the Mao-Lin regime survived in control of China as it now exists, its prestige would be enhanced and China would probably be a more formidable opponent of U.S. interests in Asia. If the Soviets succeeded in creating puppet regimes in the Chinese border provinces, Peking might become more interested in improving relations with the U.S., but a triumphant USSR would be more difficult to deal with and Soviet influence in Asia would be enhanced to a degree and in ways inimical to our interests. If the Mao-Lin regime should be ousted as a result of the war, China might be fragmented and civil war might follow. The U.S. would then face the question of whether it should not attempt to counter Soviet efforts to gain predominant influence over more than just the border areas.

The net balance of the advantages and disadvantages to the United States cannot be foreseen, but the possibilities that nuclear weapons might be used, that other countries might be drawn into the war, and that the outcome might shift the balance of power against us, are sufficiently great to make an escalation of hostilities something we should seek to avoid and to raise the question whether there are possible actions we could take to minimize the chances of a major Sino-Soviet military conflict.

We have little ability to influence directly either Moscow or Peking on the question of relations with the other, since neither regards this as a question in which we have a legitimate interest. Even so, the U.S. could make it clear that it would not welcome a major Sino-Soviet conflict and believed dangerous international complications would ensue. Even if such a position did not reinforce councils [*counsels?*] of caution in Moscow and Peking, it should serve U.S. purposes in relations with third countries.

In making contingency preparations if major Sino-Soviet hostilities seemed imminent, care should be taken to avoid creating the impression that we were preparing to take military advantage of either Peking or Moscow since this could contribute to the explosiveness of the situation.

[Omitted here are 23 pages of text divided into three major sections: 1. Options; 2. Analysis of the Interrelation: The Soviet Union, China, and the U.S.; and 3. Problems and Opportunities for the U.S. Assuming Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities.]

41. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Chairman of the Senior Review Group (Kissinger)**¹

I-25593/69

Washington, October 30, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSSM-63—U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences

I am enclosing 25 copies of the "DOD Supplementary Paper on NSSM-63," as revised since the Review Group Meeting on September 25.² I request that this revised DOD paper be submitted to the Review Group concurrently with the NSSM-63 Report forwarded to you by Mr. Cargo on October 23.³

As you know, the Secretary of Defense has directed the various elements of the Department to make a special effort to ensure that DOD views are brought to the attention of the NSC whenever these views differ from those of other agencies, as is the case with the NSSM-63 Report. The Report forwarded by Mr. Cargo reflects none of those DOD views that diverge despite our repeated efforts to incorporate them for NSC consideration.

In addition, the NSSM-63 Report includes a summary statement that neither OSD nor the OJCS representatives were given a chance to read prior to dissemination of the Report to the NSC Staff. I should also note that a DOD footnote that has been incorporated in the final draft submitted for inter-agency consideration calling attention to the DOD Supplementary Paper was omitted from the final NSSM-63 Report without the knowledge or concurrence of the DOD representatives.

We believe that the revised version of the NSSM-63 Report is fully responsive neither to the original NSSM nor to the Review Group's request at the end of the September 25 Meeting that the original Report be revised to cover certain points relating to major and prolonged Sino-Soviet hostilities.⁴ In our view, there are additional issues that must be considered in connection with alternative outcomes to the current differences between the two governments and their ruling communist parties.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, Review Group Meeting, Sino Soviet Differences, 11/20/69. Secret.

² The 9-page report is attached but not printed. See also footnote 6, Document 36.

³ Document 40.

⁴ A handwritten note in the margin reads: "Not so."

We also regard as a main issue the possibility that dynamic political change could occur in China and that hostilities, or Sino-Soviet “reconciliation” under Soviet dominance, however improbable either event may appear at this moment, would seriously affect events in and outside China. We believe that the Soviets desire a political change in China and might be willing in certain circumstances to undertake military action to help promote such change.

We believe that such courses of events, whatever their apparent likelihood at the present time, deserve greater attention because of the significance of their possible impact on the world and on U.S. interests and policy, and that they should not be overlooked solely on the ground of seeming improbability. For this reason DOD is submitting the enclosed “DOD Supplementary Paper on NSSM–63,” dated 8 October 1969.

G. Warren Nutter⁵

⁵ Printed from a copy that indicates Nutter signed the original.

42. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–8/1–69

Washington, October 30, 1969.

[Omitted here are a Table of Contents and 1-page map entitled “Communist China: Advanced Weapon Facilities.”]

COMMUNIST CHINA’S STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAM

The Problem

To assess China’s strategic weapons program and to estimate the nature, size, and progress of these programs through the mid-1970’s.

Conclusions

A. China’s nuclear test program continues to emphasize the development of high-yield thermonuclear weapons. The Chinese have

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99, National Intelligence Estimates, NIE 13–8/1–69. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a notation on the covering sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on October 30 except for the representative from the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. For the full text of this NIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, p. 678. See also the earlier version of this estimate, Document 7, and a related report, Document 168.

developed a device [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that could be weaponized for delivery by the TU-16 jet medium bomber, or possibly configured as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) warhead. They are probably at least two years away from having a thermonuclear weapon in the medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) weight class, but fission warheads for such missiles could be available now. For the next several years at least, the production of nuclear materials can probably keep pace with or exceed the requirements of testing and the number of strategic missiles and TU-16s the Chinese are likely to be able to deploy.

B. The Chinese have probably begun production of medium bombers (TU-16s). We estimate that production could reach a level of about four or five a month and that about 200 TU-16s might be available by mid-1975.

C. The evidence suggests strongly that the Chinese are moving toward MRBM deployment. We believe that any major deployment program will involve the construction of permanent complexes, but we have no evidence that such work has begun. Even if some complexes were started in early 1969, they would not be operational before about mid-1970. It is possible, however, that there are a few operational MRBM sites in China at this time. If so, they probably would be temporary-type installations intended to provide an interim capability against the USSR.

D. [*1 line of source text not declassified*] However, should a vehicle become available for testing within the next few months, IOC could be achieved by late 1972 or early 1973. It is more likely, however, that IOC will be later, perhaps by as much as two or three years. If the earliest possible IOC were achieved, the number of operational launchers might fall somewhere between 10 and 25 in 1975. In the more likely event that IOC is later, achievement of a force this size would slip accordingly.

E. The Chinese have a large solid propellant complex at Hu-ho-hao-t'e in Inner Mongolia. We lack any basis for judging how the Chinese will proceed with a solid-propellant program, but we presently doubt that the Chinese could have either an MRBM or ICBM with solid fuel motors in the field by 1975. Moreover, a concentrated effort in this field would probably force the Chinese to restrict severely the deployment of liquid-propellant missiles.

F. If the Chinese were to attempt to orbit an earth satellite in the next year or so, a modified MRBM would probably be used as the launch vehicle. [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]

G. In general, it is clear that the Chinese continue to press ahead with high priority work on strategic weapon systems. Many uncertainties remain, however, which leave in great doubt the future pace,

size, and scope of the program. Unlike the Soviet case, where we have observed numerous programs progress through development to deployment, most of the Chinese effort is not far enough along to provide an adequate historical background for judging China's technical and industrial capabilities for developing, producing, and deploying weapon systems embodying advanced technologies. [5 lines of source text not declassified] China's disturbed political situation and the increased animosity in Sino-Soviet relations add further uncertainty about the course of Chinese weapon programs over the next few years.

Discussion

I. General Considerations

1. A number of developments over the past year attest to China's intent to become a major strategic power. These include continuing work on the development of liquid fuel strategic missiles, solid propellants, and nuclear weapons, and the initiation of jet medium bomber production. For the most part the Chinese program has continued along lines previously observed.

2. There are, however, many uncertainties in our understanding of the scope, pace, and direction of the Chinese advanced weapons program. [3½ lines of source text not declassified]

3. In the missile field, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Unlike the Soviet case, where we have observed numerous advanced weapon systems progress through development to deployment, most of the Chinese effort is not far enough along to provide an adequate historical background for judging China's technical and industrial capabilities for developing, producing and deploying weapon systems embodying advanced technologies. The Soviets also publish some information on such matters as scientific accomplishments and military strategy and doctrine. This is not the case in China. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] We thus are unable to ascertain important key performance characteristics of missiles being tested or to follow closely the status of the test program. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

4. The Chinese no doubt have found it difficult to cope with the many complexities involved in advanced weaponry, and they may well find it increasingly difficult to do so as they continue to move beyond the technical limits of help received from the Soviets during the late 1950's. Technical data and specialized materials and equipment available to them from Western and Japanese sources can only partially overcome the handicap of China's limited scientific and technical resources, which are spread out thinly over a considerable number of programs.

5. As time goes on and more weapons systems reach the testing and deployment stage, there will be demands on high quality, scarce resources which will force upon the Chinese some increasingly difficult

decisions. They will have to make some choices among various weapon systems; they will also have to consider whether to deploy early systems in large numbers or to wait for later systems that might appear more credible as a threat and as a deterrent. Other choices confronting the Chinese are the balances to be struck between conventional general purpose and strategic forces, and between intercontinental and regional strategic programs. It is quite possible that the Chinese have not faced up to these problems fully and have not yet defined clearly the composition and size of their force goals.

6. Certainly the political situation in China during the past several years has not been conducive to orderly planning. There is good evidence that the Cultural Revolution intruded into the highest levels of the defense scientific establishment and into the government ministries responsible for missile and nuclear development, but we have not been able to pinpoint where disruption has occurred or to assess how serious it might have been. Although the wildly frenetic aspects of the Cultural Revolution have subsided, the chances for further negative political impact on advanced weapons programs remain. Finally, any longer term forecast of developments in China should allow for the host of uncertainties that will arise about China's future once Mao departs from the scene.

7. There are good indications that the large-scale Soviet military buildup opposite China and the recent sharp clashes on the border have increased considerably Peking's concern that the Soviets might take some major military action against China. It is highly uncertain what effects, if any, this deepened hostility might have on China's advanced weapons program. Much would depend, of course, on how high the Chinese actually rate the chances of a Soviet attack and on the type of attack they judge most likely. At one extreme Chinese fears might spur them into an emergency effort to deploy whatever they could as quickly as possible. At the other extreme it is conceivable that they might postpone deployment, at least of the sort that would appear particularly provocative to the Soviets, for fear that such deployment would increase the likelihood of a Soviet pre-emptive blow. Or the Chinese might decide that their best course was to improve the mobility and firepower of China's ground forces in an effort to make as unattractive as possible to the Soviets the prospect of a conflict at the conventional level. But these possibilities are pure conjecture, and at this point we can make only the very general judgment that Sino-Soviet antagonism is likely to continue as an important factor in Chinese military planning and strategy.

[Omitted here are paragraphs 8-40, comprising the trends and prospects portion of the estimate. This includes sections headed Nuclear Program (Nuclear Testing and Development, and Nuclear Materials Production), and Delivery Systems (Medium Bomber Force, MRBM Program, Missile Submarines, ICBM Program, IRBMs, Solid Propellant Missile Program, and Space Program).]

43. Washington Special Actions Group Report¹

Washington, November 10, 1969.

[Omitted here is a Table of Contents.]

IMMEDIATE U.S. POLICY PROBLEMS IN EVENT OF MAJOR SINO-SOVIET HOSTILITIES

Preface

The actions proposed below in the event of a major Sino-Soviet conflict are postulated on the thesis that such a conflict would not be in our interest and therefore we should do all possible to avoid involvement while doing what we can to encourage termination of the hostilities, particularly before the Soviets emerge with a major victory. However, the proposed actions also involve our being alert to the possibilities of promptly exploiting whatever opportunities may be presented for expediting a favorable termination of the war in Vietnam.

IMMEDIATE US POLICY PROBLEMS IN EVENT OF MAJOR SINO-SOVIET HOSTILITIES

Summary of Recommendations²

1. The US would publicly emphasize its impartiality and noninvolvement, urge both sides not to use nuclear weapons, call for negotiations and the restoration of peace, and take steps to avoid any provocative actions or accidental contact by US forces with belligerent

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 411, National Security Council Contingency Plans. Top Secret. This is the final version of the report discussed in various WSAG and SRG meetings (Documents 29, 32, and 36). The Department of State's Policy Planning Staff served as coordinator of the report. Even as revisions were being made, Holdridge wrote: "At the time it was begun, the prospects of a clash between Moscow and Peking seemed greater than they are today—perhaps the Soviets were actively considering taking some form of action, but now have resolved not to do so, or to defer pending the outcome of the talks in Peking." Holdridge also noted that the paper discussed short-term actions and was compatible with NSSM 63, which focused on longer term issues. He suggested that the Department of State's Policy Planning Council keep the study current. (Memorandum from Holdridge to Colonel Behr of the NSC Staff, October 20; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-071, WSAG Meeting, 10/21/69, Middle East/Sino-Soviet/Berlin.) For more information about the organization and activities of the Policy Planning Staff during the first Nixon administration, see William I. Cargo and Margaret L. Cargo, *Wherever the Road Leads: A Memoir* (Published by William and Margaret Cargo, 1997), chapter 21, "Again Washington—Directing the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (1969–1972)."

² This report was discussed briefly at the October 21 Washington Special Actions Group meeting. U. Alexis Johnson suggested that, with the exception of a few minor changes, it was a "finished product." Cargo then detailed two changes from the previous draft. The first would be to make clear that a Soviet victory did not require control of Chinese territory but instead "an extension of Soviet influence over a compliant CPR

forces. If hostilities were set off by the Soviets, the US would express its strong concern, and if nuclear weapons were used, strongly condemn their employment. These points would be made privately as well to both the Soviets and Chinese. We would not take the initiative to change our bilateral negotiating posture toward the Soviets significantly in the event of a conventional conflict, but if the Soviets employed nuclear weapons, we would at least suspend arms limitation talks. (III A, pp. 8–16)

2. In the event of any conventional Sino-Soviet conflict, the US military readiness and reaction posture would be strengthened by selected command and alerting actions. Scheduled overseas military exercises would be reviewed for possible provocative risks and degradation of our military posture, and force demobilization and withdrawal programs would be selectively suspended pending further analysis of the impact of Sino-Soviet hostilities on the US global force posture. In the event nuclear weapons were employed, DEFCON status would be increased, NATO consultations initiated, advanced Civil Defense plans implemented, and selected Reserve and National Guard units recalled to active duty. (III B, pp 17–21)

3. Close-on peripheral air and sea reconnaissance and overflights would be suspended pending high-level review of risks and intelligence requirements. Available intelligence collection platforms including advanced planning for the fullest use of present overhead reconnaissance capabilities would be readied for use as was judged needed. Peripheral collection missions along the China coast would be given earliest favorable consideration, consistent with risk factors, and human source collection efforts would be maximized. (III C, pp 22–24)

4. In the UN, the US would support a Security Council resolution consistent with our public posture, including criticism of the Soviets if their responsibility for hostilities was clear. (III D, pp 25–28)

5. We would emphasize to our Asian allies our intention of remaining non-involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict and would reaffirm our treaty commitments, maintaining close consultation with our allies. We would take precautions to forestall any actions by the Republic of Korea or the Republic of China which might expand the area of hostilities. In NATO, we would consult with our allies, maintaining a moderate, non-provocative posture, and support the implementation of appropriate alert measures as required by Soviet and Warsaw Pact

government." Second, the United States would avoid the impression that a blockade of Haiphong was a retaliatory act in the event of a Soviet blockade of Hong Kong. The blockade issue was to be kept separate from Sino-Soviet hostilities. Kissinger also requested that a summary of recommended actions (which are printed here) be added to the first section of the paper. (Ibid.)

force dispositions. We would make clear to the Soviets that these measures were defensive and not meant to threaten the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. Toward Third Countries, we would emphasize our concern over the hostilities and our wish to avoid becoming involved. (III E, pp 29–37)

6. We would convey to the East Europeans our overall position on a Sino-Soviet conflict, urging them to use their influence to prevent or end any use of nuclear weapons, indicate our intention of avoiding any provocative actions, and reiterate our desire for improved bilateral relations with all countries. (III F, pp 38–39)

7. We would assure the Japanese of US caution in all actions which might result in US involvement in Sino-Soviet hostilities, but emphasize the importance of the flexibility of US base use on Okinawa. (III G, p 40)

8. In Vietnam, the US would review programmed troop withdrawals and our military posture in the South with a view to maximizing the strain on Hanoi as a result of Sino-Soviet hostilities. We would also consider more far-ranging alternatives of increasing our military pressure on the North or of holding out a new attractive inducement to Hanoi. (III H, pp 41–43)

9. The US would strongly oppose any use of nuclear weapons in a Sino-Soviet conflict and, if intelligence suggested their use by either side was being contemplated, we would consider discreet disclosure of our information to diminish the degree of surprise and hopefully to forestall use of the weapons. If nuclear weapons were used, we would take the lead in condemning their use and increase our worldwide DEFCON status. (III I, pp 44–45)

10. The US would consult with the UK and Hong Kong Governments on possible developments in Hong Kong and possible assistance in emergencies to the Hong Kong authorities. US R&R travel and naval ship visits to Hong Kong would be discontinued if the British requested. (III J, pp 46–47)

11. In the event of a Soviet blockade of the China coast, we would decline to challenge Soviet attempts to interdict commerce to the mainland but seek through diplomatic means to protect the right of US ships to navigate freely without interference to neutral ports, including Hong Kong. (III K, pp 48–49)

12. If independence movements developed in Sinkiang or Tibet, possibly with Soviet encouragement and assistance, the US would indicate its general opposition to territorial changes by force, endorse the principle of Chinese territorial integrity, and support the principle of self-determination while awaiting a clarification of the situation. We would express private concern to the Soviets over any territorial dismemberment of China and warn the Indians that if any intervention on their part in Tibet resulted in Chinese retaliation, we would have to

review the applicability of the Indo-US Air Defense Agreement. (III L, pp 50–51)

13. In the event of an internal struggle for power in China triggered by a Sino-Soviet conflict, the US would remain impartial between all conflicting factions. (III M, p 52)

14. In order to deter a Sino-Soviet conflict, the US might publicly warn that the Sino-Soviet conflict would endanger world peace, encourage discussion of the situation in the UN as a means of building public pressures against the possible belligerents, emphasize bilaterally to the Soviets our concern over the dangers of a possible Sino-Soviet war and arrange for the same concerns to be made known to Peking, and encourage third countries to bring their influence to bear on the Soviets and Chinese to avoid escalatory actions. (V, pp 57–59)

[Omitted here are 60 pages of text divided into five sections: I. Purpose, Scope and Assumptions; II. General Posture Alternatives; III. Immediate Policy Problems and Options; IV. Impartiality Stance: Advantages in Negotiating with the Soviet Union; and V. Possible U.S. Actions to Deter Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities. The report concludes with three annexes: A. Adequacy of North Vietnam's Stockpiles of Military and War Related Supplies; B. U.S. Neutrality and Soviet Maritime Interdiction of Communist China; and C. U.S. Actions in the Event of Soviet Interference with Vessels of US Allies Trading with the Chinese Mainland or with US or Allied Vessels Trading with Hong Kong.]

44. Memorandum for the President—Evening Report¹

Washington, November 12, 1969.

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of a House of Representatives resolution concerning Vietnam.]

2. *GRC Representations on Okinawa and the Formosa Straits*—Nationalist Chinese Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming called on me today to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 13, President's Daily Brief. Secret. An Evening Report memorandum was forwarded daily to the President under the signature of the Secretary or the Under Secretary. The reports discussed overseas developments as well as budget issues and congressional relations. The information was sometimes placed into the daily briefing memorandum for the President produced by NSC staff under Kissinger's signature, but the President rarely read the Department of State's Evening Report itself.

convey his government's views on Okinawan reversion and on our decision to modify, beginning next Saturday, the Taiwan Strait Patrol.²

On Okinawa,³ Wei reiterated his government's suggestion that a plebiscite be held to confirm the wishes of the Okinawan people. I pointed out that it would be most inadvisable to introduce such a proposal at this stage in our negotiations with Japan, particularly since it might be interpreted as a shift from our acknowledgment that Japan has residual sovereignty over Okinawa. I also pointed out that recent elections in Okinawa leave no doubt as to the wishes of the people.

With respect to modification of the Taiwan Strait Patrol, Wei stated that although our decision involved little change from a technical point of view, it could have serious repercussions in terms of possible Chinese Communist reaction and public opinion in the Republic of China. He urged reconsideration of that decision. I emphasized that the decision had been prompted solely by budgetary considerations and reassured him that it involved no change in policy or our defense commitment, and that the Seventh Fleet would be able to carry on the functions of the regular patrol. I held out no possibility that the decision would be changed, noting that it had been approved at the highest level.

[Omitted here is information on Nigeria, West Germany, and media relations.]

² Rogers met with Wei and his party at 12:35 p.m. (Private Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books) For background on the Taiwan Strait patrol, see Document 34. A record of this meeting was sent to Taipei in telegram 191895, November 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 RYUKYUS)

³ Chinese interest in Japanese-American negotiations over the disposition of Okinawa is discussed in more detail in Documents 45, 113, 115, 133, and 134, as well as in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIX.

45. **Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, November 13, 1969.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with GRC Ambassador Chow Shu-kai

You have a meeting with GRC Ambassador Chow Shu-kai at 5:30 p.m. November 14, in response to a request from Ambassador Chow. As you recall from previous contacts with Ambassador Chow, he is a good, professional diplomat who likes to work through channels and who would not have sought a meeting with you except under instructions from Taipei and for purposes regarded by his government as extraordinary.

Ambassador Chow's Position

There are two issues of major importance to the GRC which we believe lie behind his meeting with you. These are:

—Our decision to modify the Taiwan Strait Patrol.² The GRC has now been informed of this decision, and has resisted it. President Chiang Kai-shek was about to intervene personally with our Chargé to ask reconsideration, but thought better of it and instead made such a request through the GRC Foreign Minister. It seems likely that President Chiang wants to end-run the State Department and get his strong feelings against our decision directly to the President. The GRC opposition to our move is based on: (1) the belief it might cause the Chinese Communists to calculate that our degree of support for the GRC had declined, thus encouraging stepped-up pressure on Taiwan or the Off-shore Islands; and, (2) fear of an adverse effect on public morale in the Republic of China.

—The Okinawa reversion issue. The GRC has long maintained that it should have some say on the basis of the Japanese Peace Treaty regarding the disposition of Okinawa. Realizing that it cannot prevent Okinawan reversion, it wants to stall by calling for a plebiscite to be held to confirm the wishes of the Okinawan people.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 751, Presidential Correspondence File, Republic of China, President Chiang Kai-shek. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. The document was date-stamped "Nov 17 1969." No record of this conversation has been found.

² See Document 34.

—In addition, the GRC may through Ambassador Chow express some concern about the general trend in Sino-US relations, fearing that our support for the GRC is eroding. Ambassador Chow may allude to comments by US officials (e.g. Secretary Rogers) on improving relations with Communist China.³

Your Position

I recommend that:

—You reiterate that the modification of the Taiwan Strait Patrol was made for budgetary considerations only.

—You point out that the totality of the US relationship with the GRC depends on far more than the mothballing of two aged destroyers, and that many important evidences of US support for the GRC will remain in effect. For example, the Seventh Fleet will continue to operate in and around the Taiwan Strait area. You may wish to remind Ambassador Chow that we have agreed to strengthen the GRC Navy by five destroyer and destroyer-escort type vessels, which would leave the power balance in the Taiwan Strait unimpaired.

—Regarding Okinawa, the US has had numerous expressions of opinion on the part of the Okinawans as to their desire to be reunited with Japan. A case in point was the election of the present Okinawan Chief Executive, Yara, on a platform favoring reversion. Resisting this trend might impair the utility of our bases, and adversely affect the security of both Japan and Taiwan. Our purpose is to see these security interests safeguarded.

—US support for the GRC has been exemplified by the US stance on the Chinese representation issue in the UNGA. The vote rejecting Communist Chinese seating, while some less than last year (48–56–21 to 44–58–23), still showed substantial agreement on this issue.⁴

—We will be looking forward to the visit of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo in February of next year, at which time the President will have the opportunity to reinforce what you have just said about Sino-US congruity of interests.

³ Apparent reference to Rogers' August 8 address before the National Press Club in Canberra, Australia. The Secretary commented that the United States had been "seeking to open channels of communication" and pointed to liberalization of passport and tourist regulations regarding the PRC. (Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1, 1969, p. 180) He reiterated these comments in his August 20 news conference in Washington. (*Ibid.*, September 8, 1969, pp. 201–208) Haig brought Rogers' comments to the attention of Kissinger on August 18 in his memorandum entitled "Items to discuss with the President," stating that "Rogers free wheeled on China without any prior White House clearance." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President 8/13/69 to 12/30/69)

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. V, Document 283.

46. **Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, November 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSSM 63, Sino-Soviet Rivalry—A Dissenting View

NSSM 63 seems to proceed from certain basic assumptions about the effect of the Sino-Soviet rivalry on US interests. I would argue those assumptions. In my view, the revised paper still: (a) overdraws the benefits of the dispute for the US, (b) omits significant side effects of Sino-Soviet hostility, (c) fails to probe the most likely form of a full-fledged Sino-Soviet war and (d) puts the fundamental policy choice to the President in the wrong terms. The following are specific points of this criticism (keyed to the sequence of discussion in your analytical summary):²

The Rivalry and US Interests

1. *The paper rests on a judgment that the dispute has kept the Russians and Chinese from concerting anti-US policies and thereby limited the freedom of each to hurt us.* I find this a questionable proposition from the history of the last eight years, particularly in the developing world where the Soviets and Chinese have had most targets of opportunity. One can argue, for example, that "concerted" Sino-Soviet policies on the Subcontinent in the '50s confined both to an equivocal posture which did little to undermine our position with either the Indians or the Paks. It was the *dispute* that freed the Soviets to follow through their own game with Nehru and Shastri, and thus emerge as the main arms supplier and a dominant influence in the area.

Similarly, it was a Peking already at odds with Moscow which (a) attacked the Indians in 1962 (creating, among other unfortunate results, Delhi's appetite for Soviet arms) and (b) moved to become a major arms supplier to the Paks in the following period. Our declining

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, Review Group Meeting, Sino-Soviet Differences, 11/20/69. Secret. Sent for information. Morris sent the memorandum to Kissinger through Robert Osgood of the NSC staff. A handwritten notation on the first page notes that copies were sent to Sonnenfeldt, Watts, Holdridge, and Kennedy. Attached was another copy of the first page of this memorandum, upon which Kissinger wrote: "But basically this is Option C-2, or is that wrong? HK."

² Reference is to the analytical summary prepared by the NSC staff for Kissinger as part of the NSSM 63 response. See Document 40.

position on the Subcontinent since 1963 (Tashkent, the loss of Peshawar, etc.) can be related directly to the *increased* freedom which the rivalry gave both the Soviets and the Chinese to pursue their own interests unfettered by their partner's sensitivities.

One can argue in the same vein about Soviet and Chinese moves at our expense in Africa, Latin America, or even in the Middle East. Ideologically cleansed of Peking's radicalism—and thus seeming less ambitious—the Soviets have been able to carry off a much more effective posture vis-à-vis nationalist clients. The Chinese, unencumbered by the Soviet restraints that surely would have been applied in a “concerted” policy, have been able to exploit LDC radicals—such as the Southern African guerrillas, the Fedayeen, etc.—as they might never have done with Moscow tugging at their sleeves. And in so doing, of course, they have sometimes pulled the Soviets along to compete.

NSSM 63 seems to bypass the origins of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Whatever else it may have been, this was also a deep-seated quarrel about the tactics of revolution in the poor countries. Having gone their own ways, each side has been able largely to pursue its own strategy in the LDCs. It doesn't matter if the failure of one is the success of the other. In either case, the results are scarcely to our advantage.

2. *The paper suggests that the Soviet readiness to deal on questions such as SALT or European security is a favorable by-product of the rivalry.* I think this too misses a point about the origins of the dispute. It was the prior Soviet recognition of its great power status, and thus of the necessity for dealing with the US on security issues, that was a major factor in alienating the Chinese in the first place. The motives that bring Moscow to the SALT talks are fundamental to Soviet foreign policy since 1949–50, and clearly pre-date the formal schism with Peking. We only have to ask ourselves if the Soviets would really back-track on SALT, etc. if only the dispute with the Chinese were healed. I have great difficulty believing that—and thus in agreeing that the rivalry per se makes the Soviets easier to live with.

3. *The paper also suggests, though much less explicitly, that the rivalry may have moved the Chinese to a less belligerent posture towards us.* There is no hard evidence of this so far. The paper argues that Chinese propaganda against the US has diminished while it has increased against the USSR. But this is more likely a matter of priority in resources, or an ideological gambit in Chinese domestic politics, than a subtle signal to us (even for the Chinese). To the contrary, it can be argued that the Chinese have stayed with Hanoi, despite the enormous strains of the Cultural Revolution, largely because they would not cede that game to the Soviets. Likewise, Soviet policy in Vietnam since 1965 (when it counted) has been heavily laden with the need to counter the Chinese. Yet again, in any case, the results are unwelcome for us.

The Chinese may still try, of course, to maneuver toward us, and there are recent hints of this (which the paper ignores). But for purposes of policy planning over 3–5 years, we cannot assume this will be anything more than shrewd short-run tactics.

In sum, there are serious doubts about the “advantages” of the rivalry. The feud is certainly one more headache for already throbbing brows in Moscow and Peking. And if one assumes (as I do not) that their pain is always in some way our gain, we can watch with pleasure. But it’s just as certain that we have no worthwhile way to exploit the present rivalry.

4. *NSSM 63 goes on to say that a war between the two would “drastically reduce” their capability to pursue policies against us elsewhere. At the same time, the paper judges that the danger of nuclear escalation would make actual hostilities “disadvantageous” to our interests.* These are not relevant criteria for judging the Sino-Soviet reaction to us in the event of hostilities. The question is not one of “capabilities” to hurt us, but rather how they would calculate their own interests (and our intentions) if they were engaged in a major conflict with each other.

Here the evidence of history argues that the sheer trauma of a war would quickly immerse both parties in their fundamental paranoia about the outside world. Neither would be disposed to rely on mere diplomatic protection of their flanks. The Soviets would: (a) almost certainly tighten the screws in Eastern Europe in a show of fearsomeness, (b) might well do some sabre-rattling and domestic tampering with the Japanese to protect that flank and (c) call in their credit with Hanoi. None of these steps would be in our interest. I find, incidentally, that one of the paper’s most salient omissions is an analysis of Soviet-instigated side-effects vis-à-vis Japan or North Vietnam. A war with China, for example, would certainly deprive Moscow of what little leverage they have on Hanoi regarding the war in South Vietnam.

As for the Chinese, they too would be impelled to secure their flanks by aggressive diversions in North Korea or North Vietnam, inevitably at our expense. There is just no evidence to suggest (and much to the contrary) that a China-confronted by war with the Soviet Union would pause for a moment to try to court the US.

5. *Moreover, the paper fails to explore one of the most likely scenarios in Sino-Soviet hostilities—namely, a Soviet surgical strike on Peking’s nuclear capacity.* That enterprise would undoubtedly add to Soviet prestige in Asia, might make the otherwise insular hacks in the Kremlin dangerously cocky, and would leave us generally on the defensive. The Chinese could respond with an irrational outburst toward Siberia or Soviet Central Asia, but it seems to me more likely that they would choose (as before) the less costly but face-saving course of lashing out anew in Southeast Asia. That brings us unpleasanties I need not describe.

Not that these prospects should lead us to try to broker a reconciliation of Moscow and Peking (though there is an interesting argument that together—squabbling over tactics and doomed to compromise—they may be less formidable opponents).

But I would repeat that NSSM 63 is misleading to the degree it gives the President reason to rub his hands over the Sino-Soviet clash. The bureaucracy seems to view our relationship to the Moscow-Peking rivalry as a classical three-power gambit—in which, as the textbooks tell us, it's smart to back the weaker against the stronger and play for the breaks. It seems to me this misjudges the perception of the world from Moscow and Peking. The only safe assumption on the basis of past history is that heightened rivalry or actual conflict would give free rein to the deepest fear and suspicion in both leaderships, and thus only enliven their common belligerence toward us.

The Policy Question

The real policy question seems to me to proceed precisely from where NSSM 63 leaves off. Our influence on the situation is minimal. Our advantages, even in rivalry short of battle, are dubious. The question for the President is: Can we find any opportunity or peril in the Sino-Soviet rivalry which should compel him to change his distinct policies towards each side—each formulated and conducted for its own reasons? I think the answer must be negative.

However, there are two important corollaries of this policy choice which the paper does not make clear:

—Whatever the scenario in a Sino-Soviet war, the Russians are going to win it. Thus, we should do nothing that jeopardizes our chances for dealing with the Soviets on questions of vital interest to the US in either Asia or Europe.

—And because the actions the President now contemplates vis-à-vis China remain peripheral to the development of the Sino-Soviet quarrel, nothing in that quarrel should deter us from following a sensible relaxation of our posture toward Peking. The Soviets are indeed nervous about these trivial gestures, but we should let them squirm. There is a threshold of Soviet tolerance in our China policy. But we should be clear that we are still far from it. We should continue to consult our own immediate and direct interests (Asian and Pacific) in trying to do business with Peking.

Conclusion

This much said, however, I feel very much the seminar-paper syndrome. These points are worth exploring at the planning level. And it is surely worth telling the President that (a) the rivalry is a mixed blessing, (b) we are trying to cover the contingencies (most of them perilous) of a Sino-Soviet war, and (c) the rivalry is no reason to change his basic policies toward either China or Russia. But beyond that, the exercise is largely academic.

The “options” in NSSM 63 are just unreal, and I have difficulty imagining a full-dress NSC discussion could illuminate the issues in a way practical enough to justify the President’s time.

I suggest the Review Group commission an Information Memo to the President (written here) giving the main conclusions of the study—and let it go at that.³

³ The “Information Memo” was apparently not written.

47. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, November 20, 1969, 3:05–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences (NSSM 63)

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

William I. Cargo

Donald McHenry

Miriam Camps

Defense

Richard A. Ware

Y. L. Wu

CIA

R. Jack Smith

JCS

Rear Adm. Frank W. Vannoy

OEP

Haakon Lindjord

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Davis forwarded the minutes to Kissinger on November 25 under a covering memorandum, in which she noted that Sonnenfeldt and Holdridge had reviewed them. (Ibid.) Cargo also prepared a short report on this meeting. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 63)

USIA
Henry Loomis
NSC Staff
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
John Holdridge
Richard T. Kennedy
Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

1. the problem should be considered by the NSC even though there was no immediate operational decision to be made;
2. for purposes of the NSC discussion, we would distinguish between neutrality on the Sino-Soviet dispute and neutrality in our relations with China and the USSR;
3. the basic paper would be carefully reviewed by the NSC Staff and any proposed restatements would be discussed with the State representatives;
4. following this review, suggestions for handling the paper in the NSC would be discussed with the RG members early next week;
5. if desired, the oral presentation for the NSC will be discussed with the State representatives;
6. the considerations in the Defense Department supplementary paper² will be brought before the NSC in some form or other.

Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting saying that the group was considering a longer range version of the paper considered at the previous Review Group meeting.³ He posed the usual questions: (1) should the paper go before the NSC, and (2) does the paper adequately and properly define the issues—is it what we want to put before the President? He noted that he would return later to the DOD supplemental paper with a view to fitting it in in some way. With regard to an NSC meeting, while there was no immediate operational decision to be made, he thought it would be useful for senior officials to address the problem. His personal recommendation would be for an NSC meeting.

Mr. Cargo agreed that while we had no immediate operational decision, the general situation would not go away.

Mr. Kissinger asked if all agreed on an NSC meeting. All consented. He asked for the views of the group on the way in which the issues are posed.

² A summary of the Department of Defense dissent is printed as Document 41.

³ See Document 36.

Mr. Cargo said that the original paper was considered to be oriented too much on presumptions of U.S. policy although these presumptions were thought to be correct ones. The present redraft had been cast more in the options mold.

Mr. Kissinger asked for views on how the options are stated.

Admiral Vannoy said the JCS had no problem.

Mr. Smith questioned the wording of Option A.⁴ He asked what new opportunities might be open to the Soviets.

Mr. Cargo said that the wording was intended to reflect a Soviet response of displeasure. He thought there would not necessarily be *new* opportunities but that the general fallout of Option A would be Soviet hostility.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the Soviets were not doing anything now that they could do if they became annoyed.

Mr. Cargo mentioned further penetration in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Smith added Berlin, but noted that it was not mentioned.

Mr. Kissinger asked if, leaving Berlin aside, we considered that the Soviets were operating at less than full capacity.

Mr. Smith thought they might intensify activities in Africa and Latin America.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that they could move more actively in other parts of the world.

Mrs. Camps thought, in general, they could agitate more noisily.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the Soviets made more noise, would not the effect be to drive Western Europe more toward the U.S.

Mrs. Camps thought the Soviets would be even more nervous about the situation in Western Europe and would likely review their options in Western Europe with a view to intensifying their efforts. She thought the Soviets would undoubtedly be more concerned about a Western Europe allied with the U.S. in active support of the Chinese.

Mr. Kissinger commented "unless you assume they do not want a Western Europe allied with the U.S. at all." He thought the Soviets were at the maximum of what they can feasibly do. If we actively support the Chinese, the Soviets would undoubtedly be much angrier but he did not know what they could do operationally.

Mrs. Camps thought that they would be more concerned with regard to Western Europe and those countries bordering China.

⁴ Reference is to Option A of Document 40. In abbreviated form, the options were: A. Support China, B. Support the USSR, C.1. Passive neutrality, and C.2. Current policy with more movement toward China.

Mr. Cargo asked if it would help to change the phrase on page 3 of the paper from “increasing their efforts to detach Western Europe from the U.S.” to “increasing their efforts to weaken the U.S. position in Western Europe.” He personally doubted that the Soviets are moving at full intensity.

Mr. Smith agreed this was true worldwide.

Mr. Lindjord thought that the use of “detach” was a problem but said OEP had no other questions on the paper.

Mr. Ware had no comment on this issue.

Mr. Wu thought Soviet reaction would depend on the time and circumstances. He thought the Soviets under pressure, while annoyed, might react in the opposite direction from that indicated in the paper.

Mr. Loomis had no comment on the paper.

Mr. Cargo asked if the revision that he had suggested would meet the concerns expressed.

Mr. Smith thought it would help.

Mr. Kissinger said he had no major problem with this formulation. However, he questioned the posing of the options, commenting that the only realistic option seemed to be C.2. With regard to Option A, he thought the political issues stated were the extremes. To support Chinese border claims would be practically to declare war on the USSR. He thought even to support the moves with regard to the GRC without undertaking the anti-Soviet moves would be pretty extreme. He had no objection to including the Option if it were understood that these were extreme cases. He thought, however, we could have a more subtle policy short of overwhelming provocation of the USSR. If the principals saw Option A as the only version of support for China, it would be too easy for them to reject. The same was true of support for the Soviets. He thought we could find ways of leaning toward the Soviets without taking the view that China is the aggressor or without supporting the Soviets in Western Europe. He found the Soviet case less extreme, however. He thought we could state our support for either side within a framework of a policy that we have no interest in measures that would bring about war. All-out support for China might produce a Soviet preemptive move. If we undertake all-out support for the Soviets, they might take this as a signal for them to take care of China and might then make a preemptive move. He thought we should, for the principals, flag the conditions under which support for either side might produce preemptive action, without at the same time rejecting a policy of support for either side.

Mrs. Camps said that the summary of the options was not adequate and that any paper for NSC consideration must be expanded to reflect the full flavor of the options as stated in the full paper. Each option contains sub-options involving questions of degree. It was difficult to analyze every conceivable sub-option and very hard to define what the limiting factors would be.

Mr. Kissinger noted that the options as stated might always produce an attack on China; it would be very hard to produce an attack on the Soviet Union.

Mrs. Camps thought that Option C.2. leaves room for movement in our relations with China.

Mr. Kissinger recognized the problem and agreed that it would be a mistake to redo the paper to include every conceivable combination of measures.⁵ He thought it would be possible to add some material to define limited cases—that gradations were possible within the statement of consequences. He thought Option C.1. combined the disadvantages of every course and that it would be considered more threatening to the Soviets than to the Chinese. He thought we needed a subtler approach.

Mr. Kissinger moved to the question of the U.S. position in the event of hostilities. He thought it was hard to believe that the Soviets would want more from us than neutrality. Neutrality would, in fact, equal support for the Soviets. Support for China might achieve nothing and might find us backing a losing cause. There was also a question of the limited degree of support we would be willing to give. Anything more than that would require massive activity. He noted statements by the Secretary and Under Secretary of State to the effect that neutrality resulted in support of the Soviets. He admitted that while he understood the question, he did not know the answer.

Mr. Cargo agreed that we were imprisoned by this.

Mr. Kissinger asked what our attitude would be in the event of a Soviet preemptive strike. Would we say “a plague on both your houses”? Would we condemn the move? Would we do more than condemn?

Mr. Cargo thought we would suspend the SALT talks.

Mr. Kissinger surmised that if the Soviets should undertake a preemptive strike against China, they would claim in the SALT talks that they had done our work for us. Should we not resist the principle of such unilateral action even though it might be advantageous to us?

⁵ Following this meeting, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Cargo concerning the response to NSSM 63. He requested that the “Options” section be refined to reflect the discussions held during the November 20 meeting. Kissinger also asked for greater distinction between the United States’ position toward the immediate causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute and attitudes toward the underlying relationship. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Cargo, November 29; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, Review Group Meeting, Sino-Soviet Differences, 11/20/69) The revised version of the report is not in the NSC files. According to the “NSSM Status Reports Prepared by S/PC,” in December 1971, no due date was set for these revisions and “No further action on this study is now likely.” (Ibid., RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters: Lot 73 D 288, NSC Under Secretaries Memoranda, 1971)

Mr. Sonnenfeldt commented that the WSAG had agreed this would set a bad precedent.

Mr. Cargo agreed that the analysis was correct. Since China is the weaker power, a stance of impartiality would be more favorable to the Soviet Union than to China. He thought there were still sensible alternatives. A minor injection of U.S. sympathy and support for China would be ineffective and would only irritate the Soviets. Massive U.S. support of China, with the implication of military support, was not thinkable as U.S. policy.

Mr. Kissinger agreed with Secretary Rogers' television statement that our essential position is and should be one of neutrality.⁶ He asked whether it was not possible within the spectrum of neutrality to carry out policies slightly leaning to one side or the other. He thought the President wished to indicate the existence of a Chinese option although our declaratory policy would be neutrality. He thought opening up certain exchange possibilities would not necessarily mean giving up neutrality.

Mrs. Camps thought this was adequately provided for in Option C.2. The concept is that since one starts with a different relationship with China than with the Soviet Union, actual neutrality would require doing some positive things with China. On the other hand, since we already have some relations with the USSR, it would involve primarily pursuing these relationships in Berlin, SALT talks, etc. We now have relations with the Soviets; we do not have relations with China.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt thought we should distinguish between the question of neutrality on the merits of the Sino-Soviet dispute itself and neutrality on our relationships with each country.

Mrs. Camps thought this had been done in Option C.2.

Mr. Kissinger thought C.2. would make this possible. He noted, however, that the NSC principals would be coming fresh to this discussion. He thought we might handle this concept in the oral presentation at the NSC meeting and offered to discuss this presentation with Mr. Cargo and Mrs. Camps. He thought the other options (A and B) might be stated as extremes without foreclosing the possibility that we could take measures leaning toward one side or the other without becoming involved in the dispute. He thought we could lean toward China but that it would be extremely unwise for us to get into the border dispute. He agreed with Mrs. Camps that there was a question of how one defines neutrality. He thought Option C.2. could be interpreted two ways: (1) stay out of the dispute but pursue U.S. interests with both countries, or (2) stay neutral across the board. Options A and B called either for taking a stand on the dispute or at least leaning ag-

⁶ Rogers appeared on the National Broadcasting Company's *Meet the Press* program on October 12. The transcript is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 27, 1969, pp. 345–350.

gressively toward one or the other side. We could take steps toward China which would annoy the USSR but could still stop short of the big issues. For example, we could promote maximum trade with China without getting involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute—still throwing our weight toward China.

Mrs. Camps thought it would be unrealistic to go very far toward China without some reciprocity.

Mr. Kissinger asked then what was the meaning of Option A.

Mrs. Camps commented that the steps described under Option A would have to be extreme if they were good enough to bring Chinese support.

Mr. Kissinger agreed on the question of reciprocity but thought leaning toward China with reciprocity would be Option C.2. He thought Option A had been stated as an extreme, but was impressed by Mrs. Camps' arguments on the question of reciprocity.

Mrs. Camps reiterated that the summary was not adequate and that the paper should be read carefully. She thought the nuances that Mr. Kissinger sought were present in the paper and that fiddling with the options would not make the issues any clearer. She suggested that the summary be dropped.

Mr. Kissinger said he had skimmed the full paper but had read the summary carefully.

Mr. Cargo thought they could not do much better with the paper if they presented options that are discernible. He thought there was a spectrum of steps toward China and Soviet reaction to them. The lower end of the spectrum of Option A is incorporated in Option C.2.—neutrality but pursuing our own interests. He thought the options were more easily seen at the upper end of the spectrum. For example, some policies under Option C.2. would constitute support for China. He considered the present division of the options not a bad one.

Mr. Kissinger agreed to read the paper carefully, saying he thought all now understood the problem.

Mrs. Camps assured him that the full paper would meet his preoccupations.

Mr. Kissinger agreed to read the full paper and, if he thought any restatements were required, to discuss them with Mr. Cargo and Mrs. Camps. For purposes of the NSC meeting he thought we should distinguish between neutrality on the dispute and neutrality in our relations with China and the USSR. Neutrality on the dispute would not necessarily preclude our leaning toward one or the other. He agreed we could not go far with Option A without reciprocity. If there were such reciprocity this would mean a diplomatic revolution. This might result in our foregoing our neutrality on the dispute—that is, of forcing us to take a position on the dispute itself. He thought this should be stated clearly for the President. On the other hand, support for the USSR would not

result in a revolution of the same magnitude. He agreed that any significant revisions of the paper would be discussed with all RG members.

He then turned to the Defense Department's supplementary paper. He thought this paper was based on a different set of assumptions and in a different time frame. He thought the views of a senior department must go before the NSC for consideration with equivalence to those of other departments. He thought the DOD paper saw certain cataclysmic events taking place beyond the options stated in the paper.

Mr. Ware said the DOD paper went a step beyond the basic paper. He referred to some of the questions on page 4 of the DOD paper which he considered not unrelated to some of Mr. Kissinger's comments. The DOD paper raised the question of how to get concessions from China, given the pressure they would be under. He thought we should not dismiss the possibility that a worse situation might be created on the mainland of China. The DOD paper attempted to explore what should be U.S. attitudes: (1) at the existing level of Soviet-Chinese relations; (2) in the event of a preemptive strike, and (3) in the event of protracted conflict. He said he did not know how these could be blended into the existing paper.

Mr. Kissinger noted the questions raised on page 4 of the DOD paper, commenting that these did not include the question of what unilateral policies we might pursue for our own objectives. What would we expect in return?

Mr. Wu thought we could ask for certain quids pro quo.

Mr. Kissinger asked if it would be in terms of "if we move into Option A, this is what we could expect to get for our position."

Mr. Ware noted, however, that even in a situation of U.S. neutrality the Chinese might fear that we could not remain neutral.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt thought this would depend on their judgment as to what U.S. neutrality means.

Mr. Wu noted that the various options stated would have to be applied within a certain environment of relations between the two countries: the present situation, increased pressures, hostilities, or preemptive strike. They would have to be considered in relation to whether the Soviets had succeeded or not.

Mr. Kissinger thought we could take care of some of the DOD points by expanding the present discussion in the paper.

Mr. Wu thought this would require extensive rewriting.

Mr. Kissinger said an alternative would be to make the DOD supplement an annex to the basic paper.

Mr. Ware suggested that two summary paragraphs be inserted in the summary of the basic paper to note the existence of a supplementary series of comments, then send the supplementary paper forward to the NSC.

Mr. Kissinger said that ideally the paper should have some inter-departmental sanction; however, he could not refuse to let the DOD paper go before the NSC, either as an annex or otherwise. He saw the major thrust of the DOD paper to be consideration of a major war or a possible cataclysmic breakup of China and of the sort of concessions we might get in this situation. He had no problem with a presentation of these considerations. He asked if the question of U.S. policies in the case of major war or cataclysmic changes inside China might not possibly be more useful as a contingency study?

Mr. Wu thought cataclysmic change might include support of a pro-Soviet China without actual war.

Mr. Cargo thought the question was how the DOD paper impinges on NSSM 63 or on the WSAG exercise. He could not say there was no possibility of the occurrence of the conditions described in the DOD paper. He did question whether they were possible enough to warrant the time required of senior people for lengthy analysis. If it was agreed to pursue these considerations, he thought the first step should be to get an intelligence estimate as to their likelihood.

Mr. Ware expressed the view that the Soviets might like to see internal change in China.

Mr. Kissinger asked why the U.S. should support a pro-Soviet government in China.

Mr. Ware asked what we would do under those conditions.

Mr. Kissinger asked what *could* we do?

Mr. Kissinger said that if the Secretary of Defense wishes the paper to go before the NSC it will, of course, go. He thought he owed it to the Defense Department to find a way to integrate the DOD paper as a possible approach.

Mr. Ware offered to sit down with State Department representatives in an attempt to work out means of incorporating or adding the DOD considerations to the basic paper.

Mr. Kissinger thought this would be difficult since the DOD paper operated on different assumptions in a different time frame.

Mr. Smith agreed with Mr. Kissinger that the DOD paper might be considered in the contingency context.

Mr. Ware thought the DOD paper was more than that since one alternative therein dealt with the existing situation between the USSR and China.

Mr. Kissinger agreed to study the basic paper carefully and to come back to the RG members early next week with suggestions for handling the paper in the NSC. He thought the discussion has been useful in clarifying the issues and assured Mr. Ware that the Defense considerations would be surfaced one way or another.

48. **Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, November 21, 1969.

SUBJECT

Warsaw Talks and Taiwan Strait Patrol

State is thinking of using the elimination of the Taiwan Strait patrol as a lever to encourage the Chinese who wish to reopen the Warsaw talks. Prior to the formal pitch we will make at the Ambassadorial talks to the Chinese Communists in Warsaw on our modification of the Taiwan Strait patrol—and as a means of re-starting such talks—State wants to make the same pitch to a Chinese official in Hong Kong [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. A message for your clearance is at Tab A,² [*1 line of source text not declassified*].

State's purpose in this clandestine approach is to reinforce the formal approach, and make sure that Peking gets the message. They say that with the adjustments in ship movements through the Taiwan Strait made to satisfy the GRC about our continued presence there, it might otherwise take a while for Peking to learn of the modification (i.e. suspension) of the Taiwan Strait patrol. (In order to reassure President Chiang, we are routing some fifteen ships a month through the Strait to make up in part for the elimination of the destroyer patrol.)

I assume that, in the formal channel at Warsaw, State intends to make clear that we are not withdrawing from our commitments. (State's purpose is simply to make some political capital out of a decision taken on budgetary grounds; we would not want the ploy to be misinterpreted as a signal of diminished US interest, which could conceivably encourage Chinese Communist pressure against the offshore islands or elsewhere. I shall be sure that you clear any instruction to Warsaw.)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland, Vol. I, Warsaw Talks up to 1/31/70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. According to another copy of the memorandum, it was drafted by Grant on November 21. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Chronological File, Box CL 3, Folder: November 17–30, 1969)

² Attached at Tab A but not printed is a memorandum from Coerr (INR/DOC) to Nelson (CIA), drafted by Thayer (EA/ACA). The message read in part: "the Department requests that you take steps as soon as possible to draw this modification [of the Strait patrol] to Peking's attention. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] a 'rumor' that the U.S. Navy's regularly scheduled patrol of the Taiwan Strait, which previously operated from Taiwan ports, is being discontinued, although U.S. Navy vessels will continue to transit the Strait. The rumor would not include any knowledge of the reason for the modification but would express the view that the move was interesting." Also attached was a draft telegram to Warsaw, Taipei, and Hong Kong, [*text not declassified*].

Although as a general rule I believe we should steer away from gimmickry such as this, I consider that under the confusing circumstances which are developing in the Taiwan Strait it would be advisable to move ahead. The draft telegram has already been cleared all over the place, but unless Under Secretary Johnson discussed it with you directly, the matter was not put to us until the draft actually arrived.

Recommendation

That you clear the draft message at Tab A.³

³ Kissinger initialed the approval option on November 26. An attached handwritten note reads: "Return to Holdridge for action. State not yet informed." Holdridge wrote on the note: "State informed 11/26 2:50 p.m." [*text not declassified*] (Memorandum from Nelson to Coerr, December 3; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country Files, Far East, China, 1969–1970)

49. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Next Moves in China Policy

I believe the time has come to proceed with the remaining measures relaxing economic controls against Communist China, which you approved in principle in June (NSDM-17),² as well as to consider other steps we might take toward China.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL CHICOM–US. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Kreisberg drafted the memorandum on October 6 and sent it under Green's signature to Richardson. On October 23 Winthrop Brown and Morton Abramowitz asked for a shorter, "punchier" version. (Ibid.) In a November 22 memorandum to Rogers, Richardson wrote: "it is very important to move on the attached package right away." He hoped that the measures could be carried out by the end of the year. Richardson emphasized that "Sino-Soviet border talks are still going on. It might prove difficult to move ahead with these measures if the talks break down." He also wanted the measures implemented prior to Chiang Ching-kuo's visit in 1970 and pointed out that "Congress will be moving out for its Christmas recess and our consultation problems will be much reduced." (Ibid.) Green revised the memorandum and forwarded it to Rogers on December 1. He attached a covering memorandum, in which he noted that the memorandum to Nixon had been changed to reflect Rogers' request to delineate more clearly between actions that could be taken immediately and actions that would wait for the resumption of Sino-American talks in Warsaw. (Ibid.)

² Document 14.

—Talks between the Soviet Union and Communist China begin in Peking on October 20. We do not believe that these will result in a fundamental change in the Sino-Soviet relationship. The roots of the ideological dispute will remain, together with a certain level of tension. Although the Sino-Soviet discussions have apparently not gone well thus far, we cannot exclude the possibility of at least a partial rapprochement between the Soviets and the Chinese, which might take the form of some restoration of normalcy in state-to-state relations.

—Our moves may introduce an additional complicating factor into the Soviet leadership's assessment of our intentions towards China—and towards the USSR, as well. Such an effect would also serve our long-term interest of forestalling an eventual more fundamental rapprochement between the USSR and China.

—At the same time, this conjunction of Soviet agreement to negotiations both with China and with us, on SALT, enables us to maintain our posture of non-involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Moves by us at this time in the direction of opening the door towards China a little more can hardly be the object of plausible objections by the Soviet Government when it itself is talking with the Chinese.

—Notwithstanding the ups and downs in Chinese propaganda stridency in recent months, there have been signs of moderation in Peking's foreign policy stance including—in private encounters—toward the U.S. We cannot predict that such steps as I propose would evoke a favorable response from Peking, but the chance that they might now appears to be greater than it has been for some time. Additionally, when the Chinese leadership appears to be in some disarray, we may contribute to a strengthening of those who advocate moderation and thereby continue to move towards a position where we may be able eventually to exert some influence on the Chinese Government in a direction more favorable to our own interests.

—Finally, the steps I propose would serve specific U.S. interests. They would also be useful preliminaries to an attempt by us in the near future to revive bilateral discussions with the Chinese and as further signals that we are interested in continuing to move towards more normal relations.

The Republic of China will object to such moves, but I do not believe this should deter us. These actions would not affect any vital security interest of Taiwan or diminish in any way our existing treaty commitments. They would be consistent with what I have told ROC leaders about our general approach towards Communist China.

If you agree that we should move forward, I would contemplate undertaking the requisite Congressional consultation, preparatory to announcement of changes in regulations.

Treasury concurs that all the actions described below can be taken by executive action and approves of the recommendations.

*Specific Recommendations*³

I have considered the whole range of measures we might take—economic, travel, raising the level of the Warsaw talks, etc.—but at this time recommend the following moves to be implemented in two stages.

a. For implementation immediately:

1. Remove Foreign Asset Control (FAC) restraints on foreign subsidiaries of United States firms on transactions with China regarded as non-strategic by COCOM (approved by you in principle in NSDM-17, June 26, 1969);

2. Eliminate the present restrictions on U.S. business participation in third-country trade in presumptive Chinese goods;

3. Modify slightly your approval in June allowing the noncommercial purchase of Chinese Communist goods by Americans traveling or resident abroad by removing the \$100 ceiling and the requirements that non-commercial imports from China enter the United States as accompanied baggage.

In addition to their political effects on the Chinese and Russians, implementation of these measures would:

—remove a substantial licensing burden on Foreign Assets Control and the general public;

—relieve a number of difficult problems which our Allies have raised pertaining to United States extraterritorial controls on the activities of American subsidiaries abroad;

—not make any commodities available which the Chinese cannot already purchase abroad;

³ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendations, but the NSC staff summarized this document in a 1-page memorandum, which Kissinger initialed and sent to Nixon on December 11. The President initialed his approval of all recommendations and added a handwritten note: "Depending on Warsaw meeting analysis." An unknown person added the notation "12-15/69." A handwritten notation beside Kissinger's signature reads: "Al—Let's move on this. I'll call Richardson." (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, December 11; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III) On December 15 Kissinger called Richardson at 11:50 a.m. to tell him that the President had approved "that proposal on China policy: foreign assistance control; restrictions on US participation in trade and modification of non-commercial purchases. Now how do we implement it?" Richardson answered that it would be done by an announcement in the *Federal Register*. Kissinger asked if could be done by early next week. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) On December 16 Kissinger sent a memorandum to Richardson entitled: "Next Move in China Policy." It reads in full: "The President has approved the 'recommendations for immediate implementation' contained on page 3 of the Secretary of State's memorandum of December 2, 1969, subject: Next Moves in Our China Policy. Implementation of these three steps should be initiated in a low-key manner so as to minimize public speculation on the implication of these moves." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHICOM-US) On December 18 Kissinger and Richardson met to discuss the implementation and public announcement of this policy. In particular Kissinger wanted to review how other nations and members of Congress would be notified. (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, December 18; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 337, Subject Files, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May 1969-December 1969)

—contribute to the competitive strength of American business concerns overseas and respond to strong pressures from foreign branches of U.S. business concerns in several Asian countries to be allowed to compete for third-country business in goods administratively assumed to be of Chinese origin; and

—satisfy the desire of tourists, collectors, museums, and universities to import Chinese products for their own account and rid us of administrative headaches.

b. For implementation following the resumption of our bilateral Ambassadorial talks with the Chinese:

1. Modify the Department of Commerce export control regulations through a general license for the export of food, agricultural equipment, fertilizers and pharmaceuticals (approved by you in principle in NSDM-17, June 26, 1969). This would

—provide an initial opening in the area of non-strategic direct U.S. trade with Peking;

—would not enable Peking to obtain commodities they are not already able to purchase elsewhere;

—would represent only a modest extension beyond the offers to sell grain and pharmaceuticals on an ad hoc basis to the Chinese made during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations; and

—would open up a potential outlet for American farm products (for example, the Chinese Communists have recently expressed interest in purchasing U.S.-produced oilseeds from a large West Coast vegetable oil company through a Hong Kong intermediary).⁴

WPR

⁴ Relevant diplomatic posts were informed of the new regulations in telegram 209491 to Taipei, Ottawa, Tokyo, Seoul, Saigon, Canberra, London, Wellington, and Hong Kong, December 18. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, STR 9–1 CHICOM) A Department of State spokesman announced the changes on December 19. (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 12, 1970, p. 31) The actual modifications to the Foreign Assets Control Regulations are in 34 *Federal Register* 20189.

50. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 9, 1969.

SUBJECT

Letter to President Chiang on Taiwan Strait Patrol

Secretary Rogers has recommended (Tab B)² that you send a brief response to President Chiang's telegraphic expression of concern at our proposal to de-activate the two destroyers which constituted the Taiwan Strait patrol.³

Under Secretary Packard and Admiral McCain reassured President Chiang that the Seventh Fleet will continue to maintain an effective surveillance of the Strait. He withdrew his objections to the removal of the two destroyers.⁴

Subsequent to that exchange, President Chiang has followed up his telegraphic message with a longer letter (Tab C)⁵ which makes clear that

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 751, Presidential Correspondence File, Republic of China, President Chiang Kai-shek. Secret; Limdis. Sent for action. Kissinger's handwritten comment on the memorandum reads: "Send out." A November 24 covering memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger contains a short, handwritten comment by Kissinger: "Can't we go a little farther on the F-4's—Laird has indicated a willingness to proceed." (Ibid.)

² Attached at Tab B is a November 19 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, in which Rogers concludes: "I believe a personal acknowledgment of his message would bring this matter to an appropriate close."

³ Chiang sent a short message to Nixon on November 14 asking that the decision be delayed. (Telegram 4608 from Taipei, November 14; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III)

⁴ A transcript of a November 14 telephone conversation between Laird and Kissinger, reads: "K indicated that the Chinese Ambassador [Chow Shu-kai] came in to see him with a personal letter to President Nixon about the two destroyers which are going off station soon. They understand the problems but they wonder whether we could delay it for 2 or 3 weeks. Laird indicated that this is part of the State Department move toward China. They came in to talk to Laird also. They equate this to a new policy toward the mainland. They are trying to get us to go along with a few F4s for them. They only want to buy 8 or 9 of them. K asked what Laird thought about that. Laird said it was o.k. with him but they want us to make credit arrangements for them. Kissinger added that he has not discussed the issue with the President but agrees with Laird's plan to allow a three-week extension of the patrol." (Ibid.; see also Document 45) Even as Kissinger and Laird discussed delaying the policy change, Packard and McCain were meeting with Chiang (November 15 in Taipei) to explain the plan to de-activate the regular patrol in the Strait. They emphasized that U.S. naval vessels would continue to transit the Strait on a regular basis, and that the de-activation was designed to retire two older destroyers. Packard reported that Chiang accepted their logic on the issue, and the Department of Defense issued orders on November 16 to follow through on the original plan to end the patrol. (Letter from Laird to Kissinger, November 29; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III)

⁵ Attached at Tab C but not printed is the November 19 letter.

he was by no means pleased with the withdrawal. He assumes that “gaps” will be created which will tempt the Communists to attack his sea lines of communications to the Pescadores and the offshore islands.

—On these grounds, he calls for an immediate review of the contingency plan “Rochester.” (This is a plan for the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores within the terms of our Mutual Security Treaty with the GRC.)

He goes on to endorse “Vietnamization” and the concept that the threatened nations should do more to assure their own defense.

—Using this justification, he reiterates the Chinese request for submarines and late-model jets (by implication, F-4s).

We have repeatedly declined Chinese requests for submarines because we do not believe that they would represent an effective use of resources for the defense of Taiwan and they would provide the GRC with a capability for mainland operations which we might not endorse.

We have not programmed F-4s in our MAP program for Taiwan because of the cost. (The issue has been made a current one, however, by a House amendment to the FY71 MAP bill to provide a squadron of F-4s to the GRC; we do not know exactly how the GRC managed to get this one into the hopper.) We *are* proceeding with the upgrading of the GRC air force, and we are presently in the process of offering the Chinese additional F-104s, which will enable them to phase out their remaining F-86s and will give them a fighter force built around F-104s and F-5s.⁶

I think that your reply to the Generalissimo should be friendly, courteous and noncommittal. We should not offer him any hope that by escalating the negotiations to your level he can get the submarines or airplanes he wants, and—given Senatorial interest in contingency plans—we do not want to seem to give too much attention or status to plan “Rochester.”

I believe that, together with your expression of concern about Mme. Chiang’s health which you have relayed through Ambassador McConaughy, President Chiang will get the message: that you remain friendly and concerned about his welfare but disinclined to embark upon a shift of policy to accommodate his desires for more sophisticated arms.

⁶ In a December 3 telephone conversation, Packard and Kissinger discussed the ROC Air Force’s needs and specifically the need for F-104s. Packard stated that “they [the ROC] don’t need them from a military standpoint—they are in good shape there. On the other hand, if we are going to follow the President’s policy of supporting our Allies (they are one of our strongest friends) and it would be a move in the President’s long-range proposals . . . Packard advised that we recommend that we go ahead with it.” (Notes of a telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

The proposed letter has been coordinated with James Keogh.⁷

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to President Chiang at Tab A.⁸

⁷ James Keogh was a journalist with *Time* Magazine before joining the President's staff in 1969.

⁸ Nixon's response, sent in telegram 208044 to Taipei, December 16, reads in part: "I am confident that any questions concerning the details of these new procedures will be resolved satisfactorily through consultations between the Commander, United States Taiwan Defense Command, and your defense authorities. If your defense authorities believe that some modifications of plan 'Rochester' are required by the present situation, the officers of the Taiwan Defense Command will be interested in hearing their views." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6-2 US)

51. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Informing the Soviets of our Talks with the Chinese

I notice that Gerard Smith and Ambassador Thompson proposed that Dobrynin be informed of the resumption of US-Chinese talks before it becomes public knowledge.²

In the last Administration it was standard practice for the State Department to provide Dobrynin with detailed records of the Warsaw talks. This was done at the Thompson and Bohlen level. The idea was to calm possible Soviet suspicions. It was also assumed that the Russians probably had some knowledge of the content of the talks from

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VI. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information.

² Thompson voiced this concern as early as February 7 in a memorandum to Rogers, in which he reported on his meeting with Kissinger and the President: "I told the President I thought we should be careful not to feed Soviet suspicions about the possibility of our ganging up with Communist China against them. In reply to his question, I said I was not referring to his public statements on this matter as the Soviets would understand that we would pursue our national interests. Rather I was thinking of any hints or actions that indicated something was going on under the table." (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12)

Polish monitoring operations and that, therefore, there was no harm in providing them with the full record.

I believe that as a matter of style, and consistent with our general approach to the Soviets and the Chinese Communists, this practice of the last Administration should not be resumed in this one. I assume that you will want to call this to the attention of the Secretary of State.³

³ Haig wrote “Absolutely” and his initials after this paragraph, along with the following comment: “Hal [Sonnenfeldt]—Rogers called HAK, agreed completely with your psn [position] and he’s even volunteered this psn—HAK ran by Pres—and confirmed in writing. Copy attached.” Attached was a December 12 memorandum from Kissinger, informing Rogers “that under no circumstances should we inform Dobrynin of the talks or their content. If Dobrynin questions, we should respond with nonchalance that they concern matters of mutual interest but not go beyond that. The President is concerned that lower-level offices not go beyond this in informal conversations.” (Ibid., POL CHICOM-US) On December 13 the President told Kissinger that the Warsaw talks, as well as any talks with the Soviet Union, “ought to be handled on a confidential basis.” Kissinger later observed: “I don’t care about these talks [Warsaw talks]; we don’t have anything to talk about anyway.” The President replied: “we all know that, but the Russians aren’t going to believe we didn’t have [*say?*] anything, and the Chinese will believe we are playing them off against the Russians.” (Notes of a telephone conversation, December 13, 12:59 p.m.; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

52. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Taipei, December 17, 1969, 4:30–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECTS

1. Exposition of U.S. China Policy
2. Changes in Seventh Fleet Patrol of Taiwan Strait
3. Miscellaneous Matters

PARTICIPANTS

President Chiang Kai-shek
Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis. The meeting was held at Chiang’s residence in Shih Lin. Drafted by McConaughy on December 30, passed to Green, who then forwarded it to Kissinger, who in turn sent it to the President. Kissinger wrote, “it would appear that McConaughy faithfully reproduced your ideas to President Chiang.” Kissinger added that he had authorized Green to “make limited dissemination of the MemCon in State, on a need-to-know basis, in the belief that the document will have a useful educational effect in acquainting the appropriate officers in State as to the tone and thrust of your China policy.” (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, February 17; *ibid.*)

PRESENT BUT NOT PARTICIPATING

Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming
 Mr. Fredrick F. Ch'ien, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, North American Bureau
 (Interpreter)

This was my first call on President Chiang, made at my request, following my return to Taiwan on December 8 after an absence of three and a half months.

I conveyed the warm greetings of President Nixon to President and Madame Chiang, together with his cordial expression of good will and sympathetic interest. I recalled President Nixon's active concern at the injury which Madame Chiang sustained in the auto accident of mid-September, and described the particulars of President Nixon's offer of U.S. medical assistance in the person of the noted American neurologist, Dr. Riland.² President Chiang expressed cordial appreciation for President Nixon's manifestations of interest and goodwill and voiced particular thanks for the kind offer of assistance in the medical treatment of Madame Chiang. He thought it would be unnecessary to accept the kind offer in view of Madame Chiang's favorable current rate of recovery, but he said he would like to consider the offer as still open in case of later need to accept it. I assured him it was a standing offer.

My principal purpose in arranging the call was to set forth for President Chiang the substance of an oral message from President Nixon in regard to U.S. China policy, which the President outlined to me in the course of my call on him at the White House on November 15, 1969.³ President Nixon instructed me to set forth this general U.S. position to President Chiang on an appropriate occasion after my return.

1. U.S. China Policy.

I told President Chiang that President Nixon had summarized to me his views on certain policy matters related to China, and had instructed me to convey the substance of what he had said to President Chiang upon my return.

I then set forth for President Chiang in summary form, and in conversational manner, a paraphrase of President Nixon's observations, along the following lines:

Mainland China. The U.S. Government remained thoroughly aware of the threat to the entire East Asian region posed by the Chinese

² During their November 15 meeting in Washington, Nixon asked McConaughy to make Chiang and his wife aware of the availability of Dr. R. Kenneth Riland, an osteopathic physician. McConaughy subsequently relayed this offer to Taipei. (Telegram 195779 to Taipei, November 21; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 CHINAT)

³ No substantive record of the November 15 meeting between Nixon and McConaughy has been found. The President's Daily Diary indicates that the meeting lasted from 12:30 to 12:51 p.m., with the last few minutes devoted to photographs taken by members of the press corps. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

Communist regime, and did not intend to pursue any policy which would enhance its capability for making trouble for its neighbors or for the rest of the world. The U.S. was not changing its attitude of vigilance or its posture of readiness to carry out its commitments in the area. At the same time, the USG believed that it had an obligation to take every practicable and prudent step to lower tensions in the area, and to implement in this part of the world the announced general Administration policy of endeavoring to substitute negotiation for confrontation. We wanted peaceful relations with all parts of the world and we wanted to avoid unnecessary provocation. In this era effective contacts with all great areas and peoples of the world aimed at creating a larger measure of understanding are an imperative necessity. In this spirit, we are making earnest efforts to establish a worthwhile dialogue with the Peiping regime. If the efforts should bear any fruit, it might take the form of a resumption of the Ambassadorial-level talks at Warsaw or elsewhere. In an effort to improve the atmosphere, we have made certain modest relaxations in the restrictions on trade and travel of American citizens in relation to Mainland China, and certain additional relaxations can be expected to follow. It is by no means certain that the Chinese Communists will react in any affirmative way to these limited gestures. In fact, it is only realistic to anticipate continued rebuffs from the Chinese Communists. Nevertheless, our efforts to improve the climate and to bring about a better and safer relationship with the Mainland will continue. We will carry forward this effort within the limits of prudence and national self-respect.

We are explaining this policy to the GRC with full candor, recognizing that President Chiang and his Government have a major interest therein which entitles them to a full exposition of our objectives. We believe that he will understand our motivation, recognizing as he does the greatness and the inescapable influence on the whole world of the vast Chinese population on the Mainland, and the need for effective communication between it and the outside world. We cannot be confident that any type of dialogue we may be able to establish with the Peiping regime will have any moderating effect on it, or be of any direct benefit to the mass of the Chinese people on the Mainland, but the possibility of some eventual influence of a beneficial nature cannot be entirely ruled out. In any event, we are determined to continue the search for serviceable contacts, and we feel it is right and appropriate for President Chiang as a friend and ally to be fully aware of the nature and the purposes of this policy.

Republic of China on Taiwan. The other facet of our China policy has to do with the Republic of China on Taiwan. President Nixon wants President Chiang to be assured in the most positive and explicit terms that the United States stands by its mutual defense commitment to the Republic of China and that nothing related to the search for better Mainland China relations will dilute that commitment. The U.S. Gov-

ernment is steadfast in its policy of strong support for and close association with the Republic of China and wants those close ties maintained and reinforced, not only in the defense area, but also in the political, economic, and cultural fields. He has expressly charged his Ambassador to the Republic of China with the responsibility for preserving and nurturing this close relationship in all its aspects. Furthermore, President Nixon has instructed the Ambassador to state on his behalf to President Chiang that in his view no aspect of our Mainland China policy impinges upon or is prejudicial to any essential interest of the Republic of China. President Nixon entertains the hope that President Chiang can accept this policy exposition with the confidence that in no respect is it inimical to the Republic of China and that it will not interfere with constructive and collaborative development efforts by our two governments in an atmosphere which we hope will be less shadowed by threats of aggression from the Mainland.

By way of further reassurance to President Chiang, I spelled out what our Mainland posture does *not* signify: (1) It does not mean that we are extending diplomatic recognition to the Chicom regime or facilitating its international acceptance; (2) It does not mean that we are lowering our defensive guard in any sector where we have a defense responsibility; (3) It does not mean that we believe there is evidence of a real change in the nature of the Chinese Communist regime, or that the Chinese Communist regime can be trusted; (4) It does not mean that we are abandoning any of our basic principles in our search for means of lessening the dangerous tensions in the East Asia region.

The President listened to the presentation intently, with apparent deep concentration and without interruption. At its conclusion, he reflected for a few moments and then simply said that he was reassured to have the confirmation that there would be no change in the U.S. policy of strong support for the Republic of China.

2. *Modification of Seventh Fleet Patrol of Taiwan Strait.*⁴

After the foregoing discussion of China policy, the President made mention, with some satisfaction, of the visit to Taipei of Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard on November 15.⁵ In that connection, reference was made to the suspension of the regular patrol of the Taiwan Strait by two destroyer escorts attached to the U.S. Seventh Fleet. The President noted that he had felt a considerable degree of concern at the U.S. decision, especially in view of the dangerous misinterpretation of the withdrawal which might be drawn by the Chinese Communists. He indicated his concerns had been partially, but not entirely, allayed

⁴ See Documents 34 and 50.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 50.

by the explanations and assurances given him by Deputy Secretary Packard and CINCPAC Admiral McCain.

I told the President that my meeting with President Nixon in Washington had taken place on the same day as his talk with Deputy Secretary Packard and Admiral McCain. The matter of the modification of the Seventh Fleet patrol of the Taiwan Strait had come up at that White House meeting, and President Nixon had asked me for a summary of the reasons for the Republic of China's objections to the change, as I understood them. I said I had given President Nixon a summation of the GRC position as I understood it, based on my general knowledge and on my conversation of a day or so before at the State Department with visiting Admiral Feng, CinC of the Chinese Navy.⁶ I said I had stressed the GRC view that the Chinese Communists would be likely to get the wrong signal from the modification, probably misconstruing it to mean a lessening of U.S. interest in the defense of the area. The consequence of such a misconstrual, in the GRC view, might be an unwitting encouragement to the Chicoms to take new and bolder steps of an aggressive nature in the Taiwan Strait area, including attacks on GRC vessels plying between Taiwan and the offshore islands. I told President Chiang that President Nixon had thereupon authorized me, upon my return, to assure the ROC Government that the slight alteration in the orders to individual ships of the Seventh Fleet were dictated purely by reasons of economy. There was no change in the role, mission or responsibilities of the Seventh Fleet and, of course, no change in our defense commitments. Nor would there be any change in our capability to carry out our commitment. President Nixon had further stated that there was naturally no U.S. intention to afford any cause for misunderstanding by the Chinese Communists. The U.S. was interested in lowering tensions and risks to peace, not in heightening them. President Nixon had told me that I could inform the representatives of the GRC that if the Chinese Communists took advantage of this U.S. administrative modification of patrol arrangements and resorted to attacks on Republic of China shipping in the Taiwan Strait area, the U.S. Government would certainly take cognizance of such an unjustified act. President Nixon indicated that he would not let any unwarranted and unprovoked Chicom attack on the Republic of China shipping in the Taiwan Strait go unnoticed. (N.B. I carefully refrained from specifying or indicating in any way what sort of reaction or cognizance President Nixon might have in mind.)

⁶ McConaughy met with Admiral Feng Chi-chung, Commander-in-Chief of the ROC Navy, on November 14 to discuss the Taiwan Strait patrol and the ROC's request to purchase submarines. (Memorandum of conversation, November 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6-2 US)

I further noted the arrangements that had been made for a material increase in the aggregate number of transits of the Strait per month by ships of the Seventh Fleet. Most of the vessels of the Fleet moving in a north/south direction would transit the Strait rather than travel along the East Coast of Taiwan. As a result, there would probably be more actual transits of the Strait by Seventh Fleet vessels, and a more thorough naval observation of the Strait under the new procedure than when the two DE's were on regular patrol. President Chiang indicated his appreciation at the receipt of this information. He seemed more relaxed about the patrol situation than he had been at the beginning of the discussion.

3. *Miscellaneous Matters.*

Brief exchanges took place on the following topics, as mentioned in Taipei telegram 5098 of December 18:⁷ Request for F-4 aircraft, forthcoming visit of Vice President Agnew to Taiwan,⁸ and USG invitation to Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo to visit the U.S.⁹

⁷ Not printed. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 CHINAT-US.)

⁸ Vice President Agnew visited Taiwan in early January 1970. Records of Agnew's conversations with ROC leaders are *ibid.*, Conference Files, 1966-1972, CF-421, Vice President Agnew's Trip, December 1969-January 1970.

⁹ In telegram 2144 from Taipei, June 13, McConaughy had proposed a visit by Chiang Ching-kuo in the late summer or early fall of 1969. The response from the Department of State, with the concurrence of DOD and CIA, telegram 103272 to Taipei, June 24, noted that it would be difficult to schedule a visit in 1969. (Both cables are *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 913, VIP Visits, Visit of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo of China, April 21-23, 1970, Vol. I) In September the Department of State proposed to Kissinger that Chiang Ching-kuo come to the United States in February 1970. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, September 15; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 CHINAT) Kissinger approved the trip in October. (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, October 17; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 913, VIP Visits, Visit of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo of China, April 21-23, 1970, Vol. I) However, in late 1969 Department of State and White House officials confronted the problem of finding a date for Chiang Ching-kuo's visit that did not come too close to U.S.-PRC talks in Warsaw. In late February 1970 McConaughy was asked to extend a formal invitation for Chiang to visit on April 20-23. (Telegram 26985 to Taipei, February 23 and telegram 29573 to Taipei, February 27; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 CHINAT) Chiang Ching-kuo accepted in early March. (Telegram 971 from Taipei, March 5; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 913, VIP Visits, Visit of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo of China, April 21-23, 1970, Vol. I)

53. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 20, 1969.

SUBJECT

Memorandum from Secretary Rogers on Handling of Warsaw Talks²

Secretary Rogers has sent you the memorandum attached at Tab A, reporting that he looked into the question of the wide dissemination given to our Warsaw contact with the Communist Chinese.³ He reports that our Embassies in Tokyo, Taipei, and Moscow, and our Consulate General in Hong Kong were kept informed because of their special interest in the matter, but under the same injunctions about public comment as were placed on the Department's spokesman in

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland, Vol. I Warsaw Talks up to 1/31/70. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² In early December, based on instructions he had received at his September 9 meeting with the President and Kissinger (see Document 31), Stoessel approached the interpreter for the Chinese Chargé at a diplomatic reception organized by the Yugoslav Government and commented that President Nixon wished to open "serious, concrete talks with Chinese." (Telegram 3706 from Warsaw, December 3; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 US) On December 10 the Chinese Embassy telephoned the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw to suggest a meeting be held the next day. (Telegram 3744 from Warsaw, December 10; *ibid.*, POL CHICOM–US) On December 11 Stoessel went to the Chargé's residence (the Chinese Ambassador to Poland was not in the country), where he told Chargé Lei Yang that the meeting "provides an opportunity to begin exploring whether some improvement in our bilateral relationship may be possible." He suggested a formal meeting for the week of January 12–16, that Chinese and English be the languages used for the talks, and that they alternate between embassies rather than meeting in a "neutral" Polish venue. He also made clear that the United States was open to moving the talks to another city. (Telegram 3760 from Warsaw, December 11; *ibid.*) The President was informed of each step by Kissinger through the daily briefing memoranda. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Boxes 15 and 16, President's Daily Briefs)

³ Attached at Tab A was a December 18 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, responding to Nixon's concerns about "wide dissemination of the Warsaw contact." (*Ibid.*, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland, Vol. I Warsaw Talks up to 1/31/70) Kissinger had relayed the President's concerns to the Department of State and ordered that all telegrams on the Warsaw talks and "all public statements, press releases or references" to the talks or relations between the United States and PRC be cleared by the White House, and that "there should be no explanation to the Soviets with respect to our talks with the Chicoms nor should there be any speculation as to their reaction to these talks." (Memorandum from Kissinger to Eliot, undated; *ibid.*) In a December 15 telephone conversation, Kissinger told Richardson that "I thought, and so did the President more so, that the Warsaw talk was handled very poorly from that point of view. We spent months setting it up and it gets buck-slipped to half the embassies in the whole world. The less we say the better off we are." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 104, Under Secretary of State, Telephone Conversations, December 1969)

Washington. (This was to limit comments on the substance of the meeting to the statement that “matters of mutual interest” were discussed.)

State informed the Governments of the Republic of China and Japan in advance of the meeting in general terms. The Secretary says that President Chiang was informed as a matter of necessary courtesy, and Prime Minister Sato was notified in order to work out with him the best means of handling public comment after the meeting became public knowledge. In fact, the Secretary says, there was no leak in either capital.

In addition, the Governments of Australia and the U.K. were briefed in confidence along the same lines very shortly before the announcement. Canada, France, Italy, and New Zealand were similarly briefed after the meeting.

The Chairman of the SALT delegation was notified on an eyes only basis that the meeting would take place. The State Department disagreed with his suggestion that the Soviets be informed in advance.

VOA and the Voice of the United Nations Command were instructed not to relay speculative comment appearing in the press, but to stick only to official statements on the subject.

The Secretary argues that despite these instructions, it has been impossible to stop public speculation and public conclusions as to the probable content of the talks. The report of Reuters that the Department spokesman said that resumption of talks had been discussed is simply untrue and is being taken up with Reuters. The Secretary notes that he will continue to clear all cables on the subject with the White House.

54. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

Word from China through Pakistan

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK Trip to China—December 1969–July 1971. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

The Pakistani Ambassador came in with a report on a recent exchange between President Yahya and the Chinese Communist Ambassador in Pakistan.²

President Yahya early in November had called in the Chinese Ambassador to tell him the impressions he had gained in his talk with you in August and also to report our intentions to withdraw two destroyers from the Taiwan Straits.³ Basically, his message was that the U.S. is interested in normalizing relations with Communist China.

Early this month, the Chinese Ambassador returned to President Yahya after having heard from Peking. He told President Yahya that the Chinese appreciate the Pakistani role and efforts. He added that, as a result, the Chinese had released two Americans a few days before. [This apparently refers to the two yachtsmen released by the Chinese.]⁴

Ambassador Hilaly asked whether there was anything of more precise substance that I could give him to be discussed when Chou En-lai visits Pakistan. He said that no date for this visit had been set yet.

I made these two points:

1. When a date is settled for the visit, I would pass on to him something more specific which President Yahya might say.

2. The Pakistanis could, however, pass along the following word to the Chinese: We appreciate this communication which Ambassador Hilaly had brought. We are serious in our desire to have conversations with the Chinese. If they want to have these conversations in a more secure manner than Warsaw makes possible or in channels less widely disseminated within the bureaucracy, you would be prepared to do this.

Ambassador Hilaly indicated that he would send this message back to President Yahya.

I will consult with you in greater detail when we learn that a date has been set for Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan.

² The conversation between Hilaly and Kissinger was held in Kissinger's office on December 19. The memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*

³ See Document 20.

⁴ Brackets in the source text. Two Americans were detained by local Chinese authorities after straying into PRC territorial waters off the coast of Kwangtung Province near Macao on February 16, 1969. They were released on December 7. PRC representatives informed the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw on December 7. (Telegram 3724 from Warsaw; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-4 CHICOM) In his December 8 daily briefing memorandum for the President, Kissinger remarked that their release "culminates a series of low-key Chinese moves clearly intended to signal us—and probably the Soviets—that they are interested in greater communication with us." (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 14, President's Daily Briefs) Chinese sources had claimed that the release was in response to the relaxation of trade restrictions, ending the Taiwan Strait patrol, and U.S. opposition to Soviet suggestions for joint action against the PRC. (Jin Zhongji, ed., *Zhou Enlai zhuan (A Biography of Zhou Enlai)* (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushe, 1998), p. 2046)

55. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Another Meeting with the Pakistani Ambassador on China

Last week Ambassador Hilaly came in to report an exchange which President Yahya had had with the Chinese Communist Ambassador in Rawalpindi.² President Yahya had conveyed his impression, based on his talks with you in August, that the US is prepared to normalize relations with Communist China.

After reporting that to Peking, the Chinese Ambassador returned to President Yahya and told him that the Chinese appreciated Pakistan's role and efforts in conveying that message. It was reported to Ambassador Hilaly that, "as a result," the Chinese had released two Americans. This apparently referred to the two yachtsmen released recently.

This week,³ the Ambassador said that he had received a more recent personal letter from President Yahya asking the Ambassador to convey to you the two following sentences:

1. "It is our assessment that the Chinese appear willing for the resumption of talks at Warsaw at the Ambassador level without insisting on preconditions."
2. "Quite apart from the public renunciation of the recent agreement between the US and Japan, the Chinese are greatly concerned over it and see in it the revival of Japanese militarism which will threaten not only China but the whole of Southeast Asia."

I told the Ambassador that we appreciated these communications and would be in touch with him when the date for Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan had been set in order to pass on something more specific for President Yahya to say.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China—December 1969–July 1971. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Saunders forwarded this memorandum to Kissinger on December 24 for transmittal to the President.

² See Document 54.

³ Kissinger met with Hilaly on December 23. The memorandum of conversation is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China—December 1969–July 1971. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 2.

At the same time, Ambassador Hilaly delivered to me a very brief note from President Yahya to you conveying his government's "thanks for your prompt response to meet the food situation in East Pakistan."⁴ He said that "this timely action will help us in improving the food situation and bringing down food prices in East Pakistan." He closed saying that he valued "your keen interest in Pakistan's development effort." You will recall in mid-October approving shipment of grain to help bring down food prices in East Pakistan.

⁴ Attached but not printed is Yahya's December 4 note.

56. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 27, 1969.

SUBJECT

Sino-Soviet Relations

Attached are extracts from a perceptive CIA analysis of current Sino-Soviet relations.² The report indicates, inter alia:

—Peking admits being forced into border talks and believes Soviet efforts to improve relations with the West are part of preparations for "dealing" with China.

—Peking's campaign of civilian "war preparations" is designed to deter a Soviet attack as well as promote national unity and unpopular domestic programs.

—Moscow will continue military pressure along the frontier and pursue diplomatic efforts to isolate China.

—Peking will remain the vulnerable and defensive party and seek to improve its international diplomatic position.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1006, Alexander M. Haig Chronological File, Sino-Soviet Relations. Secret; Sensitive. Notations on the memorandum indicate that it was to be taken to San Clemente and that the President saw it.

² Attached but not printed are extracts prepared in the White House. Although there exist a variety of reports from the CIA concerning Sino-Soviet relations, none was found in the files that corresponded to the following extracts.